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ABSTRACT 
 The fight against terrorism and organized crime require strong collaboration between 
public security organizations. Public security networks include several agencies that are not 
bound to each other with strong hierarchical ties. Because of a lack of the strong hierarchical 
structure, managing public networks is not similar to managing a single government agency. 
This study aims to examine the factors influencing network effectiveness in the public security 
sector. The main research questions of the study are: Which factors are important for 
effectiveness in public security networks? What is the role of inter-organizational trust among 
partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the highest performance in public 
security networks? What is the relative importance of goal convergence and organizational 
culture in network effectiveness? How does the relationship between inter-organizational trust, 
leadership style, goal convergence and organizational culture impact network effectiveness? In 
order to find these relations, a self-reported survey was sent to 2,095 current and previous 
Turkish public security network managers. The study found that inter-organizational trust and 
goal convergence have a positive relationship with network effectiveness. Although facilitator 
leadership is found to be the most common leadership style in Turkish public security networks, 
it is found as inappropriate to achieve higher network effectiveness. According to the results, the 
co-producer network leadership is the most convenient leadership style in terms of network 
effectiveness. While the results of the descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of 
organizational culture in public security sector have negative influence on network effectiveness, 
the hypothesis testing with the covariance structure model only support the negative impact of 
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competition among partner organization. This study contributes to the literature on network 
effectiveness with particular proposals for the public security managers and practitioners. 
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
Because of increasing challenges of terrorism and organized crime, governments 
establish various new organizations to fight against different aspects of these problems. This 
enlargement generates a complex public security network system.  Managing this complicated 
network is different from managing and leading any single public organization. This study looks 
at the network effectiveness in the public security sector. An effective collaboration is 
recognized as one of the most important requirements of the successful struggle against terrorist 
and organized crime networks. 
The main goal of the study is to examine the impacts of latent variables, which are inter-
organizational trust, network leadership style, organizational culture, and goal convergence on 
network effectiveness in public security networks. The study contributes to the existing literature 
on network effectiveness in general, and public security networks in particular. The study uses 
network theory, resource dependency, and inter-organizational social capital perspectives as 
theoretical constructs and aims to create a conceptual framework among the study variables. 
Local public security networks in Turkey are selected as the case of the research to analyze 
relations between the variables. 
This introductory section provides overall information about the statement of the research 
problem and its significance, research questions, background of the study, and theoretical 
concepts. 
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1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Terrorism and organized crime are challenging problems for governments in today’s 
world. In order to overcome increasing difficulties in public security areas, governments are 
trying to find alternative solutions. Numerous agencies are tasked to fight against these “wicked 
problems” in different countries. In this complicated public security system, it is crucial to set a 
mutual goal among responsible agencies, to make a precise evaluation of risk, to establish a 
technical infrastructure, and to create organizational policies and processes that provide 
flexibility and conformity to continuous incidents. It is also important to establish “a culture that 
accepts inquiry and information sharing” for better coordination, and to develop “a systematic 
program to increase adaptiveness and capacity for learning between governmental agencies” 
(Comfort, 2002, p. 100). 
Turkey has been suffering from terrorism and organized crime for the last three decades. 
Because of its location, Turkey has a vital point for transnational criminal organizations. In 
Turkey, five main public agencies are working to prevent and fight against terrorism and 
organized crime. These are the Police Forces, the Gendarmerie, the Coast Guard, the national 
intelligence, and the armed forces. In addition, many other agencies are needed to be involved in 
this network at different stages. An effective resistance to these problems requires a continuous 
collaboration among these intuitions. 
 Security has been a “problematic and contentious area in the Turkish administrative and 
political system, due to the structural, functional, and organizational significance of the security 
sector within this system and to the autonomous and leading role that the security sector plays” 
(Akay, 2010, p. 5). When we look at the Turkish recent history, big failures, conflicts and 
sometimes clashes can be seen among Turkish security organizations. 
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In recent years, two significant failures can be given as examples of a lack of robust 
collaboration. Two car bomb explosions killed 51 people in the Reyhanli district of Hatay 
province on 11 May 2013. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan indicated the problem of 
disconnection between police forces and national intelligence service Milli Istihbarat Teskilati 
[MIT] as the reason of the incident three days after  the explosion (Radikal, 2013). The problems 
in the collaboration among security agencies have caused some tragic mistakes as well. In 2011, 
a military air operation killed 34 smugglers who were allegedly mistaken for terrorist 
organization the PKK members. This incident occurred across the Turkish-Iraqi border near 
Uludere district in Sirnak Province. The Turkish Parliamentary Human Rights Committee report 
claimed that the main reason behind the Uludere incident was the lack of coordination between 
military and security officials (Turkish Grand National Assembly Human Rights Inquiry 
Committee [TGNAHRIC], 2013). 
This research aims to identify the factors that affect the success of collaboration among 
agencies in local public security networks. A robust collaboration between security agencies is a 
significant prerequisite of the effective struggle against terrorism and organized crime. Trust 
among network partners, effective network leadership, organizational culture and goal 
convergence are identified as the factors that affect the success of collaboration and network 
effectiveness. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
Current public administration literature emphasizes the significance of trust in the public 
sector, but there are a few empirical studies that investigate the function and conditions of trust 
in collaborative public management.  Trust has an important role as a cohesion element that 
ensures the maintenance of a fruitful partnership among dissimilar members in a network 
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(Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Trust can reduce transaction costs and facilitates collaboration 
(Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, & Mischen, 2011). Trust also increases the performance and problem 
solving capacity of the public management networks (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
It is impossible to prevent all problems, conflicts, and clashes among such big 
organizations having thousands of members that have to work together. Network leadership has 
two important functions in the public security sector related to building and sustaining trust and 
managing collaboration between agencies. First, leaders should facilitate sharing information and 
remove barriers from information flow. They are also supposed to develop the ability of the 
network to make successful joint operations against crime and terror groups. For effective 
information sharing, leaders should assign what needs to be shared, because this task needs to be 
accomplished by those who can see the broader picture. Leaders should be able to develop 
mutually shared criteria and design process rules about information sharing and joint operations. 
Healthy information flow and successful joint operations increase trust among partners, but they 
also require trust among partners.   
Second, leadership provides accountability and transparency. Actions and operations of 
the security agencies should be monitored by the leadership. In this sensitive environment, it is 
important to establish an accountable structure among and within the agencies for building and 
sustaining a meaningful collaboration. Partners and their members should be sure that violation 
of the rules and misconducts will be dealt with severely and penalized. Agencies should 
demonstrate to each other that they will not try to cover mistakes of their members by conducting 
fair and transparent investigations. Performance measurement is also another important aspect of 
this function. 
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Organizations are social structures pursuing specific common goals which cannot be 
achieved by individual effort (Pfeffer, 1997). The open system perspective of the organizational 
theory emphasizes the organizations’ interdependent structure, complexity, and environment. 
Dependence on resources, labor, external knowledge and information are important points that 
ensure different organizations work together (Scott & Davis, 2006).  
Secrecy, self-protection, and competition among agencies are problematic features of the 
organizational culture of the public security sector that complicate information sharing 
(Christensen & Crank, 2001). Various studies indicate that police culture has significant impact 
on both performance and information sharing in policing (Fraser, 2004; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 
2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). The general environment is important to 
understand and direct organizations. The characteristics of organizations’ ecology should be 
known to provide a more proper response to demands and challenges (Scott &Davis, 2006). 
Without taking into account these features, it is impossible to introduce an effective network 
structure. 
This study examines network effectiveness in the public security sector. Assessment of a 
single organization’s effectiveness is not adequate, if the results cannot be easily ascribed to the 
facilities of the organization. When the outcomes are contingent on the joined and coordinated 
activities of various different organizations, the effectiveness should be evaluated at network 
level (Provan & Milward, 1995). Network effectiveness has come to be used to refer to the 
network level achievements which cannot be accomplished easily by individual organizations 
that are working alone (Provan & Kenis 2008). 
 An effective collaboration is recognized as one of the most important requirements of the 
success in wars on terror, and organized crime networks. Inter-organizational trust, network 
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leadership, goal convergence and organizational culture are identified as the key variables of 
network effectiveness. The following research questions are addressed in the study: Which 
factors are important for effectiveness in public security networks? What is the role of inter-
organizational trust among partner agencies? Which kind of leadership style will achieve the 
highest performance in public security networks? What is the relative importance of goal 
convergence and organizational culture in network effectiveness? How does the relationship 
between inter-organizational trust, leadership style, goal convergence and organizational culture 
impact network effectiveness? 
This study contributes to earlier studies on the network effectiveness in public security 
networks. Although earlier studies have examined network effectiveness in public service 
delivery networks, little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of networks in the public 
security sector. This study addresses this issue by studying the impacts of latent variables which 
are inter-organizational trust, network leadership style, organizational culture and goal 
convergence on network effectiveness in public security networks. The study uses network 
theory, resource dependency theory, and inter-organizational social capital perspectives as 
theoretical constructs and aims to create a conceptual framework among addressed variables. 
Turkish local public security networks are selected as the case of the research to analyze 
relations between the variables. 
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1.3 Context of the Study 
In this section, some necessary information related to the Turkish administrative system, 
governorship system, and public security system will be briefly presented to provide a better 
understanding of the subjects and the logic of the dissertation. 
1.3.1 Turkish Administrative System 
Turkey is ruled by parliamentary system of government in which the government derives 
its legitimacy from the parliament. The Turkish constitution is based on the principle of 
separation of powers. The three branches in Turkey are legislature, executive, and judiciary.  
While the legislative power is used by the elected Grand National Assembly, the judiciary power 
is attributed to the independent courts, and the executive power is held by the President of the 
Republic and the Cabinet. The Prime minister is the head of the cabinet and ministers in the 
cabinet are accountable to the Prime Minister. 
 Two main principles of the administration, central administration and decentralization, 
are implemented simultaneously in the Turkish Administrative system. Therefore, it is aimed to 
establish a balance between powerful integral unity and meeting the specific common needs of 
local inhabitants (Gözübüyük, 2005). Government institutions in Turkey can be separated into 
two types which are central administration and local administration institutions.  
Local Administrations can be divided into two main categories, geographical local 
administrations, which are local governments, and functional local administrations. According to 
article 127 of Turkish Constitution, local governments are: 
Public corporate bodies established to meet the common local needs of the inhabitants of 
provinces, municipal districts and villages, whose principles of constitution and decision-
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making organs elected by the electorate are determined by law. The formation, duties, 
and powers of the local administrations shall be regulated by law in accordance with the 
principle of local administration. 
Three types of local administrations are municipalities, special provincial administrations, 
and villages. The decision making bodies of local administrations are elected by the people and 
they have certain degree of financial and administrative autonomy. Functional local 
administrations are highly specialized public institutions that deliver specific public services, 
such as social security, highways or postal services outside the central administration. The 
hierarchical supervision of the central government on functional local administrations is limited 
(Tortop, 1994; Gunday, 2003; Keles,2000). 
Public Security organizations are organized under the authority of central government. 
The central administration delivers public services across the nation. The central administration, 
which is also called general administration, involves the President of the Republic, the Prime 
Ministry, ministries, other related government institutions and local branches of these 
organizations in districts and provinces. According to the principal of central administration, 
public services are provided from the capital under a hierarchical structure. The central 
government makes all necessary political, administrative and economic decisions related to 
public services from planning to implementation. The capital administration manages revenues 
and expenditures of the public services (Kapucu & Palabiyik, 2008) 
Centralization strengthens unity and integrity of public organizations, helps to deliver 
equal level of public services across the entire country, provides greater opportunities to 
overcome economic inequalities among different regions, and reduce the negative influence of 
local pressures on public officials (Gozubuyuk, 2003). However, the principal of centralization 
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cannot be implemented strictly in such a big country. Centralization often generates unnecessary 
complexity, bureaucracy, red tape, and inefficient public service. Determining local needs from 
the capital may not be appropriate to identify the real situation. It is also not encouraging for 
democratic participation (Gunday, 2003).  
1.3.2 Governorship System  
In order to moderate the negative consequences of centralization, The Turkish 
Constitution embraced a specific type of centralization that is the principle of devolution of 
powers (Kapucu & Palabiyik, 2008). It is described in the Article 126
 
as follows: 
In terms of central administrative structure, Turkey is divided into provinces on the basis 
of geographical situation, economic conditions, and public service requirements; 
provinces are further divided into lower levels of administrative districts. 
The administration of the provinces is based on the principle of devolution of Powers. 
In the Turkish administrative system, there are 81 provinces in Turkey and each province 
is then subdivided into smaller districts. Province governors are the head of the province 
administration and responsible for the proper functioning and coordination of the public services, 
security, and well-being of their jurisdiction.  
The principle of devolution of powers empowers province governors to make and execute 
decisions on certain issues on behalf of central government. The province governorship is the 
only official position that has the privilege to take advantages of the principle of devolution of 
powers. Each ministry and other public agencies in the capital administration can devolve their 
authorization, tasks, financial resources and responsibilities to the province governors. Provincial 
branches of each central government agency work under the direct command, supervision and 
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responsibility of the province governors. The budget of public services provided by the 
governorships on behalf of central government agencies are met by the central government and 
income obtained from these services goes to the central government.  
The current reference law for the governorship system is “The Law on Provincial 
Administration” (No. 5442). Province governors are appointed by the central government and 
accepted as the central government’s highest agents in their jurisdictions.  Province governors 
are selected, upon a proposal from the Ministry of Interior, by a decree of the Cabinet and the 
approval by the President (Article 6).  The province governors are accepted as the representative 
of the state and the government in the province, the agent of each minister, and their 
administrative and political execution instrument. They are accountable to each minister for 
organizing and supervising the general administration of the province. The ministers can give 
orders and instructions to governors related to the works of their ministries. The governor has 
authority to supervise and inspect all state offices, establishments and enterprises, private 
businesses, special administration, municipality and village administrations with the exception of 
the judicial and military organizations (Article 9). 
The governors are also the superior of all general and special law enforcement agencies in 
their provinces. They are supposed to take necessary steps to create a safe environment in their 
jurisdictions, protect public order and security and to prevent crime. Law enforcement agencies 
are obliged to immediately fulfill the orders issued by the governor (Article 10). 
The provinces are subdivided into districts and district administrations are run by the 
district governors. As opposed to province governorships, district governorship is a career job. 
The central government can appoint anyone who is graduated from elementary school as a 
province governor. On the other hand, in order to be a district governor, people are required to 
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graduate from certain faculties of the universities, such as public administration, law or business 
administration. Eligible applicants are chosen from a competitive elimination process that 
involves written and verbal exams. Since the province governorship is recognized as a type of 
exceptional public servants, the law did not seek a long list of qualifications for the province 
governors.  However, the province governors are usually appointed among the district governors. 
A district governor can also be appointed as a province deputy governor, administrative senior 
inspector and Interior Ministry high and middle level bureaucrat after working for a specific time 
period as district governor. 
The district governors are accepted as the representatives of the government. They are 
responsible from the general administration of the district. The district governors are also the 
superior of all general and special law enforcement agencies within the boundaries of the district 
(Article 32). 
1.3.3 Public Security System in Turkey 
Turkish public security networks involve five main public agencies. Three of those 
organizations are law enforcement agencies. Now we are going to look at important members of 
the public security network.  
1.3.3.1 Law Enforcement Structure in Turkey 
There are three main public organizations: the Police Forces, the Gendarmerie and the 
Coast Guard that constitutes law enforcement in Turkey. All these agencies are headquartered in 
Ankara and work under responsibility of the Ministry of Interior. Law enforcement agencies are 
recognized as central government bodies and receive their funding from the general budget 
through the Ministry of Interior. Law enforcement agencies have two main types of duties. The 
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administrative duties involve activities to ensure and maintain the public order and security, and 
prevent crime facilities. Administrative duties can be defined as proactive and preventive 
measures. Governors have a strong authority to direct and supervise the administrative duties of 
law enforcement. Law enforcement agencies carry out judicial duties when a crime is committed. 
Judicial duties are related to execution of judicial services to investigate crimes, to collect and 
keep evidences and catch offenders. Law enforcement agencies work with the public prosecutors 
with regards to their judicial duties. 
The Turkish Police Force (the General Directorate of Security) with more than 200,000 
employees is the largest law enforcement agency that is responsible for urban areas, and 
organized under the Ministry of Interior. The general director is the highest rank in the national 
police and usually selected among province governors. The local branches of police forces, 
which are province and districts police departments, work under direct authority of province and 
district governors. The police departments work under a subordinating chain of command. There 
are various functional divisions of departments such as terrorism, narcotics, organized crime, 
patrol or traffic departments (Caglar, 2004).  
The Gendarmerie is a military law enforcement agency and works in rural areas. 
Similarly, the Coast Guard is a military law enforcement agency and responsible for maritime 
security. Theoretically, the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard also perform under the control of 
governors and district governors, but civilian authorities have limited power on both military 
agencies. They operate under the Ministry of Interior in peace times, but in practice they operate 
under the directives of the Armed Forces General Staff.  Civilian oversight and control 
mechanisms on the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard are weak. While governors and district 
governors are authorized to discipline police officers who violated the administrative rules, they 
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have limited direct authority over the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard. Civil authorities have 
limited power on appointment, promotion and relocation of the Gendarmerie and the Coast 
Guard officers. 
1.3.3.2 The Turkish National Intelligence Organization [MIT]  
The Turkish National Intelligence Organization [MIT] is Turkey’s main intelligence 
agency. Differing from numerous other intelligence agencies, the MIT has authority to perform 
external and internal intelligence activities. The MIT works under the direct control of the Prime 
Minister and province and district governors have almost no official power on it. The MIT has 
local offices in the provinces and in some big districts. In current structure Governors have 
almost no formal power on the provincial offices of the National Intelligence Service. Law 
enforcement agencies and military forces have their intelligence departments as well.  
1.3.3.3 The Turkish Armed Forces  
The Turkish Armed Forces consists of the Land Forces, Naval Forces, Air Force working 
under the General Staff. The Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard Command, which operate under 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs in times of peace, is a part of the Turkish Armed Forces. It has 
direct and indirect influence on domestic security.  
The most important task of the armed forces related to terrorism and organized crime is 
about border protection. Since the army is responsible for borders, military units need to inhibit 
illegal entry of all kind of materials and members of crime groups. Because the Gendarmerie and 
the Coast Guard are also military organizations, the army has an indirect effect on law 
enforcement facilities. Military units also involve fighting against terror groups in some 
mountainous regions, and also through cross border operations and air patrols.  
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Governors’ power on local armed forces units is weak. Governors do not have a 
hierarchical power on military units. However, according to the Law on Provincal 
Administration (No 54442), if governors see that existing law enforcement forces are not 
adequate to protect public security and order and prevent crime, they can call for help from the 
nearest military unit. Military units have to immediately fulfill the request from the governor. 
The commander of the military unit decides the size and the placement period of the requested 
force in coordination with the governor according to the characteristics of the incidents. In this 
situation; governors make necessary cooperation and coordination between the law enforcement 
agencies and the military units after taking the views of the commander of the supporting 
military unit (Article: 11). 
1.4. Terrorism and Organized Crime 
Terrorism and organized crime are two significant safety problems of Turkish 
Government. Turkey has been suffering from various terror groups from left wing to right wing 
that have various purposes. Separatist terrorist organization, the PKK, left wing terrorist 
organizations such as the DHKP/C, MLPK TIKKO,  and Hezbollah –not Lebanon based but 
Turkish Hezbollah- that has been exploiting religion are main terrorist organizations in Turkey. 
The PKK has been the most challenging problem of Turkey for more than 30 years. 
 Turkey also has a critical location for organized crime groups, since it is a vital transit 
line between Europe and Asia. Narcotics trafficking, human trafficking, trafficking in illicit 
goods, counterfeiting, and money laundering are the main activities of organized crime groups. 
Terrorist organizations also perform these illegal activities, or act together with organized crime 
groups to find economic resources. The profit of these organized crime activities is the main 
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financial source of the PKK and other terrorist organizations. The instability in Turkey’s 
neighbor countries, Iraq and Syria, provide permanent bases for crime groups.  
In order to fight these problems a strong collaboration is necessary among different 
agencies in the security sector. 
This chapter provided the statement of the problem, the purpose of the study and a brief 
background about the Turkish security system. The following chapter examines existing 
literature about the study constructs. 
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CHAPTER 2- LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a review of literature on previous research studies with regards to 
the variables selected for the study. First, the concept of public security network is examined. 
Second, theoretical background and relations between the study variables which are network 
effectiveness, inter-organizational trust, network leadership, organizational culture and goal 
convergence are summarized. Finally, network perspective, resource dependency theory and 
inter-organizational social capital are introduced, since they are used as the key theories to 
inform the research study. Finally a conceptual framework of the study is presented in this 
section. 
2.1 Public Security Networks 
Terrorism and organized crime are intricate and challenging problems for governments 
especially for the last three decades. Although terrorism is a concept difficult to define precisely, 
it refers to “a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear, carried out by an organization, and 
devoted to political ends” (Jenkins, 1974, p. 2). It is frequently considered as violence directed 
against civilian targets in a method to get more attention for certain objectives (Jenkins, 1974). 
Organized crime is defined in the Omnibus  Crime  Control  and  Safe  Streets  Act  of  1968 as 
“the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organized, disciplined association  engaged  
in  supplying  illegal  goods  and  services.” 
The rise of globalization, increasing information sharing, communication opportunities, 
and more open borders provide crime structures to perform illegal activities in easier ways 
(Cronin, 2002; Wagelly, 2006). Illegal networks have benefited from weaker government 
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agencies, and the reappearance of ethnic and regional conflicts. Expanding financial markets, 
rapidly advancing technology, and other improved global opportunities have also been exploited 
by transnational criminal organizations (Wagley, 2006).  
In addition, terror and crime groups shift their traditional frameworks into dark networks. 
Some of those organizations “expanded the size and importance of networks already imbedded 
in their traditional hierarchical organizations, whereas others evolved from a networked group 
into a more complex horizontal design” (Dishman, 2005, p. 238). Dark networks need flexible 
organizational frameworks that provide ability to adjust rapidly to altering pressures from 
governments and other rivals to stay alive (Miliward & Raab, 2003; Demiroz & Kapucu, 2013). 
The transformation of hierarchical organizations to illegal networks causes a special challenge 
for public security agencies.  Decentralized structures increase illicit organizations’ 
independence and complexity. Public security institutions need to follow numerous small cells of 
various kinds of crime networks. Cells of these networks usually work autonomous from the core 
of the network, and members do not know other cells’ members and support systems. This 
sophisticated system obstructs law enforcement agencies and intelligence services to find 
evidence of relations between core of the network and cells, and between different cells of the 
illegal network (Dishman, 2005).  
Kenney (2007) examines how drug trafficking and terrorist networks constantly adapt to 
the counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism programs. Because of continuous competitive 
adaptation in clandestine networks, apparent success of government forces is not usually long-
lived. Illicit networks improve “their activities in response to practical experience and technical 
information, store this knowledge in practices and procedures, and select and retain routines that 
produce satisfactory results” (p. 3). Continuous organizational learning  and building skills in 
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trafficking and terrorist systems make  it more challenging for security organizations to  
eliminate their illicit adversaries (Kenney, 2007).Terrorist and organized crime networks are also 
thought to increasingly support each other for financial resources and improving activity 
capability. Transnational criminals participate in a range of illegal events, such as human, drug 
and arm trafficking, forgery, money laundering, and corporate fraud and other fiscal crimes 
(Wagley, 2006). 
Governments need to focus on many issues to deal with those complicated dark networks. 
Because of increasing challenges in this sophisticated environment, governments establish 
various new organizations to fight against different aspects of the problem. This challenging 
struggle has caused an increase in the number of responsible public institutions and organizations 
as well as international organizations. This enlargement generates a complex public safety 
network system. An effective struggle with this wicked problem requires using multi-
jurisdictional task forces from different public security organizations. Managing this complicated 
network is different from managing any single public organization. Although its power and 
ability is higher (Finckenauer, 2007), network structure requires special knowledge for effective 
management.   
In order to achieve an effective struggle in this complicated environment, it is important 
to establish “a shared goal among the participating units; an accurate assessment of threats to the 
system; a technical infrastructure that effectively supports system operations; organizational 
policies and procedures that enable flexible adaptation to dynamic events by the participating 
units; and a culture that accepts inquiry and information sharing” (Comfort, 2002, p. 100). 
Without an effective collaboration, organizations in the public security sector may duplicate their 
limited resources. Uncertainty may lead potentially dangerous conflicts between organizations. 
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Collaboration increases organizations’ legitimacy that enables people to think that they are 
entitled to be deferred to and obeyed (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). An effective struggle against 
complicated dark networks necessitates promoting strong collaboration. 
Collaboration among law enforcement officials and between other public security 
agencies is not an easy issue. A high competition between public security organizations 
negatively affects competition. Agencies and their members compete among each other to gain 
credit for successful investigations. One of the leading reasons why security agencies and their 
members keep information within their own jurisdiction is this competition. Another reason is 
the necessity to suggest evidence of successful investigations for justifying bigger budgets for 
future assignments. Differences or disputes between law enforcement, prosecutors and 
investigating magistrates also take place frequently. A key factor for achievement in 
investigating complex criminal cases is learning to work together in agencies’ respective spheres 
of jurisdiction. Therefore, the management of every law enforcement organization and other 
public security intuitions should accept the necessity of a process of collaboration with other 
agencies, whether in the same country or abroad. This process is required to be established 
starting from high level officials and spreading to lower levels of the agencies, as well as across 
sectors (Buscaglia & González, 2006). Establishing such an effective collaboration requires a 
high level of trust and intense effort for building and sustaining collaboration among these 
organizations. 
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2.2 Network Effectiveness  
This part of the study discusses network effectiveness. It begins by providing a brief 
overview of the concepts of accountability and performance evaluation in public administration. 
It then focuses on performance evaluation in networks, and in particular for public security 
networks. 
2.2.1 Accountability and Performance Evaluation 
Accountability can be “defined as the obligation to give an account of one’s action to 
someone else, often balanced by a responsibility of that other to seek an account” (Scott &Davis, 
2006, p. 242). The traditional model of accountability in the public sector generally focused on 
bureaucratic and political accountability and is based on politics administration dichotomy. 
However, the traditional model is too narrow to meet the requirements of modern public 
administration and the dichotomy is usually accepted as unrealistic.  Its emphasis on errors rather 
than achievements has been increasingly criticized for not being very efficient and effective 
(Hughes, 2012). 
 Behn (2001) classifies accountability based on the reasons of accountability and 
identifies three types of accountability: “Accountability for finances,” accountability for 
fairness,” and “accountability for performance.” Behn indicates “accountability dilemma” that 
refers to a trade-off between those accountability types. Providing accountability for finance and 
fairness require compliance with rules.  These attempts may usually hinder accountability for 
performance, or accountability for performance may lead to an omission of accountability for 
fairness and finance. Therefore, it is very difficult to provide all three types of accountability 
simultaneously (Hill & Lynn, 2009; Hughes, 2012). 
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 Romzec and Dubnic (1987) made a different classification “based on source of control 
over an agency’s action: whether it originates within or outside the organization and the extent of 
that control” (Hill & Lynn, 2009, p. 291). They delineated four types of accountability that are 
legal, political, bureaucratic, and professional accountability. Bureaucratic accountability is 
based on hierarchical relations in which expectations are built on organizational directives. Legal 
accountability focuses on the rule of law and expectations are managed through obedience to 
external commandments. Professional accountability promotes expertise. Expectations are based 
on respect for specific judgment and expertise. Finally, responsiveness is the fundamental value 
emphasized in political accountability. Expectations are required to be reactive to other 
stakeholders (Romzec & Dubnic, 1987; Romzec &Wallace, 2000). 
Result-oriented public service is a key issue that represents the transition from traditional 
public administration to public management approach (Hughes, 2012). Today, performance 
accountability and performance management are key topics for not only scholars but also for 
public service practitioners. Organizations need to identify their successes and failures and 
develop new ways that make public service programs perform better. The main challenge in 
performance based management is performance measurement. Organizations have different 
performance perspectives related to their targets and goals. Introducing a fair measurement 
system that successfully measures all different aspects of public agencies, programs, or 
employees is not an easy issue.  Although performance evaluation is a critical concept in 
administrative science, the numbers of empirical research studies related to network performance 
evaluation are few in the public administration literature.   
  
22 
 
2.2.2 Performance Evaluation in Networks 
Network effectiveness can be defined “as the attainment of positive network level 
outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual organizational participants acting 
independently” (Provan & Kenis 2008, p. 230).Managing accountability is one of the most 
significant and challenging aspects of the network theory. Network management must work hard 
to achieve that each partner in the network would complete their responsibilities. Otherwise, free 
riders would damage the collaboration in the network (Milward & Provan, 2006). 
 On the other hand, performance evaluation in a network is not an easy task. There are 
various challenges. Consensus among partners to decide about performance criteria may not 
always be possible. Some partners may not be eager to be evaluated, since they have doubts 
about their performance and their capacity. Partners may be reluctant on performance evaluation, 
since they think that circumstances beyond their control may negatively affect their performance. 
Focusing some specific points may lead to neglecting some other significant goals which are 
more difficult to evaluate. Lastly, it is necessary to be clear about “who should be accountable to 
whom and for what results” (Page, 2004, p. 592). 
Provan, Fish, and Sydow (2007) argue that each network and each field in which a 
network perform have exclusive performance evaluation measures. These measures differ 
according to the purpose of the network. However, the network literature discusses some 
significant factors that may contribute the network effectiveness. Some of those factors are goal 
convergence among network partners, network structure, network resources, leadership style, 
internal and external legitimacy, the strength of the ties among members, inter-organizational 
trust, power differentiation, balance between stability, and flexibility (Popp et al., 2013).  
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Mandell and Keast (2007) categorize networks as cooperative, coordinative, or 
collaborative networks. Traditional measurement methods can be suitable to evaluate 
performance of cooperative and coordinative networks, since members of those kinds of 
networks preserve their independent entity. However, one of the most important characteristics 
of collaborative networks is partners’ interdependence to achieve common goals. Traditional 
measurement instruments are insufficient and incorrect to evaluate the collaborative activities 
among partners in the network.  
In the United States, intelligence activities are conducted by numerous organizations: The 
Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Coast Guard 
Intelligence, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of Homeland 
Security, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Drug Enforcement Administration, 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Marine Corps Intelligence, National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, National Security Agency, and Navy Intelligence 
consist of the intelligence community (Intelligence Community, 2012). In addition to these 
agencies, local and state police departments carry out intelligence activities. As the number of 
the intelligence agencies increases, the need for cooperation between these agencies also 
increases (Odabasi, 2010).   
The 9/11 Commission reported that the main reasons of failure on September 11 were the 
lack of collaboration, “limited capacity to share information among agencies”, and “perceived 
legal barriers to sharing information” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States, 2004, p.18). The 9/11 Commission emphasized the need to institutionalize 
information-sharing. Fusion centers were developed to ease information-sharing across agencies. 
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The national government pressured agencies “within fusion centers to work together and share 
information to prevent future large-scale terrorist attacks” (Lewandowski, 2012, p. 44). 
Lewandowski argues that in addition to building the physical structure and placing 
everyone under a new roof, establishing a new culture and environment to encourage the free 
exchange of information are important for effective information- sharing in fusion centers. A 
shorter distance between the employees of different agencies facilitates to share information, but 
more importantly this helps to break down the wall of secrecy among agencies.  Working in the 
same workplace eliminates the physical separation among the employees of fusion centers. It 
also helps to keep “everyone on an equal power status, regardless of the agency they represent. 
By allowing all of the members of fusion centers to experience their workspace as one of 
seemingly equal status for all, the flow of information becomes primarily horizontal, rather than 
vertical” (Lewandowski, 2012, p. 45). 
There has been no empirical assessment about the accountability and performance 
assessment of fusion centers in Criminal Justice research (Carter & Carter, 2009). However, 
Carter and Carter (2009) suggest four measures to evaluate the effectiveness of fusion centers. 
According to them, the first measure of the achievement in fusion centers is “whether more 
information is being shared among law enforcement agencies at all levels of government” 
(p.1336). The second measure is “the ability to collect, retain, and disseminate information while 
protecting civil rights and privacy” (p. 1336). The third measure suggested by Carter and Carter 
is “whether the information and intelligence disseminated by the fusion centers have resulted in 
the prevention, mitigation, and control of crime and terrorism” (p. 1337). The last measure is 
“whether a fusion center is cost-effective, which is extremely difficult to measure and so 
involves some value judgments” (p. 1337).  
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Although it is generally accepted that traditional performance evaluation and 
accountability tools are not appropriate for especially collaborative networks, there is not a 
generally agreed upon method for evaluating network performance. The logic model and social 
network analysis are briefly introduced in this paper.  While the logic model emphasizes the 
relations between network processes and outcomes, network analysis focuses on the 
effectiveness of a network as a whole by examining inter-organizational relations and 
networking. 
2.2.3 The Logic Model for Network Performance Evaluation 
Logic model can be used to evaluate the effectiveness of public security networks. 
Herranz (2010) introduces a logic model framework in order to conceptualize network 
coordination and performance. A logic model includes “identifying key elements and indicators 
in four areas: (a) inputs (e.g., resources, investments), (b) activities (e.g., services, processes, 
strategies, methods), (c) outputs (e.g., tangible products delivered by a program), and (d) 
outcomes (e.g., expected changes in the short, medium, and long term)” (p. 62). 
According to Herranz (2010), a logic model may be helpful to assess network 
effectiveness. It conceptually simplifies complex interrelationships, develops measurable 
performance indicators, and identifies the intermediate outcomes of inter-organizational 
processes. By making hypothesized relations between network processes and outcomes, a logic 
model may delineate how a network initiative will achieve end outcomes explicitly. He presents 
the logic model framework as a stepping stone toward relating coordination and performance in 
the planning, implementation, and evaluative reporting of networks. 
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Figure 1. Logic Model: Outcomes Sequence Chart with Indicators. Adapted from Herranz, 2010. 
Figure 2 depicts a logic model to evaluate performance of public security networks. The 
number of agencies’ employees, their equipment, the budget and other costs are indicators of 
resources. The number of documented meetings among the representatives of the participant 
organizations, the programs and services employed by the network, and the informal meetings 
are indicators of the network activities. The short term output indicator of a public security 
network is the amount of shared information among member agencies. If the network has been 
successful in increasing the information being shared, the short term goals would be met. If the 
expected increase is not found, the reason behind the issue should be examined. The ability to 
collect and use information and the number of joint operations carried out with the cooperation 
of the member agencies are intermediate outcomes of the network. The long term success 
indicators of the network are the amount of terrorist attacks or criminal activities prevented as a 
result of the collaboration, the number of cleared unsolved crime and terrorist cases, and the 
number of terrorist or criminals captured or killed by means of the collaboration. Each step 
should be separately examined, the reasons of the failure should be identified, and necessary 
updates in terms of network structure, process strategies, programs or other settings should be 
applied. 
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Figure 2: Logic model of performance measures for the public security network 
2.2.4 Inter-organizational Relationships in Networks 
A collaborative network usually involves partners from different areas and different 
backgrounds with various interests. Trust and relationships among partners are significant 
indicators of the effectiveness of the collaborative network. Inter-organizational relations can be 
used to measure network performance. Individual organizations constitute collaborative 
networks, but the effectiveness of any one organization in a network cannot indicate the 
effectiveness of the network. Although individual successes may be significant to the head of an 
organization represented in the network, these successes do not by themselves illustrate success 
of the network. Mandel and Keast (2007) emphasize distinguishing characteristics of 
collaborative networks. According to them, measures of performance  should involve the degree 
to which linkages among members are tight or loose, the degree to which members are 
 
  
28 
 
committed to the collective goals rather than to just their own organizations, the degree to which 
all relevant parties are included in the network, the type of formal and informal rules agreed 
upon, the degree to which participants are open in their communications with each other, and the 
degree to which the network is supported by key actors both inside and outside  the network 
(Mandel & Keast,2007). In this perspective, they conclude that building trust and taking risk 
have critical importance for effective collaborative networks. Social Network analysis can be 
used to examine the inter-organizational relations in a collaborative network (Kapucu & 
Demiroz, 2011; Hu, Knox & Kapucu 2014; Kapucu, & Hu, 2014; Kapucu, & Garayev, 2014) 
2.3 Inter-organizational Trust 
This part of the study discusses inter-organizational trust in networks. Before proceeding 
to examine inter-organizational trust, it will be necessary to provide a brief overview of the 
concept of trust in general. 
2.3.1 Trust 
Collective actions in a group create social capital that improves “the ability to work 
together for mutual productive gain” (Fountain, 1998, p. 104). Inter-organizational social capital 
is necessary for disparate groups to work together with sharing resources seized by individual 
organizations. Trust is an important element of social capital together with “norms”, and 
“operations of the network” that are closely linked to the values and purposes of the individual 
members (Agranof & McGuire, 2001). 
Ostrom and Ahn (2002) identify trust as an independent and non-reducible factor that 
determines the achievement or failure of collective action within a community and a main tie 
between social capital and collective action. It is not a type of social capital, but it is an output of 
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social capital. They define trust as “a particular level of subjective probability with which an 
agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action” ( p. xvi). So 
it can be said that the trustor takes a risk of loss in a collective action since there is a probability 
that the trustee may not perform the anticipated action. However, trust provides an enhanced 
opportunity for trustor and trustee to reach their shared goals. While this is a significant incentive 
for even selfish individuals, networks that have natural intentions to behave cooperatively with 
others need trust as a precondition for expected outcomes (Ostrom & Ahn, 2002). 
              Apart from the risk, other dominant characteristics of trust are vulnerability and 
expectations. When someone trusts another, “he or she is willing to assume an open and 
vulnerable position. He or she expects the other actor to refrain from opportunistic behavior even 
if there is the possibility to show this behavior” (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007, p. 29). The notion of 
trust involves a constant expectation about others that they have coherent purposes and 
motivations to his or her objectives (Lane & Bachmann, 1998).  Trust diminishes volatility, 
sophistication, and vagueness in teamwork, since a partner can assume the other’s conducts, 
actions and performances (Zucker, 1986).  
 2.3.2 Inter-Organizational Trust in Networks  
Networks need cohesion elements that enable separate organizations to work together, 
because of the absence of direct and powerful authority and hierarchy (Agranoff, 2007). Trust is 
one of the most crucial elements that hold a network together. Other cohesion factors suggested 
by the literature are ‘common purpose,’ ‘mutual dependency,’ ‘resource availability,’ ‘catalytic 
actors,’ and ‘managerial ability’ (Agranof & McGuire, 2001). 
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Another important function of trust is reducing transaction costs and facilitating 
collaboration. Informal relationships among individual organizations help to reinforce network 
bonds and allow some new joint actions (Isett et al., 2011). The power of those links enables 
transactions, since trustworthiness facilitates for both buyers and sellers the decision to trade. 
When these links are absent, both parties would need to use complicated and costly bonding and 
insurance procedures, or they will give up the transaction (Coleman, 1988). 
         Trust also helps to enhance the performance of collaboration via increasing innovation and 
problem-solving capacity. Organizations must exchange their specialist information and 
capabilities in order to learn and create new solutions for complex problems (Fukuyama, 1995). 
If they have a high level of trust and confidence in each other, this situation provides a 
continuous flow of information and enthusiasm to exchange knowledge. Consequently, the 
performance of collaboration is enlarged (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
Although the significance of trust is generally accepted in constructing networks among 
different actors, it is not easy to evaluate its effect on inter-organizational cooperation.  
Individual trust among two boundary spanners is different from “inter-organizational trust where 
a boundary spanner in one organization trusts the other organization (but not a particular 
individual)” (Brass et al., 2004, p. 803).  Even though ties may be initiated by interpersonal trust, 
the success of collaboration depends on the inter-organizational trust (Zaheer, McEvily, & 
Perrone, 1998).  
Interestingly, prior networking and close ties may lead to an adverse risk.  Organizations 
can get excessively entrenched in a specific network they have participated in, and endure the 
relation with others due to the solid links between boundary spanners. Over embedded partners 
may lose fruitful opportunities with other organizations (Brass et al., 2004).  Too much trust may 
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lead to unhealthy situations in a network. For example partners may think that all partners 
consider themselves to be similar. This leads to a kind of “blind trust” in which partners have a 
lack of concentration and checks and balances. This blurred situation causes misunderstandings 
about what the parties agreed on and distrust may unexpectedly flourish. Hence, a specific 
amount of distrust may be better for ensuring a continuous motivation in a network environment 
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
2.3.3 Building and Sustaining Trust in Networks 
Trust is generally accepted as a prerequisite for productive collaboration. But in practice, 
the presence of trust among partners in a network could possibly be an ideal condition.  The 
prevalent exercise seems to be that often partners do not have the luxury to select other partners 
to collaborate with. Instead, enacted (e.g. government) policies and sometimes the pragmatics of 
the conditions force partners to collaborate, even though trust is weak.  Hence, trust building 
between partners should be carefully taken into consideration (Huxam, 2003). 
The starting point conditions of collaboration can either simplify or make difficult 
cooperation among organizations in a network. For example, organizations may have an earlier 
history of bitter division or damaging competition, problems of disbelief, disregard, and outright 
abhorrence. These problems must be defeated for a fruitful collaboration. On the other hand, if 
organizations have a history of an earlier partnership and reciprocal esteem, cooperation may still 
be challenging, but it would be easier than the first case. Ansell and Gash (2008) discuss 
important initial conditions: power or resource imbalances of participants, different incentives of 
participants for collaboration and the past history of conflict or collaboration. If participants have 
important power/resource imbalances, effective network collaboration can succeed through “a 
positive strategy of empowerment and representation of weaker or disadvantaged stakeholders” 
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(p. 553). If participants have different alternatives to realize their goals, their perception of 
interdependence is a critical condition of successful collaboration. Past history of conflict is a 
significant barrier “unless (a) there is a high degree of interdependence among the stakeholders 
or (b) positive steps are taken to remediate the low levels of trust and social capital among the 
stakeholders” (p. 555). 
Vangen and Huxham (2003) find a pragmatic way to answer the question of “how trust 
can be built and sustained.” They suggest the following themes as to be the practitioners’ 
approach to deal with the problem: “Have clarity of purpose and objectives; deal with power 
differences; have leadership but do not allow anyone to take over; allow time to build up 
understanding; share workload fairly; resolve different levels of commitment; have equal 
ownership and no point scoring; accept that partnerships evolve over time” (p. 15).The 
significance of communication and information sharing are emphasized as core elements in 
building trust (Hu & Kapucu,  2014). But these themes are not very helpful in practice, since 
each of them carries its own problems in the application phase (Vangen &Huxham , 2003). 
Trust has a significant relation with obligation and expectation in social capital (Coleman, 
1998).  Fiduciary obligations are necessary in keeping networks together since common belief is 
not enough for trust. Trust requires obligation and expectation. According to Ferguson and 
Stoudand (1999) such expectation is related to  four trust dimensions: “participant motives, not 
exploiting or betraying purposes; competency, possessing the knowledge and skills to do what is 
expected; dependability, holding the necessary resources; and collegiality, showing respect and 
fairness” (p. 44). 
Individual organizations are held together by mutual dependence such as technical 
knowledge, information, equipment, and human or financial resources. The obligations and 
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expectations related to trust among partners are established after a reasonable time period. This is 
even true for competitor partners (Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Vangen and Huxham (2003) 
argue that trust is built through a cyclical trust-building loop. Although partners do not have a 
history of ties, they need to take a risk and initiate the collaboration.  Reach a sufficient level of 
trust to take the act of faith requires starting the cycle. In this way, expectations about the 
intended outcome are formed. After this first small step, some modest level of achievement 
reinforces trust among partners. Such success becomes part of the history of the relationship and 
improves the collaboration. The enhancing trust also increases a possibility that partners will 
have more ambitious expectations and undertakings from the network in further steps. The 
improved trust decreases a perception of risk for the next phases of the collaboration. Although 
collaboration may start with the absence of trust, ultimately trust becomes an essential piece of 
future achievement (Vangen & Huxham, 2003). 
Similarly, Ansell and Gash (2008) argue that intermediate outcomes are important for 
trust building in a network. Even if partners would not recognize themselves to be essentially 
interdependent, achievement of successful intermediate outcomes encourage an effective cycle 
of trust building and commitment. These small wins are crucial for constructing the motivation 
that can lead to effective collaboration. However, if more ambitious goals of stakeholders are not 
easily compatible with intermediate outcomes, small wins may not be an applicable policy in 
trust building (Ansell & Gash, 2008). 
Another problem in the small-wins approach is about time. Since election systems require 
clear and quick outcomes, politicians frequently make pressure for big reforms. This pressure 
forces organizations to work together, even if they had a past history of distrust or conflicts. In 
this situation, organizations need to develop new ways to deal with lack of trust, because they do 
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not have the sufficient pace to construct trust through the small-wins approach. Then, in 
managing trust it is required to evaluate the characteristics  of each collaborative network  in 
terms of “level of associated risk, level of trust existing between the partners, and whether trust 
can be built incrementally via a small-wins approach or whether a more rapid and comprehensive 
approach to trust development is required to pursue collaborative advantage. Each situation 
dictates different implications for initiating and sustaining the trust-building loop” (Vangen & 
Huxham, 2003, p. 16). 
The practical assumption is that organizations that have intentions to make collaboration 
should understand the complexity. They should be ready to nurture the process, and this 
nurturing process must be constant and perpetual (Huxam, 2003). Influencing and managing trust 
is a delicate job and takes time since partners have to work in an already existing established 
environment that can hinder the improvement of trust. Trust may also be easily broken and can 
transform into distrust. If partners are greedy for obtaining a larger portion of the profits and 
escaping risks, trust may lessen in the implementation phase. Furthermore, if partners do not 
have conflict rules in advance to deal with problematic circumstances and disputes, trust may 
also diminish. The higher level of trust between partners necessitates reciprocity in relationships 
and high density and frequency of interactions. Stabilizing interactions and expectations is 
important to prevent disruptions and frequent renegotiations of contracts. Uncertainties in 
cooperation and partners’ opportunistic behaviors should be regulated and limited by creating 
processing rules. Network leaders have a critical role in dealing with members’ intentions, and 
building trust. They should be able to facilitate and mediate conflicts for network sustainability 
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
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2.4 Network Leadership 
This part of the study describes and discusses collaborative leadership perspectives in 
networks. Before proceeding to examine network leadership, it is necessary to review the 
literature on leadership theories in general. 
2.4.1 Leadership Theories 
In literature, some scholars view leadership and management as different concepts. 
Northouse (2007) argues that “to manage means to accomplish activities and master routines, 
whereas to lead means to influence others and create visions for change” (p. 11). On the other 
hand, some others reject the dichotomy. Frederickson, Smith, Larimer, and Licari (2011) argue 
that “there is not much convincing evidence that there is an important distinction between 
leadership and management, aside from labeling some things as leadership and therefore 
important and other things as management and therefore less important” (p. 118). According to 
those who do not see any difference argue that “leadership and management studies often use the 
same independent variables to explain the same dependent variables. The only difference being 
that the leadership scholar calls his or her variable of interest ‘leadership’, while the management 
scholar calls it ‘management” (Silvia, 2010, p. 18). In this paper both terms are used as 
synonyms.  
Gullick’s POSDCORB principles represent the classic view of public administration 
about good management. Planning, organizing, staffing directing coordinating, reporting and 
budgeting are the elements of rational and scientific management (Stilman, 2008). Although, 
POSTCORB has received intensive criticism and were “hardly seemed heroic, but rather full of 
contradictions- unscientific, value laden, time-bound, and rigid, and hardly the best means to 
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meet the needs of post-war era” by further generations, it had great impact on the development of 
the study of public administration ( p. 21). 
Leadership has been the subject of huge amount of studies, and a plentiful number of 
leadership theories were suggested in different fields. According to Yukl (1989), leadership 
theories can be classified into four main categories in terms of “whether the primary focus is on 
power-influence, leader-behavior, leader traits, or situational factors that interact with behavior, 
traits, or power” (p. 254)  
The power- Influence approach emphasizes the amount and the type of the leader’s 
power. Power is accepted as the most important element to explain the effectiveness of the 
leadership. The level of power is determined by the target group’s perceptions related 
“attributes, resources, and credibility” of the leader. This approach addresses some critical 
questions to evaluate the effectiveness of the leadership such as “How is power acquired and 
lost by leaders?”, “How is power exercised by effective leaders?”, and “How much power 
should a leader have?” (Yukl, 1989) 
 Behavioral approach focuses on the behaviors of effective leaders that differentiate them 
from other people. Although behavioral research studies emerged as a result of trait approach’s 
failure, they use similar methods with trait approach (Tombul, 2011). Classification of 
leadership behaviors and their impacts are the major issues for this approach (Yukl,1989). 
Burke, Stagl, Klein, Goodwin, and Salas (2006) classify leadership behaviors into two 
categories. The first one is task-focused leadership behavior that is characterized by 
transactional, initiating structure and boundary spanning leadership behaviors. Providing praise, 
rewards, and withholding punishment are typical features of transactional leadership.  Initiating 
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structure behaviors focus the completion of task objectives through the “minimization of role 
ambiguity and conflict” (2006, p. 292).  Boundary spanning behaviors emphasize facilitator role 
and collaboration with others in order to increase resources and needed information of the 
organization. 
The second category of behaviors defined by Burke et al. (2006) is person-focused 
leadership, which involves transformational, consideration, empowerment, and motivational 
leadership (Burke et al., 2006). Vision driven change is the main dynamic of transformational 
leadership. Group cohesion and maintaining close social relationships are the basic goals of 
consideration behaviors that “reflect two-way open communication, mutual respect and trust, and 
an emphasis on satisfying employee needs” (Burke et al., 2006, p. 293). Empowerment 
leadership behaviors seek “the development of follower self-management or self-leadership 
skills. Specifically, coaching, monitoring, and feedback behaviors are included, along with those 
indicative of participative, facilitative, and consultative leadership styles” (Pearce et al., 2003 as 
cited in Burke et al., 2006). Motivational behaviors promote employee’s positive actions and 
efforts. This is particularly important for difficult times (Burke et al., 2006). 
Transformational leadership has been the subject of many leadership studies since the end 
of 1970’s. According to Burns (1978) a transformational leader motivates and encourages his 
followers and enhances their morale to achieve specific goals. Transformational leadership aims 
to create positive change and increases the performance of the group.  In order to enhance the 
motivation, a leader considers people’s interests and expectations and spends efforts to meet 
them. Furthermore, transformational leader has ability to shape and change followers’ 
perceptions and expectations (Tombul, 2011). Bass (1985) focuses the influence of 
transformational leaders on followers and argues that “leaders transform followers by making 
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them more aware of the importance and values of task outcomes; by activating their higher-order 
needs, and by inducing them to transcend self-interest for the sake of the organization” (Yukl, 
1989, p. 272). 
The trait approach focuses on the personal traits and characteristics of leaders. Early 
studies about leadership in the first half of the twentieth century, tried to find common, 
extraordinary, and inherited traits such as psychical appearance, intelligence, tireless energy or 
tolerance to stress that guarantees to be an effective leader. The followers of trait approach also 
examine the interactions, and balance means the traits for successful leadership, but they failed 
to find those specific major traits of leadership and direction of the studies changed to examine 
managerial motivation and skills such as technical or inter-personal skills (Yukl, 1989). 
Contingency or situational approach emphasizes that there is no best way to manage an 
organization (Van Wart, 2011). According to Fiedler`s contingency theory, leadership style may 
vary according to situation and environment. Different “contextual factors such as the leader’s 
authority and discretion, the nature of work performed by the leader’s unit, the attributes of 
subordinates, and the nature of environment” may require different types of leadership (Yukl, 
1989, p. 261). Ecological approach suggests similar arguments to the situational approach. Gaus 
argues that general environment is important to understand and direct change in public 
administration. Ecology “deals with all interrelationships of living organisms and their 
environment” (Gaus, 2010, p. 80). Public administrators should know the characteristics of 
institutions’ ecology to provide a more proper response to demands and challenges both within 
and outside the organization (Gaus, 2010). 
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2.4.2 Collaborative Leadership Perspectives 
Leadership is a more challenging concept in networks compared to other single groups or 
organizations. Traditional leadership theories are mainly focused on formal leaders in a team or 
in an organization. In order to accomplish their goals those leaders try to be effective or 
transform their organizations.  However, because of networks’ peculiar structure, formal leader 
models are not easily applicable to networks. Two key issues prevent the use of traditional 
leadership models to the networks. The first difference is the structure of the participants. They 
come from different organizations and do not have strong hierarchical relations. The second 
difference is related to the vagueness of collaborative goals. Each participant has their individual 
program and objectives. This situation makes it very difficult for network leaders to establish 
agreed collaborative goals among network partners (Huxham & Vangen, 2000). 
Authority and power distribution among network members should be analyzed in order to 
get a better understanding of the network leadership. Consensus is the most important concept of 
decision making in collaborative structures.  Usually, administrators and members are not 
superiors or subordinates to each other, but they are partners. However, networks still need a 
manager who helps to provide cohesion and unity (Agranoff, 2006). Network structures must be 
fully understood by the decision makers; otherwise they will have wrong outcomes and 
expectations that are consistent with the traditional ways (Keast, Mandell, Brown & Woolcock, 
2004; Kapucu, N. & Garayev, 2014).  
Provan and Kenis (2007) identifies three basic forms of network governance. These are: 
participant-governed (shared governed) networks which have a highly decentralized governance 
model based on the organizational compromising, lead organization–governed networks which 
are governed by a single network participant, and network administrative organization (NAO)  
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governed networks which are governed externally by a specific administrative organization. One 
governance form is not better than the other for the effectiveness of the network. But they 
propose that four key structural and relational contingencies are important for the successful 
adoption of a particular form of governance. These are trust, size (number of participants), goal 
consensus, and the nature of the task. 
 Figure 3. Modes of Network Governance (Provan & Kenis, 2005) 
Network management requires some special administrative tools and skill sets. Some of 
those tools and skills are also accepted as important notions by the classical administration 
paradigm. “Command” and “control” are the “main administrative dynamics” of classical public 
administration, whereas new public management focuses on “competition,” “concession,” and 
“compromise.” “Oversight and mandating” and “providing resources” that have significant roles 
in classical paradigm are also recognized as key strategies for network management (Koliba et 
al., 2010). However, varieties of governance strategies are essential for network management. 
For an effective network management, network leaders should employ all kinds of administrative 
strategies consisting of “command and control,” “facilitation,” “competition,” “negotiating,” 
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“barraging,” “mediation,” “brokering,” “collaboration,” and “cooperation”,  “participatory 
governance,” “boundary spanning,” and “system thinking” (Koliba et al., 2010). 
Eglene, Dawes and Schneider (2007) suggest three hypotheses about the relation between 
leadership communication strategies, leadership styles, and networking success. According to 
them “leadership communication strategies focused on inspirational values, consultation, and 
coalition are positive associated with voluntary participation and networking success…A 
consistent, charismatic leadership style is positively associated with networking success. 
Adaptive leadership based on learning promotes both substantive and networking success” 
(Eglene et al., 2007, p. 109). 
Ansell and Gash (2008) make two assumptions about the role of leadership related to the 
level of trust in a network. If there is a high conflict and low trust between partners, “but power 
distribution is relatively equal and stakeholders have an incentive to participate, then 
collaborative governance can successfully proceed by relying on the services of an honest broker 
that the respective stakeholders accept and trust” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 555). This honest 
broker facilitates the collaboration through encouraging participants to listen to each other. The 
honest broker remains above the disputes and sustains the transparency and integrity of the 
process to improve trust among partners. However, if power distribution is not symmetric or 
participant incentives are weak or asymmetric, a strong ‘‘organic’’ leader who emerges from 
within the community of stakeholder is more likely to succeed. By contrast to the first 
assumption, interdependence is weaker in this assumption. So building trust will be challenging.  
Since “the availability of such leaders is likely to be highly contingent upon local 
circumstances… the possibility for effective collaboration may be seriously constrained by a lack 
of leadership in this second assumption” (Ansell & Gash, 2008, p. 555). 
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2.5 Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture highlights informal aspects of organizations and institutionalized 
values. Hill & Lynn (2009) explain institutionalized values as “norms, beliefs, and standards of 
conduct that provide meaning, purpose, and a source of motivation to individuals working within 
an organizational unit and, therefore, may contribute in both positive and negative ways to an 
organization's capacity to carry out its lawful responsibilities” (p. 52). When defining 
organizational culture, Schein (1992) emphasizes shared basic assumptions. Those shared basic 
assumptions are thought to be useful by group members in dealing with problems related to 
external adaptation and internal integration. Since those assumptions are considered as valid and 
functional, they are taught to new members as the main approaches and perceptions in 
addressing the problems. Trice and Beyer (1993) proposed a definition that has two parts which 
are substance and forms.  While substance involves shared and consistent beliefs, values, and 
norms, forms are observable entities that members of an organization demonstrate the substance 
of their culture. 
 Values, professional judgments, ethics, and motives of employees are significant 
elements of an organization’s culture.  These factors have also peculiar impacts on operations 
and works of organizations. Organizational culture is not a static concept. Members of an 
organization have important influence in a constant development of organizational culture. They 
bring their unique values and beliefs (Hill & Lynn, 2009). Jorgensen & Bozemen recognize 72 
public values in their meta-analysis of 230 articles of public administration (Hill & Lynn, 2009).  
 Culture clashes among network members and organizational goal convergence divergence 
are significant determiners of network effectiveness.  Network management must focus on 
dealing with culture clashes and turf/ power problems (O’Leary & Bingham, 2007). Although, 
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networks provide greater opportunities to deal with complex problems, the members’ different 
approaches of doing things usually make effective collaboration difficult (Provan & Lemaire, 
2012). Network leaders need to provide harmony among contradicting organizational cultures 
and must have capability to uphold dueling cultures simultaneously (McPherson, Popp, & 
Lindstrom, 2006). 
2.6 Theoretical Framework 
 This study employs network theory perspective, resource dependency theory, and inter-
organizational social capital as the key theoretical framework. This part presents a brief overview 
of these theories in terms of the study. 
2.6.1 Network Theory Perspective 
Network theory can be used to examine the relationships among participating 
organizations of the public security network. It helps to understand how public networks form, 
function, sustain their survival, and can be managed effectively. Network theory provides a great 
deal of insight about effective collaboration in network structures, and this information can be 
used to analyze public security networks.  
Public management networks have been increasingly used for the last decades which are 
defined as the “age of network” by Lipnack and Stamps (1994). This trend has arisen out of the 
collective acknowledgement of the wickedness of prevailing social, political, and economic 
problems.  Networks are essential structures to cope with wicked social, political, and economic 
problems that cannot be solved by any single organization by acting solely (Provan & Kenis, 
2007). Wicked is a term that has been applied to various problems which are essentially unique, 
lack a definitive formulation, and rarely have immediate and ultimate tests of a solution (Koliba, 
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Meek, & Zia, 2010).  Wicked problems do not have certain definitions. The definition chosen by 
the decision maker determines the formulation of the solution. The actions to solve the wicked 
problems cannot be labeled as accurate and wrong, but they can be defined as better or worse, 
and cannot generally be transferred to other situations.  The wicked problems are usually 
symptoms of other problems and their existence can be explained in different ways (Rittell & 
Webber, 1984). 
Networks theory mainly examines inter-organizational relations from the individual, 
group, and organization perspectives (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007). While organizational 
theories had great impacts on early network research in public administration, the raising trend 
towards public management networks leads numerous researches on the network theory in the 
last twenty years (Lecy, Mergel & Hans, 2012).  Network theory literature emphasizes seven 
features of networks operating across public administration. 
1) Networks facilitate the coordination of actions of resources between actors with in 
network. 2) Network membership can be drawn from some combination of public, 
private, and nonprofit sector actors. 3) Networks may carry out one or more policy 
functions. 4) Networks exit across virtually all policy domains. 5) Although networks are 
mostly defined at the inter-organizational level, they also described in the context of the 
individual, groups, and organizations that compromise them. 6) Networks form as the 
result of the selection of particular policy tools. 7) Network structures allow for 
government agencies to serve in roles other than lead organizations (Koliba et al., 2010, 
p. 47). 
Various purposes of inter-organizational cooperation are discussed in network theory 
literature: Organizations have multiple interests to join network structures. Acquire re-sources, 
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gaining legitimacy, providing more effective and efficient service, reducing the ambiguities, 
achieving collective goals and addressing complex problems are the main motives for 
organizations to participate in a network (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Provan & 
Kenis, 2008). Networks save organizations which have similar goals to duplicate their efforts 
and limited resources (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). Organizations also want to share or reduce risk 
through involving a network (Kapucu & Demiroz, 2011). Networks are “flexible structures that 
are inclusive, information rich, and outside the scope of direct bureaucratic control. These 
structures allow public agencies to manage public problems by leveraging expertise held outside 
its scope of authority” (Isett et al., 2011, p. 159). 
Network theory is an umbrella perspective rather than a single solid theory.  Network 
approach is used by a set of theories to explain interactions among different organizations. This 
paper also addresses resource dependence theory and inter-organizational social capital as a 
theoretical guide for this research. 
2.6.2 Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource dependency theory (Pfeffer  & Salancik, 1978) is an open system theory. No 
organization is self-sufficient, and they have to contact, work, and exchange resources with other 
organizations in their environment. This is considered as a condition of survival. The necessity to 
attain resources generates dependencies for organizations. However, resource dependence theory 
does not view organizations as passive entities in determining their fate. They control external 
influence by mitigating their dependence to other organizations. Organizations that need 
essential resources will pursue to create relations with other organizations to acquire required 
assets.  Creating networks not only provide alternative resources for organizations but also 
reduce the number of exchange alternatives for others. Organizations aim to obtain resources 
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without generating dependencies. In addition organizations try to adjust their dependence 
relations. They want to diminish their own dependence and raise the dependence of others on 
their organizations (Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource 
dependency theory considers organizations as coalitions altering their structure and pattern of 
behavior to gain and keep necessary resources. Organizations have the capability to change and 
respond to their surroundings. There are three factors affecting the level of resource dependence 
of organizations: first, the general significance of the resource for the organization; second, 
scarcer resources increase the dependence of the organization; finally, the struggle between 
organizations for control of that resource influences the level of dependency (Scott &Davis, 
2006). 
Organizations in public security are dependent upon their environment to fight against 
terrorism and organized crime. They must realize the necessity of collaboration and understand 
their interdependence to achieve their goals. They need to share resources, information, and 
knowledge to deal with this big problem. Although the main goal of the organizations in the 
public security network is similar, participating organizations have different priorities and 
motives. The management of the public security network functions as a broker among 
participating organizations. Network management coordinates the resources which are 
significant motives for members to involve dynamic participation of the network activities. 
2.6.3 Inter-organizational Social Capital 
Social capital is defined by different researchers from different aspects. While some of 
the definitions mainly focus on the general framework of relationships in a social organization 
among various partners, others focus on external relationships of an entity with other entities 
(Adler & Kwon, 2002). According to Fukuyama, social capital is “the ability of people to work 
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together for common purposes in groups and organizations” (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 10). Putnam 
addresses social capital as a characteristic of “social organization such as networks, norms, and 
social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” (Putnam 1995, p. 67). 
Coleman defines social capital in terms of its function. “It is not a single entity, but a variety of 
different entities having two characteristics in common: They all consist of some aspect of social 
structure, and they facilitate certain actions of individuals who are within the structure” ( p. 302). 
Knoke’s definition (1999) centers on external relations and accepts social capital as “the process 
by which social actors create and mobilize their network connections within and between 
organizations to gain access to other social actors’ resources” (p. 18). Burt (1997) also focuses 
on external relations and describes it as “brokerage opportunities in a network” (p. 355) 
The construct of organizational social capital is identified as “a  resource  reflecting  the  
character  of  social  relations  within  the organization,  realized  through  members'  levels of  
collective  goal  orientation  and  shared  trust” (Leanna & van Burren, 1999, p. 540) . 
Organizational social capital is not run by a single person or an actor, but rather it is collectively 
controlled by all participants. Leanna and Van Burren (1999) address two key issues of 
organizational social capital. The first one is associability. Associability can be explained as the 
combination of sociability which refers to the ability to reach agreement about common 
objectives, and enthusiasm about giving preference to these organizational goals over personal 
interest. The second component is trust which will be examined in further sections in this paper. 
Organizational social capital brings four main benefits to social entities. It provides a 
justification for group members to subordinate their own desires in favor of organizational goals. 
Social capital assists to create more flexible work practices and improve groups’ intellectual 
human capacity as well. Finally, it provides a more productive instrument to manage collective 
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actions compared to hierarchical tools. However, organizational social capital has several costs. 
Maintaining the social capital for ongoing and new relations necessitates spending time and 
resources. Long-run relations and feeling safe due to intensive trust may reduce the 
organization’s risk taking willingness for innovative actions. Strong relations may also constrain 
seeking alternatives for existing policies (Leanna & Van Burren, 1999). 
The concept of organizational capital can be applied to network level relations. Inter-
organizational social capital is a significant asset for the public security networks that brings to 
successful collaboration among network partners. Inter-organizational social capital is directly or 
indirectly related to five variables of this research, which are inter-organizational trust, network 
leadership style, goal convergence, organizational culture, and network effectiveness. As 
mentioned before trust is one of the two main components of organizational social capital. The 
management style of network leaders may increase or reduce the stock of organizational social 
capital. Social capital can help to reduce the gap between goals of member organizations. It can 
also facilitate to reduce negative effects of organizational culture that prevents healthy 
information flow among participant agencies. Stated benefits of inter-organizational social 
capital can improve the network effectiveness in local public security networks.  
2.7 Conceptual Framework 
Figure 4 demonstrates the conceptual framework of the research. The model involves 
four main exogenous variables and one endogenous variable. Trust among network members, the 
leadership style of the network, organizational culture and goal convergence are exogenous 
variables and network effectiveness is the dependent variable. Top-down leadership 
(commissioner style), co-producer style, and bottom-up leadership (facilitator style) are latent 
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sub-categories for network leadership style. Populations of the jurisdictions, jurisdictions’ risk 
level in terms of terrorism, and organized crime are the control variables. 
 
Figure 4: Conceptual Framework: The Role of Trust, Network Leadership, Organizational 
Culture, and Goal Convergence in Network Effectiveness 
2.8 Statement of the Hypotheses 
This research examines the influence of four independent variables on network 
effectiveness. In accordance with the theoretical perspective, inter-organizational trust, nature of 
organizational culture in public security network, and goal convergence are three latent 
exogenous constructs in the framework. Network leadership style is represented by three other 
latent exogenous constructs, which are commissioner style network leadership, co-producer style 
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of network leadership, and facilitator style of network leadership. Network effectiveness is the 
endogenous latent construct. 
2.8.1 Inter-organizational Trust 
Hierarchy and administration’s dominant authority are significant factors in managing 
traditional public agencies. However, these factors are not valid for public management 
networks. In the absence of both factors, inter-organizational trust among partner agencies is a 
significant cohesion element that ensures different partners to work together (Agranoff, 2007; 
Agranof & McGuire, 2001). Trust also lessens transaction costs and eases collaboration. 
Informal relations between participants facilitate to strengthen network ties and enable some new 
joint actions (Isett et al., 2011). A high level of trust in networks allows member organizations to 
increase their information collecting and using capacity. Better flow of information enhances 
participants’ innovation and problem solving capacity and increase the performance of 
collaboration (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
This study assumes that trust has a significant impact on successful collaboration in 
public security networks.  Trust is considered as a factor that positively contributes network 
effectiveness. Managing reciprocal trust among partner organizations is an important part of a 
network managers’ job. As discussed before, communication (Vangen &Huxham, 2003), belief 
in partners’ capacity (Ostrom & Ahn, 2002; Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999),  mutual expectations 
(Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), commitment to the network (Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999),  and a 
sense of fairness (Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999) are some important indicators of trust. 
In light of the literature, the study derives following hypothesis is to be tested: 
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Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust and 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
2.8.2 Network Leadership Styles 
Three leadership styles have been discussed in the literature for network management. 
These roles are top-down (the commissioner) leadership style (Hill & Lynn, 2005), bottom-up 
(the facilitator) leadership style (Lee, 2006), and intermediate area (the co-producer) leadership 
style (Bogason, 2000). Span, Schalk, Luijkx and Schols (2009) introduced an outline for 
governance roles after examining various network researches. They explained the features of 
three governance roles (the commissioner, the co-producer, and the facilitator) through nine 
dimensions: “Who is the main actor, what is the steering mechanism, who sets the boundary 
conditions, who is dependent, who aligns, who sets goals, who is responsible, who develops the 
vision, and who monitors results?” (p. 22). 
 Top down leadership is characterized by hierarchy and authority. Although new 
administrative tools are useful, command and control are still the primary means for network 
management. The main goal for top-down leadership in a network is to control the activities of 
network participants to accomplish the highest performance. As parallel to its power, 
management takes the main responsibility for the activities (Span, 2012). The co-producer 
leadership style has a middle position between top-down and bottom up leadership. Network 
management in the co-producer style is seen as a partner. Partners identify network goals 
together. Network management aims to encourage the involvement of each actor to network 
activities. Agreement is the most important concept for the co-producer style. Network members 
share the responsibility for network facilities. The facilitator style of leadership can be labeled as 
initiator. Management does not impose any goals to the partners. Each partner identifies their 
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own goals, and implements its policies. Management seeks possible collective actions and tries 
to facilitate. Each partner is responsible for its own activities (Span et al., 2009). 
There are conflicting views related to appropriate leadership style for effective network 
management. McGuire (2006), Agranoff (2007), and Whetten (1978) found that the 
commissioner style ensures better collaboration. On the other hand, Andrews, Boyne, Law, and 
Walker (2009) and Korssen-van Raaij (2006) found that the facilitator style leads higher 
performance. McGuire (2006) argues that top-down governance provides better results since it 
ensures quick decision ability, robust management, clear goals, and less conflicts among network 
members. Warren, Rose, and Bergunder (1974) found that organizations under bottom- up 
governance model usually do not want to exchange information, time, and other resources. In 
addition, bottom-up governance causes a constant and useless struggle for authority among 
participants. However, Andrews et al., (2000) argues that top-down management may reduce 
performance of the network, since hierarchical relations inhibit participants from taking 
independent decisions. Top down leadership may also cause strict rules and guidelines which 
decrease responsiveness to altering circumstances (Andrews et al., 2009).  
Span, Luijkx, Schols, and Schalk (2012) explain this contradiction by suggesting that 
each governance roles will leave different performance results in different conditions. They 
examine four contingency factors which are network age, network size, network diversity, and 
customization of services. They found that these contingencies have significant impact on the 
relationship between governance roles and network performance. Span et al. (2012) expand their 
propositions by adding two independent dimensions, stability and complexity of a public 
network. They suggest that the commissioner style is more effective for simple and stable public 
networks; and the facilitator style is more effective for complex and dynamic public networks, 
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while the co-producer style is better for simple and dynamic public networks and complex and 
stable public networks. 
As a consequence, most of the research in network literature suggests that in different 
contingencies, different leadership styles would be more effective. Situational approach seems to 
be generally accepted as the best model for network leadership. Each network has unique 
characteristics that differentiate them from other network settings. The appropriate leadership 
style should be identified according to those features.  
In the light of these discussions the following hypothesizes were tested in the study 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network 
effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network 
effectiveness in public security networks 
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
2.8.3 Goal Convergence 
 Although networks have common goals, participants usually have multiple interest and 
priorities. Estimating network goals may not be always possible through watching actions of 
single organizations. Similarity in goals, missions and expectations contribute to accomplish 
more effective collaboration (Rivera, Soderstrom & Uzzi, 2010). Kapucu and Garayev (2012) 
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found that organizational goal convergence is positively associated with network sustainability in 
emergency management networks. When network members bring their own objectives to the 
table with different policies, tactics, and attempts, collaboration in the network could face 
conflict of interest. Bryson, Crosby, and Stone (2006) argue that goal convergence facilitates 
collaboration in network structures. To increase goal convergence planning may be helpful. 
Deliberate and emergent planning increases the chance of successful collaboration. While 
deliberate planning is more appropriate for mandated collaborations, emergent planning is more 
suitable than non-mandated collaborations 
 Accordingly, the following hypothesizes are tested in this study: 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal 
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
2.8.4 Nature of Organizational Culture in Public Security Sector 
Numerous researches argue that police culture has substantial influence on both 
performance and information sharing in the public security sector (Fraser, 2004; Luen & Al-
Hawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). Organizations dealing with 
gathering and analysis of intelligence have some common features that differentiate them from 
other private and government agencies. Although intelligence service and law enforcement 
agencies have some ideological variances, they have plentiful common cultural attributes. Those 
shared assumptions and values in public safety network usually may be source of security 
failures and weakness (Mouton, 2002). 
Different researchers found that some specific features of organizational cultures in the 
public sector such as isolation, secrecy, solidarity, defensiveness, and competition often prevent 
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healthy information sharing and collaboration (Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen & 
Al-Hawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). Isolation is a physical and 
emotional situation which inhibits employees of an agency from communicating and creating 
relations with other people who are not members of their organizations. They tend to see other 
people as a potential danger to their organizational missions and goals (Kappeler, Sluder, & 
Alpert, 1998). 
Military culture is also needed to be taken into account when assessing public security 
networks. Group allegiance and small unit loyalty are significant and essential elements of 
military culture. A strong tie in a military unit is a necessary feature to combat with enemy 
forces. However, this loyalty may undermine the overall goal and mission cohesion of larger 
units (Winslow, 1998). Similarly, law enforcement agencies and intelligence services emphasize 
the significance of loyalty and solidarity. These cultural elements are beneficial, since they 
increase employees’ commitment to missions of organizations and provide the basis for 
teamwork (Rashid, Sambasivan & Rahman, 2004; Harrison, 1998). However, they frequently 
hinder employees of the organizations from reporting the problematic conducts or poor 
performance of peers (Mouton, 2002). 
Another important shared characteristic of organizations in public security networks is 
high level of hierarchy and authority. In hierarchy driven organizations, to act within the chain of 
command is an administrative obligation as well as a cultural commitment. Subordinates are 
expected to perform and follow their chiefs’ order without questioning its basis (Souryal, 1995). 
According to Scott (1998), “authoritarian system is subject to abuse precisely because its 
controls are internalized and individual participants are unconstrained in the demands that they 
place on themselves and their colleagues” (p. 313). 
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One reason that law enforcement and intelligence agencies keep information within their 
jurisdiction is competition. A high competition between organizations can exist even at national 
and sub-national levels. Agencies and their members compete among each other to gain credit 
for successful investigations (Buscaglia & González, 2006). 
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by the nature of organizational 
culture in the public security sector. In this study, the term is used to refer common cultural 
attributes of public security organizations such as hierarchy, isolation, secrecy, self-protection, 
competition, and group loyalty. 
 Accordingly, the following hypothesizes are tested in this study: 
 Hypothesis 4:  There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the 
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.  
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks  
 Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the 
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks 
 Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation 
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks. 
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 Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among 
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
2.8.5 Control Variables 
There are three control variables in the model which are population of the jurisdictions in 
which public security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of terrorism, and 
risk level of jurisdiction in terms of organized crime. 
Population of the jurisdictions is selected as a control variable since it is a significant 
indicator of the size of the networks, number of personnel, budget, and technical capacity of the 
participating organizations. These characteristics of the networks greatly vary according to 
jurisdiction population. There are significant differences between a province public security 
network serving a population of more than 2,000,000 and a province public security network 
serving a population of about 100,000. Size, the number of personnel, and budget are not 
examined separately because the data was collected via an online survey questionnaire from 
governors. Since governors have limited or no direct authority on military units and intelligence 
services, they usually do not have exact information about their number of personnel, budget or 
other issues. Also, some of that information is secret and they would not be enthusiastic about 
sharing it in the survey. Therefore, the population of the jurisdiction is designed as a control 
variable to identify the general characteristics of the local public security networks. 
The jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of terrorism and organized crime are also selected as 
control variables in order to recognize the environment in which public security networks 
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perform. The risk levels lead different approaches and different kinds of behaviors among 
partners in the network. The number of employees and the budget of the member organizations 
also differ according to risk levels. 
The following hypotheses are proposed to test the structural relationships between these 
variables. 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between high level of inter-organizational 
trust and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network 
effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network 
effectiveness in public security networks 
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal 
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the 
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.  
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks  
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 Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the 
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks 
 Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation 
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks. 
 Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among 
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
This study expects to find a direct positive relationship between inter-organizational trust, 
goal convergence, and network effectiveness. This study also expects to find a negative 
relationship between the nature of organizational culture in public security sector and network 
effectiveness. Finally, network leadership style is expected to either positively or negatively 
influence the network effectiveness. The next chapter will introduce the methodology of this 
research. 
  
  
60 
 
CHAPTER-3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter provides the methodology of the study addressing the study design, study 
samples, data collection, sampling, power analysis, sample size justification, operational 
definitions of the study variables, statistical analysis, and the model validation. 
3.1 Research Design 
This study uses quantitative research methods (Structural Equation Model) to analyze 
empirical data which was gathered by a survey. Cross-sectional surveys gather data at one point 
in time and can be labeled as snapshots of the population. Non-experimental single group design 
was used in this research. Random assignment was not performed since it was not possible to 
control and manipulate our exogenous variables.  
3.2 Subjects for the Study 
Province security networks in Turkey are selected as the unit of analysis. Turkey is 
administratively divided into 81 provinces. The provinces are further subdivided into districts. 
There are 919 districts in Turkey. The study population consists of province and district 
governors, deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry 
high and middle level bureaucrats. They are selected as the study population since province and 
district governors are thought as to be the leader of the local public security networks.   Province 
deputy governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry high and middle level 
bureaucrats are appointed among district governors after working for a specific time period as a 
district governor. Hence, they also have deep knowledge and experience related to public 
security networks.  
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This study used human subjects, and all human subject research must receive Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approval. Before applying the survey, survey instruments were submitted to 
IRB for approval. The survey question was designed in a way that would not cause any harm to 
respondents. Completing the survey was voluntary and data will be confidential. Only aggregate 
data was collected, performed, and reported. Respondents might skip any question or stop taking 
the survey at any time. Personal information was not asked to ensure confidentiality.  
3.3 Data Collection Method 
A self-administered online survey (Appendix A) was performed to collect data. The 
survey was conducted to evaluate perceptions of public security network managers about 
network effectiveness, network leadership style, inter-organizational trust, organizational culture 
and goal convergence. The survey was built and distributed through the web-based survey tool 
Qualtrics. The links of the survey questionnaire electronically mailed to all province and district 
governors, deputy province governors, middle and high mangers of the Turkish Interior Ministry, 
and administrative senior inspectors. In the survey, respondents were asked to identify a province 
public safety network that they had the opportunity to observe closely, and evaluate the study 
variables in terms of this province public safety network. 
The survey questions were prepared in English, and were translated into Turkish. In order 
provide reliability and validity of the measurement, the Turkish version of the survey was 
reviewed by Sedat Eliuz, Yusuf Ustun, and Mehmet Yesilbas who are native speakers of Turkish 
and administrative senior inspectors of the Turkish Interior Ministry  as well as Ph.D. candidates 
in the Public Affairs Doctoral Program at the University of Central Florida.  
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3.4 Sampling 
The study population of the research is province and district public security networks in 
Turkey and their governors.  Surveys were sent online to all province and district governors, 
deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors, and the Interior Ministry middle 
and high level bureaucrats. Thus, any sampling method was not performed. According to the 
Turkish Interior Ministry data, total number of province governors, district governors, deputy 
district governors, administrative senior inspectors and, Interior Ministry high and middle level 
bureaucrats is 2,095. 
The frequency distribution of this study population with regards to their professional 
positions indicates that district governors are the largest group with 866 people (41.3%). The 
second largest group is deputy province governors with 498 people (11. %).  236 candidate 
district governors constitute 11.2 % of study population. The number of administrative senior 
inspectors is 191 (9.2%). There are 171 province governors (8.2 %) and 134 Interior Ministry 
high or middle level bureaucrats (6.4%)   
The first indicator is about periodical contacts among network members to discuss public 
security issues. Seven out of ten respondents either agreed (63.4%) or strongly agreed (7.0%) 
with the statements. While the number of respondents who did not support the statement was 37 
(12.7%), 48 respondents (16.7 %) specified that they were not sure about this indicator. The 
second indicator asked respondents whether “the organizations constantly develop long-term 
relationships among each other”. A majority of respondents reported disagreement (disagree, 
58.7%; strongly disagree, 9.0%) with the statement. Only 27 (9.0%) people supported, whereas 
66 respondents (22.9) were not sure. The third indicator is designed to evaluate the constant 
exchange of information among member organizations. Almost 4 out of 10 respondents (38.9%) 
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did not agree with the statement, while around a quarter of the respondents support the indicator. 
34.4 % of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the constant exchange of 
information.  
 The following two indicators were designed to evaluate whether the network provides 
member organizations to improve the ability of collecting and using information against terrorist 
and criminal activities. For both indicators, respondents mostly supported (59.3 % and 64.7% 
respectively) the statements. Again for both questions, almost equal numbers of the respondents 
stated that the network does not provide organizations to improve their information collecting 
capacity (11.3%), information using capacity (10.4%). The sixth indicator asked respondents 
whether the public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations. While 36.3% 
of respondents found the network successful, 27.1% of the respondents stated that it is not 
successful in joint operations. Almost four out of ten respondents (38.5%) are not sure about this 
indicator. The next two indicators ask respondents whether the public security network is 
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and organized crime activities. Both questions had 
similar results. 33.2% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the network is 
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and 34.4% of them accepted the network is successful 
in preventing organized crime activities. The percentage of respondents who do not find the 
network successful in preventing terrorist attack was 25.2%, while disagreement responses 
accounted for 23.2% in preventing organized crime activities. An almost equal percentage of 
respondents (41.6% and 42.5% respectively) in both questions neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the statement. 
 The tenth and eleventh indicators aim to measure the success of the network in solving 
terror and organized crime cases.102 respondents (35.2%) found their network successful in 
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solving terror case and 111 respondents (39.4%) found their network successful in solving 
organized crime cases. The same numbers of respondents (58) in both questions did not support 
the statements. The last two questions in this section were designed to evaluate the success of the 
network in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime groups. 92 
respondents either agreed (31.2%) or strongly agreed (1.1%) while 70 respondents either 
disagreed (22.5%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) with the statement related to capturing or 
eliminating the terrorists. The statement related to capturing or eliminating members of 
organized crime groups was either agreed (34.3%) or strongly agreed (1%) by 92 respondents, 
whereas 66 respondents either disagreed (20.6%) or strongly disagreed (2.4%). More than four 
out of ten respondents were not sure about the indicators in the last four questions (44.3%, 
40.1%, 43.2 and 41.6 respectively). 
3.5 Power Analysis and Sample Size Justification 
Before performing to statistical analysis, power analysis is necessary to determine the 
highest possibility to reject the null hypothesis when it is false (Zhang & Wang, 2009). 
Researchers determine confidence level according to their judgments about the level of 
preciseness. This study uses the alpha level of 0.05 which ensures a confidence interval of 95%. 
Thus, the results are 95% confident that any sample drawn from the target population will give 
the same result.  
Sample size is also important for the power of the study. This study use structural 
equation modeling (SEM) to analyze the data. There are different arguments related to required 
sample sizes for SEM. Kline (2005) argues that the minimum 10 case is necessary for each 
unknown parameter in the covariance structure model. Bentler and Chou (1987) propose rule of 
thumb which argues that 5 observations are adequate for each parameter when the unit of the 
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analysis is organizations. The final revised covariance structure model of the study has 86 
unknown parameters. Hence, 430 respondents would provide a perfect sample size for the study. 
On the other hand, Boomsma and Hoogland (2001) suggest that 200 cases are enough to make a 
reliable SEM analysis. This means that just about a 9.5 % response rate would be adequate for 
the study. 
3.6 Measurement 
This research aims to find relations between endogenous variables of network 
effectiveness and five latent exogenous variables (inter-organizational trust, 3 network leadership 
styles, and goal convergence),  and six observable exogenous variables in public security 
networks. Population of the jurisdictions, the risk level of the jurisdiction in terms of terrorism, 
and risk level of the jurisdiction in terms of organized crime are used as control variables. These 
three factors are indicators of jurisdictions’ characteristic that affect the organizational 
environment of public security networks. In order to find real impact of independent variables on 
the network effectiveness, these factors were controlled. 
The survey questionnaire (Appendix A) was created based on previously performed 
surveys by Wang and Kapucu (2006), Kapucu (2008), Kapucu (2012), Garayev and Kapucu 
(2013), Garayev (2011), and Demiroz (2012). Some of these research studies were federally 
funded. The lowest Cronbach’s Alpha reliability coefficient for latent constructs in these studies 
was .709, which shows the reliability of the survey questionnaire. The entire inter-organizational 
trust and the goal convergence sections and some questions of the network effectiveness section 
of the survey questionnaire were directly taken from these surveys with small changes. The 
network leadership, the organizational culture sections and most of the questions in the network 
effectiveness section were built through network theory literature. In accordance with the 
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literature, Table 1 is generated to illustrate latent exogenous and endogenous variables and their 
indicators. The table also consists of the control variables of the study.
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Table 1 Operational Definition of Variables  
Variable Indicator 
Type of 
Variable 
Data 
Source 
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The organizations involving the public security network have open communication Ordinal Survey 
The organizations in the  public security network are reliable partners Ordinal Survey 
Honesty is the basis of inter-organizational collaboration in the public security network Ordinal Survey 
Inter-organizational relations in the network are characterized by mutual understanding Ordinal Survey 
Organizations in the network keep their commitment Ordinal Survey 
Mutual acceptance is the important part of inter-organizational collaboration in the network Ordinal Survey 
There is a common belief across the network that each actor is capable of contributing to the 
overall picture 
Ordinal Survey 
Inter-organizational collaboration is characterized by mutual respect in the network Ordinal Survey 
Organizations in the network collaborate with a sense of fairness towards each other Ordinal Survey 
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Public security network goals are formulated solely by the governors  Ordinal Survey 
Public security network vision is formulated solely by the governors  
 
Ordinal Survey 
Governors act as executors Ordinal Survey 
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Variable Indicator 
Type of 
Variable 
Data 
Source 
Network activities are steered by the governors  Ordinal Survey 
Decisions in the network are made solely by the governors  
Ordinal Survey 
Governors take full responsibility for the public security network 
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Network goals are formulated by all partners jointly Ordinal Survey 
Network vision is formulated by all partners jointly Ordinal Survey 
Governors act as a partners Ordinal Survey 
Network activities are steered jointly Ordinal Survey 
Decisions in the network are made jointly Ordinal Survey 
All partners are jointly responsible for network activities Ordinal Survey 
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Each organization formulates their own goals separately in the network Ordinal Survey 
Each organization formulates their vision separately in the network Ordinal Survey 
Governors act as an initiators to facilitate the collaboration Ordinal Survey 
Network activities are steered by each organization Ordinal Survey 
Decisions in the network are made by each organization Ordinal Survey 
Each partners is responsible for their own activities 
 
Ordinal Survey 
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Variable Indicator 
Type of 
Variable 
Data 
Source 
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Organizations in the public security network do not confront problems without becoming 
defensive (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
Collaboration in the public security network  is challenging due to the organizational 
secrecy perceptions (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to high level of hierarchy in  
the organizations (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
When an employee of an organization in the network make a mistake, fellows feel  
responsibility to protect him/her (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to competition among 
organizations (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a sense of isolation among 
employees of the member organizations (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
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Organizations in the public security network have different organizational priorities 
(REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
There is a gap between organizational goals in the network (REVERSED) Ordinal Survey 
Organizations working together have little in common (REVERSED) Ordinal Survey 
Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to multiplicity of differing 
organizational backgrounds (REVERSED) 
Ordinal Survey 
Diverging organizational expectations is the reality of public security networks Ordinal Survey 
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Variable Indicator 
Type of 
Variable 
Data 
Source 
(REVERSED) 
Organizations are hardly related in terms of their organizational missions (REVERSED) Ordinal Survey 
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Organizations in the network periodically contact each other to discuss issues pertaining to 
public security 
Ordinal Survey 
Organizations constantly develop long-term relationships among each other Ordinal Survey 
Organizations in the network constantly communicate and exchange information Ordinal Survey 
The public security network provide organizations to improve  the ability of collecting and 
using information against terrorist and organized crime activities 
Ordinal Survey 
The public security network  is successful in carrying out joint operations Ordinal Survey 
The public security network is successful in preventing terrorist attacks  Ordinal Survey 
The public security network  is successful in preventing organized crime activities   
The public security network is successful in  solving organized crime cases 
Ordinal Survey 
The public security network is successful in solving terror cases 
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating the  criminals Ordinal Survey 
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Variable Indicator 
Type of 
Variable 
Data 
Source 
The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating members of organized 
crime gangs 
Population of 
Jurisdictions 
(Control) 
The population of the network jurisdiction Ordinal Survey 
Risk Level of 
Terrorism 
(Control) 
The risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of terrorism Ordinal Survey 
Risk Level of 
Organized Crime 
(Control) 
The risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of organized crime Ordinal Survey 
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3.7 Statistical Analysis 
This research uses three main statistical analysis methods to evaluate the relationships 
between independent and dependent variables. Those analyses are descriptive statistics, 
confirmatory factor analysis, and covariance structure modeling. 
3.7.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics were performed through SPSS to understand general characteristics 
of the data, and evaluate the general picture. Frequency tables and distribution of exogenous, 
endogenous and control variables were presented in the descriptive analysis. Correlation analysis 
were used to detect relations among study variables and the possible multicollinearity problem 
between indicators of each latent construct. Multicollinearity is a common problem, which 
occurs when two or more variables are highly correlated. 
3.7.2 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The study used confirmatory factor analysis to confirm the validity of measurement 
models and validate the model fit of collected data. Building measurement models are necessary, 
since latent constructs cannot be directly observed. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to decide 
the capability of a hypothesized model based on the obtained data. It seeks to determine if the 
number of factors and their regression weights are suitable to indicate latent constructs. It is a 
significant method to test construct validity of the study variables (Wan, 2002).   
 AMOS software was used to perform confirmatory factor analysis. Indicators of each 
latent variable constitute the generic measurement model of each single factor. Wan’s (2002) 
three step method used for the confirmatory factor analysis. First, p value and critical ratio were 
examined to determine if the specific indicator has a statistically significant effect on the latent 
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construct. If the critical value is equal or greater than 1.96, it can be considered that influence of 
a particular indicator on the latent variable is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. If the 
factor loading is not statistically significant, it shows that this indicator is not a suitable measure 
for the latent construct. The factor loadings among the indicators and the latent construct can be 
between 0 and 1. While 1 indicates the highest correlation, 0 means that the indicator is not 
relevant to the latent construct.  The stronger factor loading means the stronger influence of that 
indicator on the latent construct (Byrne, 2010; Wan, 2002; Bickel, 2007).  
In the second step, several statistical indexes are used to assess how well over all model 
fits the data. AMOS software produces those indexes that include chi-square value (χ 2), degrees 
of freedom (df), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the adjusted GFI (AGFI), the Tucker-Lewis 
index (TLI), the normed fit index (NFI), and root mean squared error of approximation 
(RMSEA), comparative fit Index, and Hoelter's critical N. At the final stage, modification index 
are checked to detect the possible causes of the lack of fit. Modification indices help to 
determine which correlated measurement errors should be freely estimated to reduce the chi-
square value and fit the model better.  Nested measurement models of latent constructs were 
developed according to modification indices figures,  
3.7.2.1 Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness in Public Security Networks 
Network effectiveness in public security networks is the endogenous variable of the 
study. Network effectiveness can be defined as the accomplishments which could not be realized 
by a single organization without participating in a network (Provan & Kenis 2008). Various 
indicators suggested to measure effectiveness of public security networks. This paper used 12 
indicators: Regular communication among participants; long term relations, the amount of shared 
information, information using and collecting capacity, success in joint operations, success in 
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preventing terror and organized crime cases, success in solving terror and organized crime cases, 
and success in capturing and eliminating terrorists and members of organized crime gangs 
(Demirhan, 2013). Figure 5 demonstrates the measurement model of network effectiveness. 
 
Figure 5. Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness 
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3.7.2.2 Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust in Public Security Networks 
The first exogenous variable of the study is inter-organizational trust. Trust can be 
examined under three main heading. First, companion trust is based on mutual communication 
and friendship. The main focus of competence trust is reciprocal opinions about other partners’ 
capability in collaborative activities. Lastly, commitment trust is based on expectations from 
other parties to commit contract conditions (Newell & Swan, 2000). Various studies (Wang &  
Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; Garayev, 2011;  Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 2013) used open 
communication among partner agencies, perception about reliability, honesty, mutual 
understanding, keeping commitment in collaborative process, mutual acceptance, perceptions 
about commitment, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness as the indicators of 
trust. This study also used those items to measure the level of trust among member agencies. 
Figure 6 depicts measurement model for trust. 
 
Figure 6. Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust 
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3.7.2.3 Measurement Model for Network Leadership Styles in Public Security Networks 
 Network leadership style is represented by three latent exogenous constructs, which are 
the commissioner style network leadership, the co-producer style of network leadership, and the 
facilitator style of network leadership. This study compares impacts of these three leadership 
styles on network effectiveness. In the commissioner role; network leader acts as an executer; 
network vision, goals and decisions made by solely network leader; leader steers network 
activities; and they undertakes full responsibility. The co-producer style network leader act as a 
network partner; network members jointly made network decisions, vision and goals; network 
responsibility is shared by all members. The facilitator network leader acts as an initiator. 
Network vision, goals and decisions are made by each partner solely; each partner is responsible 
for their own activities (Span, Schalk, Luijkx & Schols, 2009). Each first order latent indicator 
was measured by six indicators. Figure 7, Figure 8, and Figure 9 demonstrates measurement 
model for those three types of network leadership styles.
  
Figure 7. Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
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Figure 8. Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
 
Figure 9. Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership 
3.7.2.4 Measurement Model for Goal Convergence in Public Security Networks 
Another exogenous variable of the study is goal convergence, which can be defined as 
“the extent to which organizations have common goals and mission” (Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 
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2013, p. 106). Difference in organizational priorities, organizational goals, expectations and 
mission, diverging goals, and common points were used to measure goal convergence among 
member organizations in public security networks (Wang &  Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; 
Garayev, 2011). Figure-10 demonstrates the measurement model for goal convergence. 
 
Figure 10. Measurement Model for Goal Convergence 
3.7.2.5 Measurement Model for Organizational Culture in Public Security Networks 
Organizational culture is defined as institutionalized values that “refer to those norms, 
beliefs, and standards of conduct that provide meaning, purpose, and a source of motivation to 
individuals working within an organizational unit and, therefore, may contribute in both positive 
and negative ways to an organization's capacity to carry out its lawful responsibilities” (Hill & 
Lynn, 2009, p. 52). Public security organizations have some unique cultural characteristics that 
differentiate them from other public organizations. Various specific features are argued in the 
literature (Mouton, 2002; Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, 1998; Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 
2001; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001). Confronting problems without becoming defensive, 
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organizational secrecy, organizational isolation, and the level of hierarchy, organizational 
solidarity, and competition among agencies were measured by single questions  in the survey as  
separate characteristics of organizational culture in public security networks.  
3.7.3 Covariance Structure Model 
Covariance structure model were used to assess relations between our latent constructs 
and confounding factors. The model includes both exogenous and endogenous latent variables. 
CSM can also simultaneously estimate latent variables from observed variables. CSM combines 
confirmatory factor analysis and structural equation modeling into one method. Covariance 
structure analysis or model offers a simple way to portray the complex relationships among the 
study variables with latent variables (Wan, 2002). Figure 11 demonstrates covariance structure 
model of network effectiveness, trust, network leadership, goal convergence, and organizational 
culture. 
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Figure 11. Generic Covariance Structure Model
  
81 
 
 
3.8 Model Validation 
This study uses various criteria to reach a valid model for the hypotheses. These criteria 
are reliability threshold, multicollinearity threshold, statistical significance level, criteria for 
factor loadings, and goodness of fit statistics. 
Reliability of measures, which is related to internal consistency and reproducibility, is an 
important criterion for a good research. In order to evaluate internal consistency, Cronbach’s 
alpha score was used.  George and Mallery (2006) suggest that an excellent study must have 
alpha coefficient above .90, while above .80 is good and above .70 is acceptable. Kline (2005) 
discusses that an alpha coefficient above .70 is satisfactory for the internal consistency. This 
study uses .70 as an acceptable threshold for the Cronbach’s alpha score of the measures 
There are different arguments related to thresholds for multicollinearity.  Kline (2005) 
suggests that below .90 is an acceptable threshold for the multicollinearity while Garson (2012) 
argues that multicollinearity is a problem when correlation is higher than .85, and Meyers, Gamst 
and Guarino (2006) accept a stricter threshold of .70. This study uses .85 for the multicollinearity 
threshold.  
In order to check the fitness of indicators in CFA, the critical ratio of factor loadings are 
examined. If factor loading of an indicator is higher than +1.96 or lower than -1.96, it can be 
regarded as statistically significant at the .05 confidence level (Byrne, 2006). Then, insignificant 
indicators are excluded from the model. 
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Another criterion is the threshold for factor loadings in confirmatory factor analysis (Hoe, 
2008). The literature argues different standardized regression weights for this criterion. Chin 
(1998) suggests that standardized regression weight of .30 is adequate to consider a meaningful 
indicator for a latent construct. Hair et al. (1998) argues that very important indicators should 
have greater than .50 factor loading, above .40 indicates important indicators and .30 is an 
acceptable threshold. This study uses .40 as the threshold for factor loadings; therefore indicators 
having standardized weights lower than .40 are removed from the measurement models.  
In order to validate measurement models, goodness of fit statistics (which can be 
obtained through AMOS software) are used. Goodness of fit statistics describes whether the 
measurement models represent the observed values in the data set. There are various tests to 
evaluate consistency of the obtained data with a measurement model and there is not a consensus 
in literature about which goodness of fit statistics should be utilized (Schermelleh-Engel et al. 
2003; Garson 2012). 
Kline (1998) suggests chi-square, Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), 
Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and one of the following fit index: Normed Fit Index (NFI) or 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Garson (2012) offers three goodness of fit statistics that are chi-
square, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA), and one of the following criteria: 
NFI, Relative Fit Index (RFI), Incremental Fit Index (IFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) and 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI). Garver and Mentzer (1999) suggest Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), 
Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). 
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Goodness of Fit Index (GFI), and Adjusted Goodness of Fit Index (AGFI) are no longer 
considered to evaluate model fit, because they are not suitable for complicated models with 
smaller sample size (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Garson, 2012). In addition to these indexes, Hoelter's 
Index is used to assess the sufficiency of the sample size for the model fit (Wan, 2002; Garson, 
2012) 
This study uses chi square, chi-square / degree of freedom, Tucker Lewis Index, 
Comparative Fit Index (CFA), Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) and 
Hoelter's Critical N value to evaluate model fit. Table 2 indicates the expected values of 
goodness of statistics to consider that the model fits reasonably well.  
If an acceptable goodness of fit statistics results cannot be achieved, some revisions 
would be necessary to find a better fitting model. In order to improve the model by decreasing 
chi square value, modification index should be examined. Modification indices are utilized to 
add correlation paths among measurement errors of indicators that provide better improvement in 
the measurement model. Similar to confirmatory factor analysis, overall goodness of fit of 
covariance structure model is analyzed through goodness of fit statistics. 
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Table 2 Goodness of Fit Statistics Thresholds. Adapted from Kula (2011). 
Fit Index Shorthand          Criteria Source 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 
Schermelleh-Engel et al. 
(2003); Wan (2002); 
Garson (2012); Kline 
(2005) 
 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom 
 
χ2/df 
for moderate <.05 
for conservative <.03 
for more conservative <.02 
Ullman (2001); 
Kline (1998); 
Wan (2002); Kline 
(2005) 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI 
.90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
Hoe (2003); 
Hu & Bentler (1999); 
Schumacker & Lomax 
(2004) 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 
05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
Browne & Cudeck 
(1993);  
Wan (2002); 
Schumacker & Lomax  
(2004); Garson (2012); 
Schermelleh-Engel et al. 
(2003) 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 
90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
Hu & Bentler (1999); 
Schreiber et al. (2006) 
Hoelter's Critical N 
Hoelter 
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
Wan (2002); Garson  
(2012) 
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 CHAPTER 4- FINDINGS 
This chapter introduces the data analysis of the study. The data analysis methods include 
descriptive analysis of each study variable; correlation analysis of the latent constructs to detect 
relationships between indicators of latent variables and multicollinearity; confirmatory factor 
analysis of measurement models to validate measurement models of each latent variable; 
reliability analysis to evaluate the internal consistency of the measurement before and after the 
revision of measurement models; and covariance structure analysis to test study hypotheses. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The email with the survey link was sent to 2,095 province governors, district governors, 
deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors, and the Interior Ministry high and 
middle level bureaucrats.  In total, 335 people responded to the survey, but thirty respondents did 
not answer more than 50% of the survey questions. These responses are removed from the 
dataset. The final data set for the statistical analysis comprised of 305 responses. As mentioned 
in the previous section, this is an adequate sample size for analysis. 
The frequency distribution of respondents in terms of their professional positions 
indicates that % 44 of respondents are district governors. Administrative senior inspectors 
represent 25 % of respondents and deputy province governors constitute 14 % of total 
respondents. 12 % of respondents are Interior Ministry high or middle level bureaucrats and 5% 
of respondents are candidate district governors. The province governors represent only 1 % of 
total responses. 
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Some respondents replied to the majority of the survey questions but had some answers 
missing. Their missing responses were imputed by obtaining maximum likelihood estimators 
which is named as Expectation-Maximization in SPSS (Statistic Pack for Social science). This 
section presents descriptive analyses of endogenous latent variable, exogenous variables and 
control variables. 
4.1.1 Endogenous Variable (Network Effectiveness) 
 The only endogenous variable of the study is network effectiveness. Network 
effectiveness was measured by a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). The survey used twelve items to measure the level of network 
effectiveness in a province public security network. These items indicate different attributes of 
network effectiveness. Respondents were asked to evaluate statements related to:  periodical 
contacts, developing long-term relationship, exchanging information, ability of collecting and 
using information against terrorist and criminal activities, joint operations, success in preventing 
terrorist attacks and organized crime activities, success in solving terror and organized crime 
cases, and success in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime 
gangs. 
 Indicators of network effectiveness have a relatively diverse distribution of responses. 
Agreement responses exceed disagreement responses for 10 indicators, and vice versa for other 
two indicators. For the last 7 items, neither agree nor disagree responses had the highest share. 
Table 3 summarizes the answers of the indicators of network effectiveness in the form of 
frequency distributions.  Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the 
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dataset.  The items have around 6% missing values. The categories were provided in ascending 
order from highest to lowest. 
Table 3 Frequency Distribution of Items for Network Effectiveness 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
The organizations in 
the network 
periodically contact 
each other to discuss 
issues pertaining to 
public security 
(NE1) 
Valid Agree 182 59.7 63.4 63.4 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
48 15.7 16.7 80.1 
Disagree 32 10.5 11.1 91.3 
Strongly Agree 20 6.6 7.0 98.3 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 287 94.1 100.0  
Missing  18 5.9   
 Total 305 100.0   
The organizations 
constantly develop 
long-term 
relationships among 
each other. 
(NE2) 
Valid Disagree 169 55.4 58.7 58.7 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
66 21.6 22.9 81.6 
Strongly Disagree 26 8.5 9.0 90.6 
Agree 26 8.5 9.0 99.7 
Strongly Agree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
 Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The organizations in 
the network 
constantly exchange 
Valid Disagree 99 32.5 34.4 34.4 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
99 32.5 34.4 68.8 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
information 
(NE3) 
Agree 72 23.6 25.0 93.8 
Strongly Disagree 13 4.3 4.5 98.3 
Strongly Agree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network provides 
participant 
organizations to 
improve the ability of 
collecting 
information against 
terrorist and criminal 
activities (NE4) 
Valid Agree 149 48.9 51.7 51.7 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
84 27.5 29.2 80.9 
Disagree 28 9.2 9.7 90.6 
Strongly Agree 22 7.2 7.6 98.3 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
 Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network provides 
participant 
organizations to 
improve the ability of 
using information 
against terrorist and 
criminal activities 
(NE5) 
Valid Agree 165 54.1 57.7 57.7 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
71 23.3 24.8 82.5 
Disagree 27 8.9 9.4 92.0 
Strongly Agree 20 6.6 7.0 99.0 
Strongly Disagree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
Missing  19 6.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
 
The public security 
network is successful 
in carrying out joint 
operations 
(NE6) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
111 36.4 38.5 38.5 
Agree 90 29.5 31.3 69.8 
Disagree 69 22.6 24.0 93.8 
Strongly Disagree 9 3.0 3.1 96.9 
Strongly Agree 9 3.0 3.1 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
 Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network is successful 
in preventing terrorist 
attacks 
(NE7) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
119 39.0 41.6 41.6 
Agree 90 29.5 31.5 73.1 
Disagree 64 21.0 22.4 95.5 
Strongly Disagree 8 2.6 2.8 98.3 
Strongly Agree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
 Missing  19 6.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network is successful 
in preventing 
organized crime 
activities 
(NE8) 
Valid   Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
121 39.7 42.5 42.5 
Agree 95 31.1 33.3 75.8 
Disagree 58 19.0 20.4 96.1 
Strongly Disagree 8 2.6 2.8 98.9 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.1 100.0 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Total 285 93.4 100.0  
 Missing 20 6.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network is successful 
in solving terror cases 
(NE9) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
127 41.6 44.3 44.3 
Agree 100 32.8 34.8 79.1 
Disagree 51 16.7 17.8 96.9 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.3 2.4 99.3 
Strongly Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 287 94.1 100.0  
 Missing  18 5.9   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network is successful 
in solving organized 
crime cases 
(NE10) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
113 37.0 40.1 40.1 
Agree 109 35.7 38.7 78.7 
Disagree 52 17.0 18.4 97.2 
Strongly Disagree 6 2.0 2.1 99.3 
Strongly Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 282 92.5 100.0  
Missing  23 7.5   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
The public security 
network is successful 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
123 40.3 43.2 43.2 
Agree 89 29.2 31.2 74.4 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
in capturing or 
eliminating the 
terrorists 
(NE11) 
Disagree 64 21.0 22.5 96.8 
Strongly Disagree 6 2.0 2.1 98.9 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.1 100.0 
Total 285 93.4 100.0  
 Missing  20 6.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The public security 
network is successful 
in capturing or 
eliminating members 
of organized crime 
gangs 
(NE12) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
119 39.0 41.6 41.6 
Agree 98 32.1 34.3 75.9 
Disagree 59 19.3 20.6 96.5 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.3 2.4 99.0 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
 Missing  19 6.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
 The first indicator is about periodical contacts among network members to discuss 
public security issues. Seven out of ten respondents either agreed (63.4%) or strongly agreed 
(7.0%) with the statements. While the number of respondents who did not support the statement 
was 37 (12.7%), 48 respondents (16.7 %) specified that they were not sure about this indicator. 
The second indicator asked respondents whether “the organizations constantly develop long-term 
relationships among each other”. A majority of respondents reported disagreement (disagree, 
58.7%; strongly disagree, 9.0%) with the statement. Only 27 (9.0%) people supported, whereas 
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66 respondents (22.9) were not sure. The third indicator is designed to evaluate the constant 
exchange of information among member organizations. Almost 4 out of 10 respondents (38.9%) 
did not agree with the statement, while around a quarter of the respondents support the indicator. 
34.4 % of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with the constant exchange of 
information.  
 The following two indicators were designed to evaluate whether the network provides 
member organizations to improve the ability of collecting and using information against terrorist 
and criminal activities. For both indicators, respondents mostly supported (59.3 % and 64.7% 
respectively) the statements. Again for both questions, almost equal numbers of the respondents 
stated that the network does not provide organizations to improve their information collecting 
capacity (11.3%), information using capacity (10.4%). The sixth indicator asked respondents 
whether the public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations. While 36.3% 
of respondents found the network successful, 27.1% of the respondents stated that it is not 
successful in joint operations. Almost four out of ten respondents (38.5%) are not sure about this 
indicator. The next two indicators ask respondents whether the public security network is 
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and organized crime activities. Both questions had 
similar results. 33.2% of the respondents either agreed or strongly agreed that the network is 
successful in preventing terrorist attacks and 34.4% of them accepted the network is successful 
in preventing organized crime activities. The percentage of respondents who do not find the 
network successful in preventing terrorist attack was 25.2%, while disagreement responses 
accounted for 23.2% in preventing organized crime activities. An almost equal percentage of 
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respondents (41.6% and 42.5% respectively) in both questions neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the statement. 
 The tenth and eleventh indicators aim to measure the success of the network in solving 
terror and organized crime cases.102 respondents (35.2%) found their network successful in 
solving terror case and 111 respondents (39.4%) found their network successful in solving 
organized crime cases. The same numbers of respondents (58) in both questions did not support 
the statements. The last two questions in this section were designed to evaluate the success of the 
network in capturing or eliminating the terrorists and members of organized crime groups. 92 
respondents either agreed (31.2%) or strongly agreed (1.1%) while 70 respondents either 
disagreed (22.5%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) with the statement related to capturing or 
eliminating the terrorists. The statement related to capturing or eliminating members of 
organized crime groups was either agreed (34.3%) or strongly agreed (1%) by 92 respondents, 
whereas 66 respondents either disagreed (20.6%) or strongly disagreed (2.4%). More than four 
out of ten respondents were not sure about the indicators in the last four questions (44.3%, 
40.1%, 43.2 and 41.6 respectively). 
4.1.2 Exogenous Variables 
The study analyzed the effects of inter-organizational trust, three network leadership 
styles (commissioner, co-producer, and facilitator), goal convergence, and 6 unique 
characteristics of security agencies’ organizational culture on network effectiveness. Since each 
of these characteristics of organizational culture was measured by one separate question in the 
survey, organizational culture is not a latent variable. Therefore, there are 5 latent and 6 
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observable exogenous variables. Indicators of each of the five latent constructs and 6 observable 
variables’ frequency analysis were conducted separately to understand the general characteristics 
of the dataset and evaluate the general picture. All of the exogenous variables were measured by 
a five-point Likert response scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). 
Respondents were asked to identify a province public security network that they had an 
opportunity to observe closely, and rate each of the statements in regard to this province’s public 
security network. 
4.1.2.1 Inter-organizational Trust 
 The survey used nine items to measure the level of trust among member agencies in a 
province public security network. These nine items indicate different attributes of inter-
organizational trust. Respondents were asked to evaluate the level of open communication 
among member agencies, perception about reliability, honesty, mutual understanding, mutual 
acceptance, perceptions about keeping commitment in the collaborative process, perceptions 
about other actors’ capability, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness in the 
selected province security network. Indicators of inter-organizational trust have the most diverse 
distribution of responses in the entire survey. The results indicate a relatively variant distribution 
compared to the other latent constructs. Table 4 summarizes answers of the indicators of inter-
organizational trust in the form of frequency distributions.  Missing values were not replaced to 
illustrate the raw format of the dataset.  The items have around 1% missing values. The 
categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest. 
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Table 4 Frequency Distribution of Items for Inter-organizational Trust 
 
Indicator 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Organizations 
involving the 
province public 
security network 
have an open 
communication 
(T1) 
 
Valid Disagree 108 35.4 35.5 35.5 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
91 29.8 29.9 65.5 
Agree 78 25.6 25.7 91.1 
Strongly Disagree 22 7.2 7.2 98.4 
Strongly Agree 5 1.6 1.6 100.0 
Total 304 99.7 100.0  
Missing  1 .3   
Total 305 100.0   
Organizations in 
this public 
security network 
are reliable 
partners 
(T2) 
Valid Agree 116 38.0 38.2 38.2 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
99 32.5 32.6 70.7 
Disagree 72 23.6 23.7 94.4 
Strongly Disagree 10 3.3 3.3 97.7 
Strongly Agree 7 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 304 99.7 100.0  
Missing  1 .3   
Total 305 100.0   
Honesty is the 
basis of inter-
organizational 
collaboration in 
the public security 
network 
(T3) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
109 35.7 36.1 36.1 
Agree 92 30.2 30.5 66.6 
Disagree 68 22.3 22.5 89.1 
Strongly Agree 17 5.6 5.6 94.7 
Strongly Disagree 16 5.2 5.3 100.0 
  
96 
 
 
Indicator 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Total 302 99.0 100.0  
Missing  3 1.0   
Total 305 100.0   
 
Inter-
organizational 
relations in the 
network are 
characterized by 
mutual 
understanding 
(T4) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
105 34.4 34.7 34.7 
Agree 92 30.2 30.4 65.0 
Disagree 90 29.5 29.7 94.7 
Strongly Disagree 8 2.6 2.6 97.4 
Strongly Agree 8 2.6 2.6 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
Missing  2 .7   
Total 305 100.0   
 
Mutual acceptance 
is the important 
part of inter-
organizational 
collaboration in 
the network 
(T5) 
Valid Agree 146 47.9 48.3 48.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
63 20.7 20.9 69.2 
Disagree 45 14.8 14.9 84.1 
Strongly Agree 42 13.8 13.9 98.0 
Strongly Disagree 6 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 302 99.0 100.0  
Missing  3 1.0   
Total 305 100.0   
The organizations 
in the network 
keep their 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
121 39.7 40.2 40.2 
Agree 115 37.7 38.2 78.4 
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Indicator 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
commitment 
(T6) 
 
Disagree 48 15.7 15.9 94.4 
Strongly Disagree 10 3.3 3.3 97.7 
Strongly Agree 7 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 301 98.7 100.0  
Missing  4 1.3   
Total 305 100.0   
There is a 
common belief 
across the network 
that each actor is 
capable of 
contributing to the 
overall picture 
 (T7) 
Valid Agree 141 46.2 46.8 46.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
80 26.2 26.6 73.4 
Disagree 63 20.7 20.9 94.4 
Strongly Agree 10 3.3 3.3 97.7 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.3 2.3 100.0 
Total 301 98.7 100.0  
Missing  4 1.3   
Total 305 100.0   
Inter-
organizational 
collaboration is 
characterized by 
mutual respect in 
the network  
(T8) 
Valid Agree 141 46.2 46.5 46.5 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
92 30.2 30.4 76.9 
Disagree 57 18.7 18.8 95.7 
Strongly Disagree 7 2.3 2.3 98.0 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
Missing  2 .7   
Total 305 100.0   
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Indicator 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
The organizations 
in the network 
collaborate with a 
sense of fairness 
towards each other 
(T9) 
Valid Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
122 40.0 40.7 40.7 
Disagree 98 32.1 32.7 73.3 
Agree 64 21.0 21.3 94.7 
Strongly Disagree 14 4.6 4.7 99.3 
Strongly Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 300 98.4 100.0  
Missing  5 1.6   
Total 305 100.0   
 
 The first indicator of inter-organizational trust is related to open communication. Most 
of the respondents stated that they either disagree (35.5%) or strongly disagree (7.2%) that 
organizations in their security network have an open communication. Open communication was 
either agreed or strongly agreed with by 83 respondents, with a cumulative percentage of 27.2%. 
Ninety-one respondents (29.8%) neither disagree nor agree about this indicator. The second 
indicator asked the reliability of partner agencies. Reliability was either agreed or strongly 
agreed with by 123 respondents. Thus, 40.3% of the cumulative percentage of the respondents 
either agreed or strongly agreed with the indicator. 99 respondents (32.5%) were not sure about 
this indicator, while 82 respondents either disagree (23.6) or strongly disagree (3.3) about the 
reliability of partners. A great number of respondents (35.7%) were not sure that honesty is the 
basis of the collaboration in the network. Honesty was either agreed (30.2%) or strongly agreed 
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(5.6%) with by 109 respondents, with a cumulative percentage of 35.8%. 84 respondents either 
disagreed (22.3%) or strongly disagreed (5.2%) with the statement. 
 The fourth question reflected the mutual understanding in the network. 100 respondents 
either agreed (30.2%) or strongly agreed (2.6%) with the statement. An almost equal number of 
respondents stated that they either disagree (29.55) or strongly disagree (2.6%) with the 
statement in this is question. 34.4% of respondents neither disagree nor agree with the statement 
of the fourth indicator. The following indicator addressed mutual acceptance in the network. The 
majority of the respondents agreed (47.9%) or strongly agreed (13.8%) with the statement. While 
20.7% of the respondents were not sure, only 16.8% disagree or strongly disagree with the 
indicator. The sixth indicator was designed to evaluate organizations’ keeping commitment to 
the network. Most of the respondents (39.7%) were not sure or clear about the item. The 
cumulative percentage of the respondents who either reported agreement or strong agreement 
was 40%, while only 19% of the respondents either disagreed (15.7%) or strongly disagreed 
(3.3%) with the statement. 
 The following indicator is designed to evaluate the actors’ capability in the network. 
Respondents mostly stated that they either agree (46.2%) or strongly agree (3.3 %) with the 
statement that there is a common belief across the network about each actors’ capability of 
contributing to the overall picture. Only 23% of the respondents did not support the statement. 
The remaining 80 respondents (26.2 %) were not sure about the indicator. The next indicator is 
about mutual respect in the network. Frequency distribution of answers to mutual respect 
indicator is on similar lines with the previous indicator. While 48.2% of the respondents reported 
  
100 
 
agreement (46.2%) or strong agreement (2.0%), 20.7% did not support the statement. The last 
indicator addressed sense of fairness. The great number of respondents neither disagreed nor 
agreed (40.0%) with the statement. Respondents who either disagreed (32.1%) or strongly 
disagreed (4.6%) account for 36.7% of total responses. Only 68 people responded that they agree 
(21.0%) or strongly agree (0.7%) with the statement. 
4.1.2.2 Network Leadership Styles 
 Three types of leadership styles, which are commissioner, co-producer, and facilitator 
leadership styles, represent the network leadership in this study. The survey used 18 items to 
evaluate the existing situation with regards to the leadership styles. For each three leadership 
styles six items were used. These six items indicate different attributes leadership styles. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate; who formulates network goals and visions; what is the role 
of the governor in the network; who steers the network activities; who makes the decisions; and 
who takes responsibility from the network activities.  
4.1.2.2.1 Commissioner Style of Leadership 
A great majority of the respondents did not support the statements related to the 
commissioner leadership style. More than half of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed 
with all of the statements of this latent construct. Table 5 summarizes answers of the indicators 
of commissioner style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions.  Missing values were 
not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the dataset. Most of the indicators have less than 1% 
missing values. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest. 
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Table 5 Frequency Distribution of Items for Commissioner Style of Leadership 
 
     
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Network goals 
are formulated 
solely by the 
governor in the 
network. 
(NL1) 
Valid Disagree 151 49.5 49.7 49.7 
Agree 52 17.0 17.1 66.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
49 16.1 16.1 82.9 
Strongly Disagree 44 14.4 14.5 97.4 
Strongly Agree 8 2.6 2.6 100.0 
Total 304 99.7 100.0  
Missing  1 .3   
Total 305 100.0   
Network vision is 
formulated solely 
by the governor 
in the network. 
(NL2) 
Valid Disagree 153 50.2 50.2 50.2 
Neither Disagree 
or Agree 
64 21.0 21.0 71.1 
Strongly Disagree 45 14.8 14.8 85.9 
Agree 37 12.1 12.1 98.0 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 305 100.0 100.0  
 Missing  1 .3   
 Total 305 100.0   
The governor acts 
as an executor 
(NL3) 
 
Valid Disagree 134 43.9 44.1 44.1 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
74 24.3 24.3 68.4 
Agree 65 21.3 21.4 89.8 
Strongly Disagree 28 9.2 9.2 99.0 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 304 99.7 100.0  
 Missing  1 .3   
 Total 305 100.0   
Network activities 
are steered by the 
governor  
(NL4) 
Valid Disagree 141 46.2 46.5 46.5 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
87 28.5 28.7 75.2 
Agree 44 14.4 14.5 89.8 
Strongly Disagree 28 9.2 9.2 99.0 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
 Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
 
Decisions in the 
network are 
made solely 
by the 
governor 
(NL5) 
Valid Disagree 155 50.8 51.2 51.2 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
72 23.6 23.8 74.9 
Strongly Disagree 55 18.0 18.2 93.1 
Agree 20 6.6 6.6 99.7 
Strongly Agree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
 Valid Disagree 123 40.3 40.7 40.7 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
The governor 
takes full 
responsibility for 
the public security 
network activities 
(NL6) 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
71 23.3 23.5 64.2 
Agree 67 22.0 22.2 86.4 
Strongly Disagree 36 11.8 11.9 98.3 
Strongly Agree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 302 99.0 100.0  
 Missing  3 1.0   
 Total 305 100.0   
  
 The first two items asked to evaluate the statement that network goals and vision are 
formulated solely by the governor in the network. Of the total 305 respondents, 195 respondents 
reported disagreement (49.5%) or strong disagreement (14.4%) with the first statement, for a 
cumulative percentage of 63.9 %. Only 19.6% of the respondents agreed or disagreed with the 
first statement. Similarly, 65% of the respondents either disagreed (50.2%) or strongly disagreed 
(14.4%) for the second statement which was related to the vision of the network. Only 43 
respondents (16.9%) reported agreement or strong agreement about the fact that network vision 
is formulated solely by the governor. The third item asked to evaluate the statement that 
“network activities are steered by the governor.” While 198 respondents either disagreed (43.9%) 
or strongly disagreed (14.8%), only 68 respondents (22.3%) supported the statement. Almost a 
quarter of respondents (24.3%) neither agreed nor disagreed with this statement.  
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 The fourth item asked to assess the sentences that “network activities are steered by the 
governor.” The total number of people who either agreed (14.4%) or strongly agreed (1.0%) with 
the fourth item was 47. On the other hand, the total number of respondents who either disagreed 
(46.2%) or strongly disagreed (9.2%) with the statement is 196 at the cumulative percentage of 
55.4%. 87 people (28.8%) stated that they neither agree nor disagree, and 210 respondents out of 
303 either disagreed (50.8%) or strongly disagreed (18%) with the statement that “decisions in 
the network are made solely by the governor”, whereas only 6.9%  reported agreement. 72 
respondents neither disagreed nor agreed (23.6%) with the indicator. According to the results of 
the sixth indicator, 52.1% of respondents did not think that the governor takes full responsibility 
for network activities. Instead, 23.6 % of the responses either agree strongly agree with the 
statement. 23.3% of the responses account for neither agree nor disagree choice. 
4.1.2.2.2 Co-producer Style of Leadership 
 The responses to the statements in the survey related to the co-producer leadership style 
presents a relatively variant distribution compared to commissioner leadership style. However, 
most answers to the indicators accumulate in disagree responses. Except the fourth item (NL10), 
the numbers of disagreements are more than agreements responses. Table 6 summarizes answers 
of the indicators of co-producer style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions. Most 
of the indicators have less than 1% missing values. They were not replaced to illustrate the raw 
format of the dataset. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest.  
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Table 6 Frequency Distribution of Items for Co-producer Style of Leadership 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Goals are 
Formulated by all 
partners jointly 
(NL7) 
 
Valid Disagree 115 37.7 38.0 38.0 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
85 27.9 28.1 66.0 
Agree 74 24.3 24.4 90.4 
Strongly Disagree 26 8.5 8.6 99.0 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
 Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
Network vision is 
formulated by all 
partners jointly  
(NL8) 
 
 
Valid Disagree 112 36.7 37.3 37.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
96 31.5 32.0 69.3 
Agree 66 21.6 22.0 91.3 
Strongly Disagree 24 7.9 8.0 99.3 
Strongly Agree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 300 98.4 100.0  
Missing  5 1.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
The Governor acts 
as a partner in the 
network instead of 
a hierarchical 
superior 
(NL9) 
 
Valid Disagree 131 43.0 43.2 43.2 
Agree 75 24.6 24.8 68.0 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
66 21.6 21.8 89.8 
Strongly Disagree 25 8.2 8.3 98.0 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 2.0 100.0 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Total 303 99.3 100.0  
 Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
Network activities 
are steered jointly 
(NL10) 
Valid Agree 111 36.4 36.6 36.6 
Disagree 88 28.9 29.0 65.7 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
86 28.2 28.4 94.1 
Strongly Disagree 15 4.9 5.0 99.0 
Strongly Agree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
Decisions in the 
network are made 
by all partners 
jointly 
(NL11) 
Valid Disagree 111 36.4 36.8 36.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
92 30.2 30.5 67.2 
Agree 78 25.6 25.8 93.0 
Strongly Disagree 20 6.6 6.6 99.7 
Strongly Agree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 302 99.0 100.0  
Missing  3 1.0   
Total 305 100.0   
All partners are 
jointly responsible 
from network 
activities 
(NL12) 
Valid Disagree 130 42.6 42.9 42.9 
Agree 79 25.9 26.1 69.0 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
68 22.3 22.4 91.4 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Disagree 22 7.2 7.3 98.7 
Strongly Agree 4 1.3 1.3 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
 Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
 A majority of the respondents did not support that network goals and vision are 
formulated by all partners jointly.  The number of respondents who either disagreed (38 %) or 
strongly disagreed (8.6 %) with the first statement is 141 out of 303. The numbers of people who 
think the goals are formulated by all partners jointly are 77 (Agree, 24.4%; Strongly Agree, 
1.0%). 85 respondents (28.1 %) indicated that they were not sure or clear about this indicator. 
The cumulative percentage of those who either disagreed or strongly agreed that network vision 
is formulated by all partners jointly is 45.3 (37.3 % and 8.0% respectively). 96 respondents 
(32%) neither disagreed nor agreed with the indicator, while the number of people who 
supported was 68 (22.7%). For the third indicator respondents were asked to evaluate to the 
statement that ‘the governor acts as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior.” 
131 respondents disagreed (43.2) and 25 respondents strongly disagreed (8.2%). The cumulative 
percentage of those who reported agreement for this item is 26.8%. Around one fifth of the 
respondents (21.6%) were not sure about this statement. 
The fourth indicator is the only item that the agreement responses exceed the 
disagreement responses in co-producer style of leadership indicators. This item asks respondents 
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to evaluate the statement that “network activities are steered jointly.” For this statement, 114 
respondents either agreed or strongly agreed, constituting a cumulative percentage of 37.6%, and 
34.0% percent of the respondents indicated disagreement with this item. The number of people 
who were not sure or clear about this item is 86 (28.4 %). The last statement in this latent 
construct was related to joint decisions and joint responsibilities. While the statement related to 
joint decisions was either disagreed (36.4) or strongly disagreed (6.6%) with by 131 people, for a 
cumulative percentage of 43.4%, the cumulative number of people who either disagreed (42.9%) 
or strongly disagreed (7.3%) with the statement is 152.The number of people who either agreed 
or strongly agreed with the joint decisions statement is 80 (26.1%), and the number of people 
who supported the joint responsibility statement is 83 (27.4%). 
4.1.2.2.3 Facilitator Style of Leadership 
Overall responses to the indicators of facilitator style of leadership accumulate within 
strongly agree and agree responses. The results clearly indicate that that facilitator leadership 
style is the most common leadership style in Turkish province public security networks, 
compared to commissioner and co-producer leadership styles. Table 7 summarizes answers of 
the indicators of facilitator style of leadership in the form of frequency distributions. Similar to 
previous constructs, the indicators have a very low number of missing values. The categories 
were provided in ascending order from highest to lowest. 
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Table 7 Frequency Distribution of Items for Facilitator Style of Leadership 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Each organization is 
formulating their 
own goals 
separately 
(NL13) 
Valid Agree 155 50.8 51.5 51.5 
Disagree 62 20.3 20.6 72.1 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
52 17.0 17.3 89.4 
Strongly Agree 26 8.5 8.6 98.0 
Strongly Disagree 6 2.0 2.0 100.0 
Total 301 98.7 100.0  
Missing  4 1.3   
 Total 305 100.0   
Each organization is 
formulating their 
own visions 
separately in the 
network. 
(NL14) 
Valid Agree 172 56.4 56.6 56.6 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
54 17.7 17.8 74.3 
Disagree 51 16.7 16.8 91.1 
Strongly Agree 24 7.9 7.9 99.0 
Strongly Disagree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 304 99.7 100.0  
Missing  1 .3   
Total 305 100.0   
 
The governor acts 
as an initiator to 
facilitate the 
collaboration 
(NL15) 
Valid Agree 209 68.5 69.0 69.0 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
48 15.7 15.8 84.8 
Disagree 28 9.2 9.2 94.1 
Strongly Agree 18 5.9 5.9 100.0 
Total 303 99.3 100.0  
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Missing  2 .7   
 Total 305 100.0   
Network activities 
are steered by each 
organization 
(NL16) 
Valid Agree 182 59.7 60.5 60.5 
Disagree 54 17.7 17.9 78.4 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
50 16.4 16.6 95.0 
Strongly Agree 14 4.6 4.7 99.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 301 98.7 100.0  
 Missing  4 1.3   
 Total 305 100.0   
Decisions in the 
network are made 
by each 
organization 
(NL17) 
 
Valid Agree 131 43.0 43.5 43.5 
Disagree 84 27.5 27.9 71.4 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
78 25.6 25.9 97.3 
Strongly Agree 6 2.0 2.0 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 301 98.7 100.0  
Missing  4 1.3   
 Total 305 100.0   
Each partner is 
responsible for their 
own activities 
(NL18) 
Valid Agree 224 73.4 74.2 74.2 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
40 13.1 13.2 87.4 
Disagree 22 7.2 7.3 94.7 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Strongly Agree 13 4.3 4.3 99.0 
Strongly Disagree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 302 99.0 100.0  
 Missing  3 1.0   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
 Slightly more than half of the respondents (51.5%) agreed and 8.5% strongly agreed 
with the first statement of “each organization is formulating their own goals separately in the 
network.” While 22.6 percent did not support, a total of 17.3% have stated that they are not sure 
about this statement. The second item evaluates the statement of “each organization is 
formulating their own visions separately in the network.” Of the total 304 respondents, 196 (64.5 
%) agreed or agreed strongly and only 54 respondents (17.8 %) either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with this statement. 17.7% share belongs to respondents that neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the item. More than seven out of ten respondents stated that they either agreed 
(69.0%) or strongly agreed (5.9%) with the statement that the governor acts as an initiator to 
facilitate the collaboration. There are only 28 respondents (9.2 %) who reported disagreement 
and 48 respondents who were not sure about the statement. 
 For the fourth indicator, which is “network activities are steered by each organization,” 
196 respondents either agreed or strongly agreed with a cumulative percentage of 65.2. 55 
respondents either disagreed or strongly disagreed with this, for a cumulative percentage of 18.2. 
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The fifth item stating that “decisions in the network are made by each organization” has the 
lowest percentage of agreement responses in this latent construct (Agree, 43.5%; Strongly Agree, 
2.0%). While 28.9% percent of respondents reported disagreement, 25.9 percent of the 
respondents were not sure or clear about the statement. The last item stating that “each partner is 
responsible for their own activities” has the highest number (224) and percentage of agreement 
responses (74.2 %) among all other questions in this construct. The respondents who agreed or 
strongly agreed with the statement account for 78.5% of total responses while neither agree nor 
disagree responses have 13.1 % share and disagreement responses have only 5.3% share. 
4.1.2.3 Goal Convergence 
 The survey used six items to measure the level of organizational goal convergence in a 
province public security network. These six items indicate different attributes of goal 
convergence. Respondents were asked to evaluate the difference in organizational priorities, 
organizational goals, expectations and mission, diverging goals, and common points among 
member organizations in an identified public security network. As opposed to the previous 
constructs, statements in the goal convergence section of the survey were reversed. Therefore, 
agreement responses represent goal divergence and disagreement responses represent goal 
convergence. Overall responses to the statements of organizational goal convergence except the 
GC4 accumulate within agree and strongly agree choices. The results indicate that respondents 
think there is a low level of organizational goal convergence in province public security 
networks. Table 8 summarizes answers of the indicators of organizational goal convergence in 
the form of frequency distributions.  Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw 
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format of the dataset.  The items have around 5% missing values. The categories were provided 
in ascending order from highest to lowest.  
Table 8 Frequency Distribution of Items for Goal Convergence 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 
Organizations in the 
public security 
network have 
different 
organizational 
priorities 
(GC1) 
Valid Agree 191 62.6 66.1 66.1 
Strongly Agree 56 18.4 19.4 85.5 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
25 8.2 8.7 94.1 
Disagree 15 4.9 5.2 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 289 94.8 100.0  
 Missing  16 5.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
Collaboration in the 
public security is 
challenging due to a 
multiplicity of 
differing 
organizational 
backgrounds 
(GC2) 
Valid Agree 197 64.6 68.4 68.4 
Strongly Agree 56 18.4 19.4 87.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
25 8.2 8.7 96.5 
Disagree 7 2.3 2.4 99.0 
Strongly Disagree 3 1.0 1.0 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
 Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
There is a gap 
between 
organizational goals 
Valid Agree 142 46.6 49.7 49.7 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
64 21.0 22.4 72.0 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
in the network 
(GC3) 
Disagree 52 17.0 18.2 90.2 
Strongly Agree 22 7.2 7.7 97.9 
Strongly Disagree 6 2.0 2.1 100.0 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
 Missing  19 6.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
Organizations 
working together 
have little in common 
(GC4) 
Valid Disagree 136 44.6 46.9 46.9 
Agree 81 26.6 27.9 74.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
61 20.0 21.0 95.9 
Strongly Agree 7 2.3 2.4 98.3 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 290 95.1 100.0  
 Missing  15 4.9   
 Total 305 100.0   
Diverging 
organizational 
expectations is the 
reality of public 
security networks 
(GC5) 
Valid Agree 188 61.6 65.3 65.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
51 16.7 17.7 83.0 
Disagree 31 10.2 10.8 93.8 
Strongly Agree 17 5.6 5.9 99.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
 Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Organizations are 
hardly related in 
terms of their 
organizational 
missions  
           (GC6) 
Valid Agree 142 46.6 49.3 49.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
71 23.3 24.7 74.0 
Disagree 64 21.0 22.2 96.2 
Strongly Agree 9 3.0 3.1 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
 The first indicator was developed to assess the difference in organizational priorities. 
A great majority of the respondents (247 out of 289) selected that they either agree (66.1%) or 
strongly agree (18.4%) that organizations in the network have different organizational priorities. 
Only seventeen respondents (5.9%) stated that he/she disagrees with the statement, whereas 
8.7% of the respondents neither agreed nor disagreed with it . The second item reflected the 
difference in organizational backgrounds. This indicator has the highest percentage of agreement 
responses in this latent construct. 253 out of 288 respondents (87.8%) either agreed (68.4%) or 
strongly agreed (19.4%) with that collaboration is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing 
organizational backgrounds. Only ten respondents (3.4%) stated that they either disagree or 
strongly disagree with the statement. The frequency distribution of answers for organizational 
goals is more diverse than the previous two items. More than half of the respondents either 
agreed (49.7%) or strongly agreed (7.7 %) with the statement.  58 respondents either disagreed 
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(18.2%) or strongly disagreed (2.1%) and 64 of them neither agreed nor disagreed (22.4%) with 
this question.  
  The fourth statement is the only indicator that reported disagreement reports exceed 
agreement responses in this latent construct. 141 respondents either disagreed (46.9%) or 
strongly disagreed (1.7%) that organizations working together have little in common. 88 
respondents either agreed (27.9%) or strongly agreed (2.4%) and 61 respondents (21%) were not 
sure with the statement. The total number of respondents who either agreed (65.3%) or strongly 
agreed (5.9) with the fifth item that states diverging organizational expectations is the reality of 
the network was 205. While 51 respondents (17.7%) were not sure about this statement, 32 
people responded (11.2%) that they do not agree with the statement. The last indicator of goal 
convergence asks to evaluate the statement of “organizations are hardly related in terms of their 
organizational missions.” This statement was either agreed or strongly agreed with by 151 
respondents. Thus, 52.4% of the cumulative percentage of the respondents either agreed or 
strongly agreed with the indicator. 71 respondents (24.7%) were not sure about this indicator, 
while 66 respondents (22.9) either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement.  
4.1.2.4 Organizational Culture 
Organizational culture refers to common cultural attributes of public security 
organizations. The study focused on six unique characteristics of security organizations, which 
are defensiveness, secrecy, hierarchy, isolation, group loyalty, and competition. Organizational 
culture is not designed as a latent construct in this study. The survey used a single specific item 
to measure for each six characteristic of security organizations. Respondents were asked to 
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evaluate a specific statement for each variable. Thus, variables of organizational culture were 
designed as observable variables. Similar to organizational goal convergence, statements in 
organizational culture of the survey were reversed. Therefore, agreement responses represent a 
problematic situation for collaboration in the network. Overall responses to the statements of 
organizational culture intensively accumulate within agree and strongly agree choices. The 
results indicate that respondents think attributes of organizational culture in public security lead 
to difficulties for collaboration in local public security networks. Table 9 summarizes responses 
of the statements related to organizational culture in the form of frequency distributions.  
Missing values were not replaced to illustrate the raw format of the dataset.  The items have 
around 5% missing values. The categories were provided in ascending order from highest to 
lowest. 
Table 9 Frequency Distribution of Items for Organizational Culture 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
The organizations 
involving the public 
security network do 
not confront 
problems without 
becoming defensive 
(OC1) 
 
Valid Agree 168 55.1 58.3 58.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
45 14.8 15.6 74.0 
Strongly Agree 44 14.4 15.3 89.2 
Disagree 26 8.5 9.0 98.3 
Strongly Disagree 5 1.6 1.7 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
Collaboration in the Valid Agree 174 57.0 60.4 60.4 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
public security 
network is 
challenging due to 
organizational 
secrecy     
perceptions of the 
network members 
(OC2) 
Strongly Agree 90 29.5 31.3 91.7 
Disagree 12 3.9 4.2 95.8 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
10 3.3 3.5 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
Missing  17 5.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
Collaboration in the 
public security 
network is 
challenging due to a 
strict hierarchy in the 
organizations. 
(OC3) 
Valid Agree 180 59.0 62.9 62.9 
Strongly Agree 64 21.0 22.4 85.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
21 6.9 7.3 92.7 
Disagree 19 6.2 6.6 99.3 
Strongly Disagree 2 .7 .7 100.0 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
 Missing  19 6.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
Collaboration in the 
public security 
network is 
challenging due to a 
sense of isolation 
among employees of 
the member 
organizations 
(OC4) 
Valid Agree 182 59.7 63.2 63.2 
Strongly Agree 55 18.0 19.1 82.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
40 13.1 13.9 96.2 
Disagree 10 3.3 3.5 99.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 288 94.4 100.0  
Missing  17 5.6   
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Total 305 100.0   
When an employee 
of an organization in 
the network makes a 
mistake, fellows feel    
responsibility to 
protect him/her. 
(OC5) 
Valid Agree 167 54.8 57.8 57.8 
Strongly Agree 53 17.4 18.3 76.1 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
45 14.8 15.6 91.7 
Disagree 23 7.5 8.0 99.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 289 94.8 100.0  
 Missing  16 5.2   
 Total 305 100.0   
Collaboration in the 
public security is 
challenging due to 
competition among 
organizations 
(OC6) 
Valid Agree 170 55.7 58.6 58.6 
Strongly Agree 63 20.7 21.7 80.3 
Neither Disagree or 
Agree 
36 11.8 12.4 92.8 
Disagree 20 6.6 6.9 99.7 
Strongly Disagree 1 .3 .3 100.0 
Total 290 95.1 100.0  
Missing  15 4.9   
 Total 305 100.0   
 
The first question in this section is designed to evaluate the characteristics of 
defensiveness in member organizations in the network. Respondents mostly stated that they 
either agree (58.3%) or strongly agree (31.3 %) with the statement that organizations involving 
the network do not confront problems without becoming defensive. Only 31 (10.7%) respondents 
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did not support the statement. The remaining 45 respondents (15.6 %) were not sure about the 
item. The next indicator is about organizational secrecy. This statement had the highest 
agreement responses of the entire survey. Of the total 288 responses, 264 respondents (91.7%) 
either agreed (60.4%) or strongly agreed (31.3%) with that “collaboration in the public security 
network is challenging due to organizational secrecy perceptions of the network members.” Only 
14 respondents (4.9%) stated that they either disagree or strongly disagree, and 10 respondents 
(3.5%) were not sure about the statement. The third statement is related to hierarchy. Most of the 
respondents (83.3%) stated that they either agree (62.9%) or strongly agree (22.4%) with that 
collaboration in the network is challenging due to a strict hierarchy in the organizations. The 
statement was either disagreed or strongly disagreed with by 21 respondents, with a cumulative 
percentage of 7.3%. Similarly, 21 respondents neither disagree nor agree with this statement. 
Frequency distribution of answers to the statement about the sense of isolation among 
employees of the member organizations is on similar lines with previous statements. While 
82.3% of the respondents reported agreement (63.2%) or strong agreement (19.1%), 8.3% did 
not support the statement. The fifth indicator addressed group loyalty. A great number of 
respondents either agreed (57.8) or strongly agreed (18.3%) with the statement of, “when an 
employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake, fellows feel responsibility to 
protect him/her”.  Respondents who either disagreed or strongly disagreed account for 8.3% of 
total responses. The last items asked respondents to evaluate the statement of “collaboration in 
the public security is challenging due to competition among organizations.” Again respondents 
mostly stated that they either agree (58.6%) or strongly agree (21.7%) with the statement. Only 
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7.2% of the respondents did not support the statement. The remaining 36 respondents (12.4 %) 
were not sure about the indicator.  
4.1.3 Control Variables 
The study has three control variables: The population of the jurisdictions in which public 
security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of terrorism, and risk level of 
jurisdiction in terms of organized crime were selected as control variables. All of these three 
variables were grouped as ordinal level variables. Table 10 presents frequency distribution of the 
control variables of the study. 
Table 10 Frequency Distribution of Control Variables 
 
 
Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Population 
POP 
 
Valid Over 2.000.000 31 10.2 10.8 100.0 
1.000,000- 2.000.000 44 14.4 15.4 89.2 
500.000-1.000.000 66 21.6 23.1 73.8 
250.000- 500.000 79 25.9 27.6 27.6 
Under 250.000 66 21.6 23.1 50.7 
Total 286 93.8 100.0  
Missing  19 6.2   
Total 305 100.0   
 
 
Terror 
Risk 
Level 
Valid Very High  56 18.4 19.6 47.0 
High         53 17.4 18.6 65.6 
Medium 78 25.6 27.4 27.4 
Low 47 15.4 16.5 100.0 
Very Low 51 16.7 17.9 83.5 
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Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
(TRL) Total 285 93.4 100.0  
 Missing  20 6.6   
 Total 305 100.0   
Organized 
Crime Risk 
Level 
Valid Very High 33 10.8 11.7 95.4 
High 79 25.9 28.0 66.3 
Medium 108 35.4 38.3 38.3 
Low 49 16.1 17.4 83.7 
Very Low 13 4.3 4.6 100.0 
Total 282 92.5 100.0  
Missing  23 7.5   
Total 305 100.0   
 According to Table 10, 79 respondents selected provinces serving a population between 
250,000 and 500,000; 66 respondents selected provinces serving a population less than 250,000 ; 
Again 66 respondents evaluated provinces serving a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000; 
44 respondents selected provinces serving a population between 1,000,000 and 2,000,000; and 
31 respondents evaluated provinces serving a population more than 2,000,000. 
With regards to the jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of terrorism: 78 respondents think 
that his/her province is in medium risk category; 56 respondents think that his/her province is in 
very high risk category; 53 respondents think that his/her province is in high risk category; 51 
respondents think that his/her province is in low risk category, and 47 respondents think that 
his/her province is in a very low risk category. 
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With regards to the jurisdictions’ risk level in terms of organized crime: 108 respondents 
think that his/her province is in a medium risk category; 79 respondents think that his/her 
province is in high risk category; 49 respondents think that his/her province is in low risk 
category; 33 respondents think that his/her province is in very high risk category, and 13 
respondents think that his/her province is in very low risk category. 
In general, the descriptive statistics analysis results show that the indicators of network 
effectiveness and inter-organizational trust have relatively diverse distribution of responses. The 
most common leadership style is facilitator leadership style, whereas commissioner leadership 
style is not usually preferred by Turkish province governors for public security networks. A great 
majority of responses indicate that inter-organizational goal convergence is not high, and specific 
characteristics of organizational culture in the public security sector make collaboration difficult 
in public security networks. The numbers of missing responses are in acceptable ranges to be 
handled by expectation maximization method. 
4.2 Correlation Analyses 
After examining the frequency distributions of the latent construct, correlation analysis 
was performed to identify relationships among study variables and the possible multicollinearity 
problem. Multicollinearity is a common problem, which occurs when two or more variables are 
highly correlated. Multicollinearity “generates biased estimates of the parameters” (Wan, 2002, 
p. 76).  There are different arguments related to the threshold for multicollinearity.  Kline (2005) 
suggests that below .90 is an acceptable threshold for the multicollinearity while Garson (2012) 
argues that multicollinearity is a problem when correlation is higher than .85, and Meyers, Gamst 
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and Guarino (2006) accept a stricter threshold of .70. This study uses .85 for the multicollinearity 
threshold. 
Table 11 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of the only endogenous variable of 
network effectiveness. The table shows that all 12 indicators of network effectiveness are 
correlated with each other at .01significance level. There are several correlations having the 
value of greater than .85, which are between: NE7 and NE8 (.861); NE9 and NE10 (.859); NE10 
and NE12 (.877); and final NE11 and NE12 (.860). In confirmatory factor analysis, the 
multicollinearity among these indicators will be dealt with by removing NE8, NE10 and NE11 
from the measurement model.   
Table 11 Correlation Matrix for Network Effectiveness 
 NE1 NE2 NE3 NE4 NE5 NE6 NE7 NE8 NE9 NE10 NE11 NE12 
 NE1 Corr. C. 1.000            
Sig. (2-T) .            
N 305            
NE2 Corr. C. .183** 1.000           
Sig. (2-T) .001 .           
N 305 305           
NE3 Corr. C. .454** .403** 1.000          
Sig. (2-T) .000 .000 .          
N 305 305 305          
NE4 Corr. C. .230** .244** .307** 1.000         
Sig. (2-T) .000 .000 .000 .         
N 305 305 305 305         
NE5 Corr. C. .159** .171** .295** .753** 1.000        
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 NE1 NE2 NE3 NE4 NE5 NE6 NE7 NE8 NE9 NE10 NE11 NE12 
Sig. (2-T) .005 .003 .000 .000 .        
N 305 305 305 305 305        
NE6 Corr. C. .163** .374** .297** .444** .425** 1.000       
Sig. (2-T) .004 .000 .000 .000 .000 .       
N 305 305 305 305 305 305       
NE7 Corr. C. .150** .383** .291** .399** .410** .706** 1.000      
Sig. (2-T) .008 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .      
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305      
NE8 Corr. C. .168** .333** .302** .388** .419** .689** .861** 1.000     
Sig. (2-T) .003 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .     
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305     
NE9 Corr. C. .211** .355** .310** .366** .382** .614** .756** .700** 1.000    
Sig. (2-T) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305    
 NE10 Corr. C. .202** .333** .332** .352** .355** .625** .694** .742** .859** 1.000   
 Sig. (2-T) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .   
 N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305   
 NE11 
 
Corr. C. .185** .350** .288** .351** .362** .620** .709** .685** .851** .823** 1.000  
 Sig. (2-T) .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
 N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305  
 NE12 Corr. C. .199** .363** .333** .310** .354** .628** .725** .754** .782** .877** .860** 1.000 
 Sig. (2-T) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
 N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 12 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of inter-organizational trust. The 
table indicates that all indicators of inter-organizational trust are correlated with each other at the 
.01significance level. The correlations between the indicators vary between .237 (T1/T5) and 
.733(T2/T3). Therefore, any multicollinearity problem is not detected, and all indicators of inter-
organizational trust will be kept in the measurement model. 
 
Table 12 Correlation Matrix for Inter-organizational Trust 
 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 
 T1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000         
Sig. (2-tailed) .         
N 305         
T2 Correlation Coefficient .563
**
 1.000        
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .        
N 305 305        
T3 Correlation Coefficient .558
**
 .733
**
 1.000       
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .       
N 305 305 305       
T4 Correlation Coefficient .528
**
 .605
**
 .698
**
 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .      
N 305 305 305 305      
T5 Correlation Coefficient .237
**
 .357
**
 .501
**
 .432
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .     
N 305 305 305 305 305     
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 T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 
T6 Correlation Coefficient .427
**
 .465
**
 .502
**
 .527
**
 .346
**
 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305 305 305 305    
T7 Correlation Coefficient .365
**
 .395
**
 .356
**
 .335
**
 .299
**
 .316
**
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .   
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305   
T8 Correlation Coefficient .478
**
 .489
**
 .486
**
 .548
**
 .295
**
 .515
**
 .440
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305  
T9 Correlation Coefficient .509
**
 .496
**
 .573
**
 .645
**
 .357
**
 .539
**
 .459
**
 .594
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 305 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 13 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of commissioner leadership style. 
According to the table, all indicators of this latent contract are also correlated with each other at 
the .01significance level. The highest correlation is between NL1 and NL2 with the score of.851. 
This indicates a multicollinearity problem, which will be handled in confirmatory analysis by 
either excluding one of those highly correlated indicators from the measurement model or 
combining those indicators. There is not any other high correlation, which is greater than .85, 
between indicators. 
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Table 13 Correlation Matrix for Commissioner Leadership Style 
 NL1 NL2 NL3 NL4 NL5 NL6 
 NL1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .      
N 305      
NL2 Correlation Coefficient .851
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
N 305 305     
NL3 Correlation Coefficient .494
**
 .498
**
 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305    
NL4 Correlation Coefficient .543
**
 .565
**
 .593
**
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .   
N 305 305 305 305   
NL5 Correlation Coefficient .551
**
 .571
**
 .505
**
 .661
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305  
NL6 Correlation Coefficient .342
**
 .333
**
 .361
**
 .427
**
 .411
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 14 Correlation Matrix for Co-producer Leadership Style 
 NL7 NL8 NL9 NL10 NL11 NL12 
 NL7 Correlation Coefficient 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .      
N 305      
NL8 Correlation Coefficient .865
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
N 305 305     
NL9 Correlation Coefficient -.064 -.098 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .265 .088 .    
N 305 305 305    
NL10 Correlation Coefficient .532
**
 .542
**
 -.113
*
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .049 .   
N 305 305 305 305   
NL11 Correlation Coefficient .627
**
 .643
**
 .014 .610
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .811 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305  
NL12 Correlation Coefficient .360
**
 .443
**
 -.081 .454
**
 .509
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .156 .000 .000 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Table 14 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of co-producer leadership style. The 
table shows that all indicators of this latent contract except NL9 are correlated with each other at 
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.01significance level. NL9 has only one significant correlation (-.113) with NL10 among other 
indicators. This is a signal of low factor loadings in confirmatory factor analysis. The highest 
correlation among indicators of co-producer leadership model is between NL7 and NL8 with a 
score of .865. In confirmatory factor analysis, the multicollinearity among these indicators will 
be dealt with by dropping one of these indicators or combining them. 
Table 15 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of facilitator leadership style. The 
table shows that all indicators of this latent contract are correlated with each other at least at .05 
significance level. The lowest correlation score is .131, which is between NL17 and NL 18.  The 
highest correlation in this latent construct is between NL13 and NL14 with the value of .818.This 
score does not indicate a multicollinearity threat, being lower than .85. Thus, no indicator will be 
removed from the measurement model because of the multicollinearity in confirmatory factor 
analysis. 
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Table 15 Correlation Matrix for Facilitator Leadership Style 
 NL13 NL14 NL15 NL16 NL17 NL18 
 NL13 Correlation Coefficient 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .      
N 305      
NL14 Correlation Coefficient .818
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
N 305 305     
NL15 Correlation Coefficient .234
**
 .278
**
 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305    
NL16 Correlation Coefficient .465
**
 .501
**
 .281
**
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .   
N 305 305 305 305   
NL17 Correlation Coefficient .395
**
 .459
**
 .132
*
 .538
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .021 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305  
NL18 Correlation Coefficient .097 .096 .196
**
 .203
**
 .131
*
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .091 .093 .001 .000 .022 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Tables 16 shows inter-item correlations for indicators of organizational goal convergence. 
The table indicates that all indicators are correlated with each other at the .01 significance level. 
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The correlations between these indicators vary between .216 (GC1/GC6) and .487(GC1/GC2). 
Since the values are below .85, there is no sign of multicollinearity and no indicator will be 
removed from the generic measurement model in confirmatory factor analysis. 
Table 16 Correlation Matrix for Organizational Goal Convergence 
 GC1 GC2 GC3 GC4 GC5 GC6 
 GC1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .      
N 305      
GC2 Correlation Coefficient .487
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
N 305 305     
GC3 Correlation Coefficient .423
**
 .438
**
 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305    
GC4 Correlation Coefficient .284
**
 .253
**
 .513
**
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .   
N 305 305 305 305   
GC5 Correlation Coefficient .426
**
 .348
**
 .405
**
 .256
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305  
GC6 Correlation Coefficient .216
**
 .214
**
 .307
**
 .415
**
 .289
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 
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Table 17 Correlation Matrix for Organizational Culture 
 OC1 OC2 OC3 OC4 OC5 OC6 
 OC1 Correlation Coefficient 1.000      
Sig. (2-tailed) .      
N 305      
OC2 Correlation Coefficient .268
**
 1.000     
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .     
N 305 305     
OC3 Correlation Coefficient .334
**
 .521
**
 1.000    
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .    
N 305 305 305    
OC4 Correlation Coefficient .340
**
 .499
**
 .675
**
 1.000   
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .   
N 305 305 305 305   
OC5 Correlation Coefficient .317
**
 .329
**
 .370
**
 .474
**
 1.000  
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .  
N 305 305 305 305 305  
OC6 Correlation Coefficient .387
**
 .418
**
 .559
**
 .595
**
 .445
**
 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 . 
N 305 305 305 305 305 305 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
The values of inter-item correlations for organizational culture are shown in Table 17. 
The variables are significantly correlated with each other at the .01 level. The highest correlation 
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appears to be between GC3 and GC4 with the score of .513, indicating no concern of 
multicollinearity. Table 34 in Appendix D shows the correlation matrix for exogenous and 
endogenous variables with control variables. The control variable of population of the 
jurisdictions failed to demonstrate any significant relationship with network effectiveness. The 
control variable of risk level of terrorism has very low but statistically significant negative 
correlation with three indicators of network effectiveness (NE 10, NE 11 and NE 12), while risk 
level of organized crime has also statistically significant but a low negative correlation with 7 
indicators (NE5,NE6, NE7, NE8, NE9, NE10, NE 11, NE12). According to the Table, five 
indicators of inter-organizational trust (T1, T2, T3, T5, and T6) and control variable of organized 
crime risk level have statistically significant and negative correlations. The control variable of 
terrorism risk level was negatively correlated with only two indicators (T2, and T5). No 
significant correlation was detected between population and indicators of inter organizational 
trust.  
Similar to previous constructs, organized crime risk level was negatively correlated with 
four indicators of commissioner leadership style (NL1, NL2, NL3, and NL5). Three indicators 
(NL1, NL2, and NL5) were negatively correlated with terror risk level and no correlation was 
found between population and the indicators of commissioner leadership style. Five indicators of 
co-producer leadership style (NL7, NL8, NL10, NL11 and NL12) had a statistically significant 
negative correlation with organized crime risk level. The results did not find any significant 
correlation between indicators of co-producer leadership style and the control variables of 
population and terror risk level. The last leadership style of facilitator leadership did not have 
any statistically significant correlation between the three control variables of the study.  
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In terms of goal convergence, three indicators (GC1, GC3 and GC5) were negatively 
correlated with control variable of the population, whereas just one indicator (GC6) was 
negatively correlated with terror risk level. Any other statistically significant correlation was 
detected between indicators of goal convergence and control variables. The table shows that 
among the six variables of organizational culture, three of them (OC1, OC3, and OC6) had 
statistically significant negative correlation with the control variable of population. The analyses 
did not find any other significant correlation between the variables of organizational culture and 
control variables. 
In sum, almost all of the indicators in each constructs are correlated with each other at 
least .05 significance level. Six multicollinearity problems were detected. In order to handle 
these problems, five indicators will be removed from the measurement models. Among the three 
control variables, population of jurisdiction does not have any statistically significant correlation 
with indicators of endogenous and exogenous variables, whereas risk level of terrorism and risk 
level of organized crime demonstrate some low negative correlations with some indicators of 
those variables. 
4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Confirmatory factor analysis confirms measurement models of latent constructs’ validity 
(Byrne, 2010) and validate the model fit of collected data. Confirmatory factor analysis is used to 
decide the capability of a hypothesized model based on obtained data (Wan, 2002) and to find 
shared common variance of indicators of latent constructs (Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). It is a 
helpful tool to decide if the number of factors and their regression weights are suitable to define 
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latent variables. It is an important technique to evaluate construct validity of the study variables 
(Wan, 2002).   
 Confirmatory factor analyses were performed through AMOS (Analysis of Moment 
Structures) software. The study used Wan’s (2002) three stage approach to determine the finest 
measurement model for each latent variable in terms of obtained data. In the first step, the 
appropriateness of indicators in a generic measurement model was tested by examining the factor 
loading of indicators. P value and critical ratio were used to determine if a specific indicator has 
a statistically significant effect on the latent construct. If the critical value is either: equal or 
greater than 1.96; or equal and lower than -1.96 it can be considered that influence of a particular 
indicator on the latent variable is statistically significant at the .05 level. If the factor loading is 
not statistically significant, it shows that this indicator is not a suitable measure for the latent 
construct. The stronger factor loading means the stronger influence of that indicator on the latent 
construct (Byrne, 2010; Wan, 2002; Bickel, 2007).  
In the second step, various statistical indexes, produced by AMOS software were used to 
evaluate how well over all model fits the data. At the final stage, model respecification is made 
by examining modification index. Modification index is used to detect the possible causes of the 
lack of fit. Modification indices determine which correlated measurement errors should be freely 
estimated to reduce the chi-square value and fit the model better.  Nested measurement models of 
latent constructs were developed according to these modification indices values. 
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4.3.1 Network Effectiveness 
Network effectiveness is the only endogenous latent construct in the study. The generic 
measurement model consists of 12 indicators. The Figure 12 shows the initial CFA analysis 
results for the generic measurement model of network effectiveness. 
For the first step of CFA, critical ratios and p values were checked to identify whether the 
indicators are statistically significant predictors. Table 18 indicates the parameter estimates of 
network effectiveness.  The table shows that all items are statically significant even at .01 level. 
Then factor loadings of indicators were examined to identify the strength of indicators in 
predicting the latent construct of network effectiveness. The coefficient values were between 
lowest .304 (NE1) and highest .930 (NE10). Therefore, NE1 should be removed from the model 
because of having low factor loading.  
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Figure 12. Generic Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness 
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Table 18 Parameter Estimates of Network Effectiveness 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator U.R.W. R.W. SE C.R.   P U.RW. R.W. S.E. C.R. P. 
NE1 1.000 .304         
NE 2 1.234 .405 .278 4.439 *** .442 .435 .057 7.715 *** 
NE 3 1.421 .399 .322 4.415 *** .483 .407 .067 7.161 *** 
NE 4 1.586 .483 .335 4.737 *** .577 .528 .060 9.700 *** 
NE 5 1.454 .467 .310 4.686 *** .535 .516 .057 9.440 *** 
NE 6 2.516 .718 .481 5.231 *** .915 .784 .055 16.768 *** 
NE 7 2.754 .827 .515 5.352 *** 1.000 .902    
NE 8 2.716 .840 .506 5.363 ***      
NE 9 2.850 .905 .526 5.415 *** .856 .816 .049 17.476 *** 
NE 10 2.974 .930 .547 5.433 ***      
NE 11 2.887 .910 .533 5.419 ***      
NE12 2.987 .924 .550 5.429 *** .873 .811 .051 17.263 *** 
e3<-->e4    .309 .679 .033 9.342 *** 
e1<-->e2    .184 .338 .034 5.421 *** 
e7<-->e8    .087 .411 .019 4.591 *** 
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
For the second step of the CFA, the appropriateness of the generic measurement model 
was checked by examining the goodness of fit statistics (Table 19). The selected goodness of fit 
statistics criteria indicated a very poor model fit for the generic measurement model. All selected 
criteria were far from the accepted limits. Some revisions are necessary to increase model fit of 
the measurement model of network effectiveness. 
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Table 19 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for the Network Effectiveness 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 699.297 27.333 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   12.950 1.608 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.745 .987 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.198 .045 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.791 .992 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
32 307 
     
 
The third step is model respecifiation. Correlation analysis indicated some 
multicollinearity among the indicators. NE8, NE10 and NE11 were excluded from the 
measurement model to eliminate multicollinearity. Then NE1 was dropped from the 
measurement model, since its factor loading was lower than the selected threshold of .40. 
Although dropping these indicators improved goodness of fit statistics, this revision was not 
enough get a good model fit. Then modification index was examined to reduce the chi-square 
value and fit the model. According to the modification indices, 4 error terms which are: e1 and 
e2; e3 and e4; and e7 and e8 were correlated with each other. This revision increased the model 
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fit to recommended level. All selected goodness of fit statistic criteria were met to consider a 
perfect measurement model. After the respecifiation, NE7, NE9 and NE12 became the indicators 
in the network effectiveness measurement model having the highest coefficient values with 
scores of .902, .816, and .811 respectively. 
 
Figure 13. Revised Measurement Model for Network Effectiveness 
 
4.3.2 Inter-Organizational Trust 
Inter-organizational trust is the first exogenous latent variable of the study. Inter-
organizational trust has 9 indicators. In the first step, the initial confirmatory factor analysis is 
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performed to the generic measurement model of inter-organizational trust to test the validity of 
the model. The results are indicated in Figure l4.  
 
Figure 14. Generic Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust 
Table 20 presents parameter estimates for both generic and revised models. The critical 
values of all the nine indicators are greater than 1.96, and the p values are lower than .05. 
Therefore, all indicators are statistically significant at the .05 level. In order to determine the 
strength of an indicator in the model, standardized regression weights should be examined. T3 is 
the strongest indicator with the standardized regression weight of .826. Other indicators in the 
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model are also very strong predictors. The weakest indicator in the generic model is T7 with the 
value of .524. 
Table 20  Parameter Estimates of Inter-organizational Trust 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW RW SE CR   P URW RW SE CR P 
T9 1.000 .765    1.000 .825    
T8 .939 .700 .075 12.458 *** .879 .706 .066 13.299 *** 
T7 .736 .524 .081 9.044 *** .695 .533 .073 9.535 *** 
T6 .918 .696 .074 12.373 *** .848 .692 .065 12.976 *** 
T5 .820 .548 .086 9.498 *** .748 .538 .078 9.639 *** 
T4 1.145 .822 .076 14.987 *** 1.051 .813 .066 15.890 *** 
T3 1.256 .826 .083 15.057 *** 1.154 .818 .081 14.244 *** 
T2 1.064 .756 .078 13.603 *** .972 .744 .078 12.433 *** 
T1 .997 .670 .084 11.859 *** .915 .663 .074 12.298 *** 
d3<-->d2 
d9<-->d3 
d9<-->d2 
   .098 .286 .028 3.467 *** 
   -.084 -.311 .022 -3.843 *** 
   -.090 -.313 .022 -4.107 *** 
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
For the second step, selected goodness of fit statistics, which were discussed in the 
methodology section, were used. Table 21 demonstrates goodness of fit statistics of both generic 
and revised measurement model of inter-organizational trust.  Even though TLI , CFI and 
Hoelter's Critical N  were in acceptable limits, other goodness of fit statistics does not indicate a 
valid measurement model.  
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Table 21 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Inter-Organizational Trust 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 119.880 69.644 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   4.440 2.902 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.908 .949 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.106 .079 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.931 .966 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
102 159 
     
 
Therefore, specification search was performed to increase the model fit of the 
measurement model. Since there is not any concern of multicollinearity as discussed in the 
correlation analysis and all factor loadings are statistically significant, no indicators were 
removed from the measurement model. The only way to revise the measurement model is 
examining the modification index. Based on the modification indices, d2 and d3, d2 and d9, and 
d3 and d9 were correlated. Figure 15 illustrates the revised measurement model of inter-
organizational trust. The results of goodness of statistics of the revised measurement model 
indicate a valid model for this latent construct. The lowest standardized regression weight in the 
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revised model is .533 that shows all indicators are powerful predictors of the inter-organizational 
trust. T9, T3 and T4 have the strongest factor loadings on inter-organizational trust, with 
standardized regression weights of .825, .818, and .813 respectively.
 
Figure 15. Revised Measurement Model for Inter-organizational Trust 
 
4.3.3 Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
Commissioner Style of Network Leadership is the second exogenous latent variable of 
the study. It was measured by six indicators. The results of initial confirmatory analysis for the 
generic measurement model of the commissioner style of leadership are presented in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16. Generic Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
 
Parameter estimates for the hypothesized model of the commissioner leadership style is 
shown in Table 21. All critical ratios of the indicators of the model were higher than 1.96 and p 
values are lower than .05 which shows statistically significant relationships at .05 level. All 
factor loadings of indicators (Table 22) in the generic measurement model are high enough to 
predict the latent construct varying from the lowest .403 to the highest .914.   
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Table 22 Parameter Estimates of Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator U.R.W. R.W. S.E. C.R.   P U.R.W.    
R.W. 
    S.E. C.R. P 
NL1 1.581 .901 .121 13.075 *** 1.061 .659 .096 11.004 *** 
NL2 1.488 .914 .113 13.165 ***      
NL3 960 .583 .104 9.193 *** 1.027 .681 .090 11.387 *** 
NL4 1.000 .653    1.182 .842 .087 13.658 *** 
NL5 902 .638 .107 6.547 *** 1.000 .771    
NL6 .701 .403 .091 9.939 *** .827 .518 .097 8.548 *** 
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
 
Analysis of goodness-of-fit statistics (Table 23) indicated a poor model fit for the initial 
run of CFA analysis.  The model did not meet any criteria of goodness of fit statistics. Therefore, 
model respecification is necessary to get better model fit.  According to the correlation analysis 
results, NL2 was removed because of the high correlation between NL1.  
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Table 23 Goodness-of-Fit Statistics for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 150.384 5.706 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   16.709 1.141 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.747 .997 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.227 .022 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.848 .999 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
35 590 
     
 
 After excluding NL2 from the model, the revised model had a perfect model fit. Since all 
goodness of fit statistics were within the recommended limits, examining the modification 
indices were not necessary. A significant improvement in goodness of fit statistics can be seen 
from the generic measurement model to the revised model at Table 23. The figure 17 presents 
the revised measurement model of commissioner leadership style. The lowest factor loading in 
the revised model increased from .403 to .518. The high factor loading values show strength of 
indicators in predicting this latent construct. NL4 and NL5 have the highest factor loadings on 
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the construct of commissioner leadership style, with standardized coefficient values of .841 and 
.771 respectively. 
 
Figure 17. Revised Measurement Model for Commissioner Style of Network Leadership 
 
4.3.4 Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
The generic measurement model of co-producer style of network leadership style had six 
indicators.  Figure 18 demonstrates factor loadings of coproduce style leadership measurement 
model.  
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Figure 18. Generic Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
Critical rate scores and p values shown in the Table 24 indicate that all of the factor 
loadings except NL9 were statistically significant. Standardized regression weights demonstrate 
the relative significance of the factor loadings. The lowest factor loading score after NL9 is 
NL12 with a score of .475. 
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Table 24 Parameter Estimates of Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW RW SE CR   P URW RW SE CR P 
NL7 1.518 .914 .123 12.290 *** 1.203 .716 .129 9.351 *** 
NL8 1.505 .945 .121 12.432 ***      
NL9 -.165 -.096 .102 -1.619 .106      
NL10 1.000 .613    1.203 729 .127 9.456 *** 
NL11 1.139 .713 .110 10.394 *** 1.415 .876 .140 10.084 *** 
NL12 .799 .475 .107 7.479 *** 1.000 .588    
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
 
Table 25 shows the goodness of fit statistics of both generic and revised measurement 
model of the co-producer network leadership style. Only TLI is within the acceptable limits for a 
valid measurement model. Because the generic model did not meet other criteria based on the 
goodness of fit values, some revision was required.  
First NL8 was excluded from the model due to high correlation between NL7. 
Multicollinearity is a significant problem which reduces the model fit. Then NL9 was excluded 
from the model since its critical rate (-1619) is lower than 1.96 and p value (.106) is greater than 
.05. These scores indicate that NL9 is an insignificant predictor of co-producer style of network 
leadership. Figure 19 depicts the revised measurement model of the latent variable. After those 
necessary revisions, the goodness of fit statistics shows substantial improvement. All selected 
criteria were met to conclude a valid measurement model. Regression weight scores of items in 
the revised measurement model vary from the lowest .588 (NL12) to the highest .876 (NL11).  
  
152 
 
These values mean that all indicators are strong predictors of the latent construct of co-producer 
style of network leadership style.  
Table 25 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 102.554 5.588 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   11.395 2.794 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.952 .975 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.083 .077 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.185 .992 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
51 326 
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Figure 19. Revised Measurement Model for Co-producer Style of Network Leadership 
4.3.5 Facilitator Style of Network Leadership  
Facilitator Leadership style is the last latent construct related to network leadership styles. 
The generic measurement model of facilitator leadership style consisted of 6 indicators. The 
Figure 20 shows the generic measurement of this latent construct. 
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Figure 20. Generic Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership 
Table 26 presents parameter estimates of facilitator style of network leadership style. 
Critical ratios of six indicators and p values were examined to determine the significance of the 
indicators in the measurement model. The only indicator, having a p value greater than .05 and 
critical rate lower than 1.96, is NL 18. Other five indicators are statistically significant predictors 
at .05 level. Their standardized regression weights were varying from lowest .330 to the highest 
.937. 
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Table 26 Parameter Estimates of Facilitator Style of Network Leadership 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR   P URW SRW SE CR P 
NL13 1.752 862 .167 10.465 *** 1.815 .850 .183 9.934 *** 
NL14 1.756 .937 .167 10.484 *** 1.886 .958 .195 9.672 *** 
NL15 .491 .330 .095 5.195 *** .507 .324 .100 5.088 *** 
NL16 1.000 .565    1.000  .538    
NL17 .921 .497 .126 7.310 *** .913 . 469 .103 8.887 *** 
NL18 .113 .078 .087 1.294 .196      
d5<-->d4    .227 .408 .036 6.310 *** 
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for both the generic and the revised models of facilitator style of 
network leadership were demonstrated in Table 27. Goodness-of-fit statistics indicate that the 
final generic model of the latent variable has not a good fit to the gathered data. All scores of 
selected goodness of fit statistics were found out of the acceptable limits. Therefore, a revision in 
the model is necessary to get better model fit.  
In the revision phase, first the insignificant indicator NL18 was dropped from the model. 
Then NL 15 was excluded from the model because its regression weight is lower than the 
threshold of .40. However, these modifications were not enough to obtain acceptable goodness of 
fit values. Then modification index was examined to make necessary revision. Modification 
indices provide to find which correlated measurement errors should be freely estimated in order 
to decrease the chi-square value and fit the model better. According to the modification error 
terms of NL16 and NL17 were correlated with each other. However, this revision decreased the 
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chi square valueless less than 1.00 (.220) that indicates poor model fit (Garson, 2012).In order to 
obtain a valid model, factor loading threshold was omitted for this model, and NL 15 was kept in 
the model. 
Table 27 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Facilitator Style of Network Leadership 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
     Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 74.932 8.372 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   8.372 2.093 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; 
acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.816 .981 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.155 .060 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.890 993 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; 
acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
69 345 
The final-revised measurement model is presented in Figure 21. A substantial 
improvement is observed in goodness of fit statistics (Table 27) of the final-revised measurement 
model. All selected criteria were met that indicates the appropriateness of the revised 
measurement model of facilitator style of network leadership. Factor loading of indicators in the 
revised model varies from .324 to .957 indicating strong predicting capability. NL14 and NL13 
are the strongest predictors having the coefficient values of .957 and .852 respectively. 
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Figure 21. Revised Measurement Model for Facilitator Style of Network Leadership 
4.3.6 Organizational Goal Convergence 
Organizational goal convergence is the last exogenous latent construct in the study. Six 
indicators represent the generic measurement model of goal convergence. Figure 22 shows the 
generic measurement model. 
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Figure 22. Generic Measurement Model for Organizational Goal Convergence 
Table 28 demonstrates the parameter estimates for the generic model. All factor loadings 
of indicators were found to be significant at .05 level (CR > 1.96). The coefficient estimates of 
indicators in the generic measurement model vary from lowest .394 to highest .789. 
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 Table 28 Parameter Estimates of Organizational Goal Convergence 
                       Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW RW SE CR   P URW RW SE CR P 
GC1 1.000 .775    1.000 .775    
GC2 .971 .789 .082 11.812 *** 1.010 .847 .086 11.807 *** 
GC3 1.141 .676 .108 10.557 *** .997 .611 .101 9.852 *** 
GC4 .848 .502 .107 7.915 *** .618 .378 .103 6.000 *** 
GC5 .710 .520 .087 8.199 *** .650 .492 .082 7.914 *** 
GC6 .619 .394 .099 6.231 ***      
d4<-->d3    .234 .381 .042 5.611 *** 
           
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
 
After examining the appropriateness of indicators, goodness-of-fit statistics was 
performed to check the validity of the generic measurement model. The goodness of fit statics in 
Table 29 indicated a poor model for the initial run of CFA analysis. No criteria were met to 
consider a valid measurement model for obtained data. The model should be respecified to 
achieve good model fit. 
All indicators were statistically significant predictors of goal convergence and no 
multicollinearity was detected in the correlation analysis, but factor loading of GC6 is lower than 
our threshold of .40.  Therefore GC6 is removed from the model. Since this change was not 
enough to get required model fit, modification index was examined.  Based on suggestions by 
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modification index scores, two pairs of measurement errors which are d3 and d4 were correlated 
to increase the model fit. After making this revision, the goodness of fit statistics greatly 
improved compared to generic model and all selected criteria were met. Figure 23 shows the 
revised measurement model of goal convergence. GC2 and GC1 are the strongest predictors of 
goal convergence in the revised model having coefficient values of .847 and .775.   
Table 29 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Organizational Goal Convergence 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 85.480 7.860 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   9.498 1.965 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.751 .978 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.167 .056 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.850 .991 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
61 367 
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Figure 22. Revised Measurement Model for Organizational Goal Convergence 
 
After validating measurement models of latent constructs through CFA, reliability of 
measurement were examined. The following section is focused to evaluate the internal 
consistency of each latent construct. 
4.4 Reliability 
Reliability or internal consistency of a measurement is a significant indicator of the 
quality of survey instruments for survey studies. This study evaluated internal consistency by 
using Cronbach’s Alpha score which is one of the most extensively used analyses for the 
reliability. As discussed in the methodology section, there are different arguments related to the 
threshold for Cronbach’s Alpha score. This study used .70 as an acceptable threshold for the 
Cronbach’s alpha score of the measures. 
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Some items of constructs were removed from the measurement model in confirmatory 
factor analysis because of multicollinearity and low factor loadings. Cronbach’s Alpha was 
performed before and after confirmatory factor analysis for endogenous and exogenous variables 
by using SPSS. The Table demonstrates the Cronbach’s Alpha scores of measurement models of 
the latent constructs. Organizational goal convergence has the lowest score with the value of 
.771.  Having greater than .70, the results indicate that all measurement models have good 
internal consistency before and after confirmatory factor analysis.  
Table 30 Cronbach's Alphas Scores of Measurement Models 
Measurement Model 
 Number of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
Score 
Before After Before After 
Inter-organizational Trust 9 9 .896 .896 
Commissioner Leadership Style 6 5 .856 .815 
Co-produce Leadership Style 6 4 .760 .814 
Facilitator Leadership Style 6 4 .752 .819 
Organizational Goal Convergence 6 5 .777 .771 
Organizational Culture 6 6 .801 .801 
Network Effectiveness 12 8 .917 .871 
 
After making the final measurements model for each latent construct through CFA and 
testing the reliability of measurement, the next step is building a covariance structure model to 
test the hypotheses of the study.  
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4.5 Covariance Structure Model 
After validating the measurement models for each latent construct, Covariance structure 
model was used to evaluate causal relationships between our exogenous and endogenous 
variables and confounding factors. Covariance structure model can simultaneously test study 
hypotheses and estimate latent variables from observed variables (Wan, 2002). The covariance 
structure model does not only illustrate the significance of the hypothesis paths, but also 
indicates the explanatory power of the model by calculating the R
2
 value for the endogenous 
latent construct.  R
2
 indicates the total variation in the endogenous variable that is accounted by 
the exogenous variables (Kaplan, 2000; Bates, 2005) 
According to results of confirmatory factor analyses, the generic covariance structure 
model, presented in Figure 11, was revised. The new generic model is presented in Figure 23. 
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Figure 23. First Revised Generic Covariance Model 
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In this generic covariance structure model, single arrowed lines between variables 
represent hypothesized causal relationships between exogenous and endogenous variables. 
Single arrowed lines between indicators and variables represent the predictive capability of each 
indicator for each latent construct. Insignificant paths in the model are shown with red colored 
arrows.  Table 31 introduces coefficient weights between variables and also factor loadings 
between variables and their predictors in detail.  
In the initial covariance model, factor loadings between all indicators and their latent 
constructs are statistically significant. This result verifies the results of confirmatory factor 
analyses for each latent construct. The regression weights between the endogenous variable of 
network effectiveness, and exogenous variables of inter-organizational trust, goal convergence, 
co-producer network leadership style, facilitator network leadership style, OC5 (group loyalty) 
and OC6 (competition) are statistically significant. P values of these variables are lower than .05 
and critical values are higher than 1.96. A higher regression weight represents a stronger 
relationship with network effectiveness. Therefore inter-organizational trust (.326) goal 
convergence (271) and co-producer leadership styles (.229) are the strongest exogenous variables 
on network effectiveness.  
Regression weights between endogenous variable of network effectiveness and 
exogenous variables of commissioner network leadership style, OC1 (defensiveness), OC2 
(organizational secrecy perceptions), OC3 (strict hierarchy), and OC4 (sense of isolation) are not 
statistically significant. Except OC5, the relationships have significantly low regression weights 
(.066, -.057, -.034, 052, .023 respectively) high P values (.254, .281, .529, .326, .663 
respectively), and inadequate critical rates (1.142, -1.079, .630, 981, .436 respectively). Among 
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the three control variables POP (population) and TRL (terror risk level) have low regression 
weights (.032, -.050), high P values (.546, .347) and inadequate critical rates that show the 
insignificant relationship between network effectiveness.  
Table 31 Parameter Estimates of Covariance Structure Model 
 Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
N. Effectiveness <--- I. Trust .304 .326 .054 5.638 *** .311 .304 .085 3.651 *** 
N. Effectiveness <--- Comm. L. .057 .066 .050 1.142 .254      
N. Effectiveness <--- Co-pr. L. .185  .229 .048 3.879 *** .235 .238 .081 2.892 .004 
N. Effectiveness<---Facilitator L. -.095 -.126 .042 -2.285 .022 -.094 -.119 .046 -2.057 .040 
N. Effectiveness <--- Goal C. .315 .271 .070 4.465 *** .441 .357 .098 4.487 *** 
N. Effectiveness <---OC1 -.043 -.057 .040 
-
1.079 
.281      
N. Effectiveness <--- OC2 .030 .034 .048 .630 .529      
N. Effectiveness <--- OC3 .044 .052 .045 .982 .326      
N. Effectiveness <--- OC4 -.022 -.023 .050 -.436 .663      
N. Effectiveness <---OC5 .111 .137 .043 2.558 .011      
N. Effectiveness <--- OC6 -.111 -.134 .044 
-
2.517 
.012 -.133 -.153 .062 -2.163 .031 
N. Effectiveness <--- POP .017 .032 .028 .604 .546      
N. Effectiveness <--- TRL -.025 -.050 .026 -.943 .346      
N. Effectiveness <--- OCRL -.071 -.108 .035 -2.033 .042 -.084 -.121 .036 -2.350 .019 
NE2 <--- N. Effectiveness .469 .412 .067 7.044 *** .465 .425 .063 7.395 *** 
NE3 <--- N. Effectiveness .529 .397 .078 6.764 *** .529 .414 .074 7.173 *** 
NE4 <--- N. Effectiveness .619 .509 .069 8.948 *** .619 .529 .065 9.502 *** 
NE5 <--- N. Effectiveness .563 .488 .066 8.518 *** .564 .508 .062 9.064 *** 
NE6 <--- N. Effectiveness .948 .760 .065 14.654 *** .948 .776 .061 15.634 *** 
NE7 <--- N. Effectiveness 1.000 .859    1.000 .871    
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 Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
NE9 <--- N. Effectiveness .865 .774 .059 14.740 *** .865 .789 .055 15.744 *** 
NE12 <--- N. Effectiveness .888 .773 .060 14.735 *** .886 .787 .056 15.698 *** 
T1 <--- I. Trust .915 .663 .074 12.334 *** .923 .655 .077 12.026 *** 
T2 <--- I. Trust .975 .747 .078 12.483 *** .951 .717 .081 11.810 *** 
T3 <--- I. Trust 1.150 .815 .081 14.245 *** 1.092 .764 .082 13.325 *** 
T4 <--- I. Trust 1.050 .813 .066 15.941 *** 1.036 .793 .068 15.265 *** 
T5 <--- I. Trust .746 .537 .077 9.629 *** .695 .485 .082 8.492 *** 
T6 <--- I. Trust .846 .692 .065 12.980 *** 850 .682 .067 12.629 *** 
T7 <--- I. Trust .697 .534 .073 9.574 *** 703 .524 .076 9.278 *** 
T8 <--- I. Trust .880 .701 .066 13.351 *** .887 .700 .068 13.046 *** 
T9 <--- I. Trust 1.000 .825    1.000 .818    
NL1 <--- Commissioner L. .898 .659 .078 
11.54
0 
***      
NL3 <--- Commissioner L. .869 .681 .073 
11.97
5 
***      
NL4 <--- Commissioner L. 1.000 .842         
NL5 <--- Commissioner L. .847 .771 .062 
13.66
7 
***      
NL6 <--- Commissioner L. .700 .518 .079 8.801 ***      
NL7 <--- Co-producer L. .866 .722 .069 
12.58
9 
*** .908 .743 .067 13.531 *** 
NL10 <--- Co-producer L. .862 .731 .068 
12.75
6 
*** .877 .731 .066 13.275 *** 
NL11 <--- Co-producer L. 1.000 .867    1.000 .851    
NL12 <--- Co-producer L. .720 .592 .071 
10.17
2 
*** .729 .589 .071 10.310 *** 
NL13 <--- Facilitator L. .955 .847 .060 15.808 *** .952 .845 .058 16.536 *** 
NL14 <--- Facilitator L. 1.000 .962    1.00 .963    
NL15 <--- Facilitator L. .267 .323 .048 5.593 *** .266 .322 .047 5.605 *** 
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 Generic Model Revised Model 
Indicator URW SRW SE CR P URW SRW SE CR P 
NL16 <--- Facilitator L. .527 .537 .055 9.668 *** .526 .336 .054 9.780 *** 
NL17 <--- Facilitator L. .482 .469 .058 8.321 *** .482 .470 .057 8.422 *** 
GC1 <--- Goal Convergence 1.018 .783 .085 
11.94
6 
*** 1.023 .781 .077 13.248 *** 
GC2 <--- Goal Convergence 1.000 .832    1.000 .825    
GC3 <--- Goal Convergence .999 .605 .102 9.837 *** 1.011 .608 .098 10.278 *** 
GC4 <--- Goal Convergence .634 .383 .104 6.099 *** .669 .401 .102 6.536 *** 
GC5 <--- Goal Convergence .660 .493 .083 7.981 *** .683 .506 .081 8.439 *** 
Facilitator L.  <--> I. Trust      -.149 -.260 .031 -4.768 *** 
Co-producer L.  <--> I. Trust      .292 .636 .039 7.510 *** 
Goal C.  <--> OC6      .271 .626 .033 8.230 *** 
e3 <--> e4 .295 .669 .032 9.185 *** .294 .668 .032 9.179 *** 
e1 <--> e2 .171 .320 .033 5.148 *** .172 .322 .033 5.167 *** 
e7 <--> e8 .092 .425 .019 4.910 *** .093 .428 .019 4.968 *** 
d3 <--> d2 .098 .285 .028 3.487 *** .131 .346 .028 4.705 *** 
d5 <--> d3      .124 .242 .031 3.994 *** 
d9 <--> d2 -.092 -.320 .022 
-
4.229 
*** -.088 -.304 .021 -4.152 *** 
d9 <--> d3 -.082 -.303 .022 
-
3.776 
*** -.059 -.206 .021 -2.856 .004 
d22 <--> d23  (d17 <--> d18) .227 .409 .036 6.321 *** .227 .214 .036 6.334 *** 
d26 <--> d27  (d21<--> d22) .223 .358 .042 5.317 *** .214 .346 .041 5.209 *** 
Note: U. R.W. = Unstandardized Regression Weights; S.R. W. = Standardized Regression 
Weights; S. E. = Standard Error; C. R. = Critical Ratio 
Similar to confirmatory factor analysis, covariance structure modelling also uses the 
three-step method to validate the model. In the first step insignificant exogenous and control 
variables should be excluded from the generic model.  Therefore, insignificant variables: 
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commissioner network leadership style, OC1, OC2, OC3, OC4, POP and TRL were excluded 
from the covariance structure model. When these variables were excluded, critical value of OC5 
decreased to 1.802, which is less than the threshold of 1.876, and its P value increased to .072, 
which indicates statistically insignificant variable. Therefore OC5 was also removed from the 
revised covariance structure model. 
Table 32 Goodness of Fit Statistics of Covariance Structure Model 
Fit Index 
Shorthand 
 
Criteria Generic 
Model 
Final 
Revised 
Model 
Chi-Square   χ2 Smaller the better 2703.043 884.666 
Chi-square / Degree of Freedom χ2/df ≤ 2 ; ≤ 3; ≤ 4   2.900 1.847 
Tucker Lewis Index TLI .90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.710 .909 
Root Mean Square Error of  
Approximation 
RMSEA 05 < value ≤ .08; acceptable 
≤ .05; good 
.079 .053 
Comparative Fit Index CFI 90 ≤ value < .95; acceptable 
≥ .95 ; good 
.727 .917 
Hoelter's Critical N Hoelter  
Index 
75 ≤ value < 200; acceptable 
≥ 200 ; good 
113 183 
     
 
For the second step, goodness of fit statistics was evaluated. Table 32 indicates the 
goodness of fit statistics for the initial and final revised covariance structure model. Although 
excluding insignificant exogenous and control variables substantially increased model fit, 
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goodness of fit statistics are not enough to consider a valid covariance model.  No criteria were 
met to consider a valid measurement model for obtained data. The model should be respecified 
to achieve good model fit. 
For the third step, modification index was examined to make necessary revisions. 
According to the modification indices, inter-organizational trust and co-producer network 
leadership style, inter-organizational trust and facilitator leadership style, goal convergence and 
OC6, and error terms of d3 and d5 were correlated to each other. After the respecifiation, all 
selected criteria were met to conclude a valid covariance structure model. Figure 24 presents the 
final-revised covariance structure model. 
 171 
 
 
Figure 24. Final Revised Covariance Structure Model 
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All factor loadings in the final-revised covariance structure model are statistically 
significant at .05 level, varying from the lowest .322 to the highest .963.  Inter-organizational 
trust, goal convergence, co-producer network leadership style, and OC6 are statistically 
significant hypothesized exogenous variables. The only significant control variable is the risk 
levels of network jurisdictions in terms of organized crime.  
The strongest impact on network effectiveness comes from latent constructs of goal 
convergence and inter-organizational trust. More specifically, goal convergence is positively 
correlated with network effectiveness with a standardized regression weight of .357 (p≤.001).   
Inter-organizational trust is positively correlated with network effectiveness with a standardized 
regression weight of .304 (p≤.001).  Co-producer style of network leadership has also significant 
prediction power on network effectiveness. Co-producer leadership is positively correlated with 
network effectiveness with standardized regression weight of .227 (p=.006). These three positive 
correlation coefficient paths mean that growth in these variables would cause an increase in 
network effectiveness.  On the other hand, facilitator style of network leadership is negatively 
correlated with network effectiveness with standardized regression weight of -.119 (p= .040) and 
high competition (OC6) is negatively correlated with network effectiveness with standardized 
regression weight of -.153 (p=.031). These two negative correlation coefficients paths indicate 
that growth in these variables would cause a decrease in network effectiveness.  
The final covariance structure model also indicates some correlation relationships 
between some exogenous variables. Inter-organizational trust is positively correlated with co-
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producer style of network leadership with a correlation coefficient of .636.  Inter-organizational 
trust is negatively correlated with facilitator style of network leadership with a correlation 
efficient of -.260. Finally, Goal Convergence is positively correlated with OC 6 (strict 
competition) with a correlation coefficient of .626.  
The overall model identifies that four of six exogenous latent variables (inter-
organizational trust, goal convergence, co-producer style of network leadership, and facilitator 
style of network leadership), and one exogenous observable variables ( high competition), along 
with the control variable of risk level of organized crime (OCRL) account for 37 % of variation 
in network effectiveness.  
4.6 Hypotheses Testing 
This study aims to analyze the relationships between inter-organizational trust, network 
leadership style, goal convergence, organizational culture and network effectiveness in public 
security networks. Moreover, the impacts of control variables that are population of the 
jurisdictions in which public security networks perform, the risk level of jurisdictions in terms of 
terrorism, and risk level of jurisdiction in terms of organized crime were analyzed. Based on the 
theoretical framework and literature review, the following hypotheses were tested in this study 
through the results provided in the findings section: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust and 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
The first hypothesis addresses a positive relationship between inter-organizational trust 
and network effectiveness. The results of the analysis supported this hypothesis. With a 
standardized regression coefficient of .304, inter-organizational trust is the one of the two most 
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significant exogenous variable of the study, determining network effectiveness in a public 
security network. The unstandardized regression weight of .311 indicates that one raw unit 
increase in inter-organizational trust accounts for a .311 decrease in network effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between network leadership style and network 
effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2a: Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Hypothesis 2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest network 
effectiveness in public security networks 
Hypothesis 2c: Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks 
The second hypothesis addresses a relationship between network leadership styles and 
network effectiveness. This hypothesis was tested with three alternative sub hypotheses. This set 
of hypotheses aims to find the most appropriate leadership style to achieve the highest network 
effectiveness in a public security network.  The results of the analysis supported the association 
between network leadership style and network effectiveness. The results indicate that co-
producer style has positive impact on network effectiveness, whereas facilitator leadership style 
negatively influences network effectiveness. The study did not find a relationship between 
commissioner style and the endogenous variable. 
 More specifically, the covariance structure model found no statistical relationship at p ≤ 
.05 about Hypothesis 2a, suggesting a positive relationship between top down leadership style 
(the commissioner role) and network effectiveness (β= 0.066). However, the study result 
supports Hypothesis 2b, suggesting a positive relationship between co-producer style of 
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leadership and network effectiveness. The unstandardized regression weight of .235 represents 
that for a one-raw-unit increment on co-producer style of network leadership style leads to an 
increase of .235 in network effectiveness. According to analysis results, facilitator style of 
network leadership style has a negative impact on network effectiveness; therefore, Hypothesis 
2c was not supported. The unstandardized regression weight of -.94 indicate that one-raw-unit 
increase in facilitator network leadership style accounts for a .94 decrease in network 
effectiveness. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the organizational goal 
convergence and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
The results of the final-revised covariance structure model show that goal convergence 
has a significant and positive relationship with network effectiveness with a standardized 
regression weight of .357 at p ≤ .05. Goal converge is the most important variable to influence 
network effectiveness. The unstandardized regression weight of .441 indicates that a one-raw-
unit increase on goal convergence leads to a .441 increase in network effectiveness. Therefore, 
the hypothesis was supported. 
Hypothesis 4:  There is a relationship between the nature of organizational culture in the 
public security and network effectiveness in public security networks.  
Hypothesis 4a: There is a negative relationship between the level of defensiveness in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks  
 Hypothesis 4b: There is a negative relationship between the level of perception of the 
organizational secrecy in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks 
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 Hypothesis 4c: There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy in the 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4d: There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation 
among employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security 
networks. 
 Hypothesis 4e: There is a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty among 
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4f: There is a negative relationship between the level of competition among 
member organizations and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 Hypothesis 4 addresses the relationship between the nature of organizational culture in 
the public security sector and network effectiveness. In order to test this hypothesis, six sub-
hypotheses were examined. Common cultural attributes of public security organizations such as 
hierarchy, isolation, secrecy, self-protection, competition, and group loyalty were tested with 
specific sub hypotheses. The study results partially supported the Hypotheses 4. Although 
descriptive statistics supports the negative impacts for all these cultural attributes of public 
security organizations on network effectiveness, the covariance structure model could not find 
statistically strong relationships for the Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, 4d and 4e. The Hypothesis 4f was 
supported by the covariance structure model. 
 When we examine the sub-hypotheses in detail, Hypotheses 4a assumed a negative 
relationship between the level of defensiveness in member organizations and network 
effectiveness. However, the relationship between defensiveness and network effectiveness was 
not found to be significant at .05 significance level (β= -0.057). Although the direction of the 
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association was negative as assumed, null hypothesis was failed to reject because of a weak 
relationship.  Hypotheses 4b predicted a negative relationship between the level of perception of 
the organizational secrecy in member organizations and network effectiveness. The revised 
covariance structure model did not find any statistically significant evidence in the relationship at 
.05 significance level with the standardized regression weight of .034. Null hypothesis was also 
failed to reject for the hypotheses 4c , assuming a negative association between the level of 
hierarchy in member organizations and network effectiveness (β= .052). Similarly, the 
hypotheses 4d, assuming a negative relationship between the level of sense of isolation among 
employees of the member organizations and network effectiveness, was not supported by the 
analysis (β= -.023) 
Although a statistically insignificant relationship was found for the hypotheses 4e revised 
covariance structure model, the relationship was relatively stronger compared the first four 
variables. The hypotheses assumed a negative relationship between the level of group loyalty 
among employees of member organizations and network effectiveness, but the first covariance 
structure model indicates a positive relationship.The last sub hypothesis, which suggests a 
negative relationship between level of competition among member organizations and network 
effectiveness, was supported by the analysis with a standardized regression weight of -.153. The 
unstandardized regression weight of -.133 indicates that a one-raw-unit increment on competition 
accounts for a .133 decrease in network effectiveness.  Table 33 shows the summary of 
hypothesis testing results. 
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Table 33 Summary of Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypotheses            Results 
H1 
There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational 
trust and network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 
Supported 
H2 There is a relationship between network leadership style and 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Supported 
H2a Top down leadership style (the commissioner role) will achieve 
the highest network effectiveness in public security networks 
Not Supported 
H2b: The co-producer style of leadership will achieve the highest 
network effectiveness in public security networks 
Supported 
H2c 
Bottom up leadership style (the facilitator role) will achieve the 
highest network effectiveness in public security networks. 
 
Not Supported 
(Negative 
Relationship Found) 
H3 
There is a positive relationship between the organizational 
goal convergence and network effectiveness in public security 
networks 
 
Supported 
H4 
There is a relationship between the nature of organizational 
culture in the public security and network effectiveness in 
public security networks. 
Partially Supported 
H4a 
There is a negative relationship between the level of 
defensiveness in the member organizations and network 
effectiveness in public security networks 
Not Supported 
H4b 
There is a negative relationship between the level of perception 
of the organizational secrecy in the member organizations and 
network effectiveness in public security networks 
Not Supported 
H4c 
There is a negative relationship between the level of hierarchy 
in the member organizations and network effectiveness in public 
security networks 
Not Supported 
H4d 
There is a negative relationship between the level of sense of 
isolation among employees of the member organizations and 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Not Supported 
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Hypotheses            Results 
H4e 
There is a negative relationship between the level of group 
loyalty among employees of the member organizations and 
network effectiveness in public security networks. 
Not Supported 
 
H4f 
There is a negative relationship between the level of 
competition among member organizations and network 
effectiveness in public security networks. 
 
Supported 
 
Consequently, the statistical analysis results supported three of the four main hypotheses. 
The fourth main hypothesis, which is related to organizational culture, is partially supported. The 
study found that inter-organizational trust and goal convergence have a positive relationship with 
network effectiveness. Although facilitator leadership is found to be the most common 
leadership style in Turkish public security networks, it is found as inappropriate to achieve 
higher network effectiveness. According to the results, the co-producer network leadership is the 
most convenient leadership style in terms of network effectiveness. While the results of the 
descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of organizational culture in the public 
security sector have negative influence on network effectiveness, the hypothesis testing with the 
covariance structure model only support the negative impact of competition among partner 
organization. The next chapter will discuss the findings of the statistical analysis. 
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CHAPTER 5- DISCUSSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 In the light of study findings, this section focuses in detail on discussions on study 
variables and covariance structure model, theoretical methodological, managerial, and policy 
implications, limitations of the study, and possible future research topics. 
5.1 Discussions  
5.1.1 Network Effectiveness 
Network effectiveness is defined by Provan and  Kenis (2008) “as the attainment of 
positive network level outcomes that could not normally be achieved by individual 
organizational participants acting independently” (p. 230). Determining appropriate performance 
evaluation measures in networks is more challenging compared to single organizations (Page, 
2004). Each network has special performance evaluation measures that are more suitable to the 
field in which a network works, and the purpose of the network (Provan, Fish & Sydow, 2007)  
Network effectiveness in public security networks is the endogenous variable of the study 
that originally consists of 12 indicators: Regular communication among participants; long term 
relations, the amount of shared information, information using and collecting capacity, success 
in joint operations, success in preventing terror and organized crime cases, success in solving 
terror and organized crime cases, and success in capturing and eliminating terrorists and 
members of organized crime gangs. Among these indicators: success in preventing terror attacks 
and success in preventing organized crime incidents;  success in solving terror cases and success 
in solving organized crime cases; and success in capturing or eliminating terrorists and success 
in capturing or eliminating members of organized crime gangs were highly correlated. High 
correlation in these indicators can be justifiable, since they were addressing the same aspects of 
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similar problems. In confirmatory factor analysis, one of the highly correlated variables should 
be removed from the measurement model to prevent biased estimates of the parameters (Wan, 
2002). Thus, three indicators, which are success in preventing organized crime incidents, success 
in solving organized crime cases, and success in capturing or eliminating the terrorists, were 
excluded from the model. 
 In the generic measurement model all indicators were found as statistically significant at 
.05 significance level. However, the factor loading of the indicator of regular communication 
among participants was lower than the factor loading threshold criterion of .40. This indicator 
was also excluded from the model to get better model fit. After examining the modification 
indices, three pairs of error terms in the model were correlated with each other to increase model 
fit.  
The revised measurement model of network effectiveness consists of 8 indicators. Factor 
loading of indicators are ranging from .407 to .871. The highest factor loading is produced by the 
success in preventing terror attacks with a regression coefficient value of .871 followed by the 
indicators of success in solving terror cases and success in capturing or eliminating members of 
organized crime gangs which have standardized regression weights of .789 and .787 
respectively. These scores make them the most important indicators of the construct. The 
Cronbach’s Alpha score of the revised model is .871. Given factor loadings, Cronbach’s Alpha 
score and goodness of fit statistics verify a valid and reliable latent construct for the network 
effectiveness.  
Among three control variables, risk level of terrorism has low negative relationships with 
three indicators of network effectiveness, and risk level of organized crime has again a low 
negative relationship with seven indicators.  Negative directions in correlations show that as 
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jurisdictions’ risk level increase, network effectiveness decreases. The control variable of 
population of the jurisdictions failed to demonstrate any significant relationship with network 
effectiveness.  
5.1.2 Inter-Organizational Trust 
Inter-organizational trust is the first exogenous latent variable of the study. It was 
designed to measure the level of trust among organizations in public security networks. Nine 
indicators of the variables which  are open communication among partner agencies, perception 
about reliability, honesty, mutual understanding, keeping commitment in collaborative process, 
mutual acceptance, belief on capability, mutual respect among members, and sense of fairness, 
came from different studies in literature (Vangen &Huxham, 2003; Ostrom & Ahn, 2002; 
Ferguson & Stoudand, 1999; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). The survey questions were previously 
used by different studies (Wang &  Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; Garayev, 2011;  Kapucu, 
Garayev & Wang, 2013). 
No indicators were excluded from the measurement model because of high correlation. 
All indicators were found statistically significant at .05 significance level. Since all standardized 
regression weights of the indicators were higher than .40 (factor loading threshold) all of them 
were kept in the model. Modification indices were examined to make respecifiation and 
according to those scores, three error terms were correlated. In revised model factor loadings are 
between .485 and .818.Cronbach’s alpha score for inter-organizational trust was .896 which 
indicates a very good level of reliability. The results of confirmatory factor analysis show that 
indicator sense of fairness has the highest factor loading (.818). Mutual understanding has the 
second highest factor loadings (.793), and Honesty takes the third place in terms of regression 
weight rankings (.764). While five indicators of inter-organizational trust are negatively 
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correlated with control variable of organized crime, only two indicators have significant negative 
correlation with terrorism risk level of network jurisdiction. Negative directions in correlations 
reveal that as jurisdictions’ risk level increase, inter-organizational trust in networks decreases. 
No significant correlation was detected between population and indicators of inter organizational 
trust. 
5.1.3 Network Leadership Styles 
In order to compare the impact of three alternative styles of network leadership on 
network effectiveness, three latent constructs, which are commissioner style, co-producer style, 
and facilitator style, were built for the study. In the generic measurement model each leadership 
style was measured with six indicators. These indicators were taken from the paper written by 
Span et al. (2009). 
According to the indicators of commissioner network leadership style, network goals and 
network vision are formulated solely by governors. Governors act as an executor and steer 
network activities. Decisions in the network are made solely by the governor and they take full 
responsibility for public security network activities. The descriptive statistics demonstrated that 
the commissioner style is the least common leadership style for Turkish public security 
networks. The statements for this construct were mostly not supported. This is mainly because 
governors have very limited power on military forces and intelligence service departments. Their 
power on the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard is even restricted, although they are a kind of 
law enforcement agency. Therefore, managing public security networks with commissioner 
leadership style is not very possible for governors.  
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Among these six indicators for commissioner style, the first two indicators were highly 
correlated with each other. This is a justifiable situation, being goals of the network and visions 
of the network are similar concepts. Therefore, the second indicator related to vision was 
excluded from the model. After this revision, the model had a perfect model fit, thus any other 
revision was not needed to validate the model.  All other indicators were statistically significant, 
having factor loadings between .518 and .841. Indicators related to steering network activities 
and decision making had the highest standardized regression weights (.841, .771), specifying that 
they are the most important indicators of the commissioner leadership style. Even though, the 
Cronbach’s Alpha score decreased from .856 to .815 after revision, this score still demonstrates a 
good reliability of measurement. Organized crime risk level was negatively correlated with four 
indicators of commissioner leadership style and three indicators were negatively correlated with 
terror risk level. No significant correlation was found between population and the indicators in 
this construct.  
 According to the indicators of co-producer network leadership style, network goals and 
network vision are formulated by all partners jointly. Governors act as a partner in the network 
instead of a hierarchical superior. Network activities are steered jointly and decisions in the 
network are made by all partners jointly. Finally, all partners are jointly responsible for network 
activities. According to the frequency distribution of the responses, co-producer style is also not 
a very common leadership style of province governors for managing public security networks. 
Although the responses to the statements get higher agreement responses compared to statements 
of commissioner leadership style, disagreement responses usually exceeded agreement responses 
except the indicator related to steering network activities. 
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Similar to the commissioner leadership style, the first two indicators were highly 
correlated with each other. They are related to goals of the network and vision of the network.  
This was an expectable result, after finding a similar high correlation between goals and vision in 
commissioner leadership style. The second indicator, related to vision, was also removed from 
this model. Another significant point in correlation analysis is related to the third indicator, 
which says governors act as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior. This 
indicator had only one significant correlation with other indicators in this construct. In addition, 
the direction of this correlation was negative. This could be regarded as a signal of low factor 
loading in confirmatory factor analysis.  
The results of confirmatory factor analysis confirmed this signal, finding a low factor 
regression weight with a P value of .106 that indicates an insignificant indicator. After excluding 
this indicator, the co-producer leadership style had a perfect model fit.  Factor loadings of the 
indicators in the revised measurement model differed from the lowest .589 to the highest .851. 
Regression weights demonstrated that decision making is the most important indicator of this 
latent construct. Goodness of fit statistics, high factor loadings and Cronbach’s Alpha score 
(.814) demonstrated the validity and reliability of the conceptualization of this latent variable of 
co-producer network leadership style. All indicators of co-producer leadership style except NL9 
had statistically significant negative correlation with organized crime risk level. This result 
shows that as the risk level of organized crime risk increased, governors perform behaviors 
related co-producer leadership style less. The results did not find any significant correlation 
between indicators of co-producer leadership style and the control variables of population and 
terror risk level. 
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The third network leadership style is facilitator leadership. According to the original 
indicators, under management of facilitator leadership in a network, each organization 
formulates their own goals and visions separately. The governor acts as an initiator to facilitate 
the collaboration and each organization steers their own activities in the network. Decisions in 
the network are made by each organization and each partner is responsible for their own 
activities.  
According to the frequency distributions, the facilitator style is the most common 
leadership style in Turkish public security networks. Responses for the statements of facilitator 
style of leadership accumulate within agreement responses. Governors’ weak power on security 
agencies, the strong relationship between the provincial branches of security organizations and 
their headquarters, and the unwillingness of agencies to enter a deeper partnership in the network 
may direct governors to choose characteristics of facilitator leadership style. 
Correlation analysis did not demonstrate any high correlatioqn between indicators in this 
construct leading to a multicollinearity problem. The generic measurement model of facilitator 
network leadership style was examined through confirmatory factor analysis. Confirmatory 
factor analysis demonstrated that the last indicator, which says each organization and each 
partner is responsible for their own activities in the network, was found statistically insignificant 
at .05 significance level. All other indicators were statically significant. Although factor loading 
of the indicator that says the governor acts as an initiator to facilitate the collaboration was not 
higher than .40, it was not removed from the model. Because this revision would decrease the 
χ2/df value lower than 1.00 that leads poor model fit. All remaining indicators were ranging from 
.470 to .963 were satisfactory. The highest factor loading is produced by the indicator related to 
the vision of the network. According to the result of modification indices, two error terms are 
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correlated with each other. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient (.819) of the revised model, factor 
loadings, and goodness of fit statistics demonstrate the validity and reliability of the 
conceptualization for the facilitator leadership style. The results of correlation analyses showed 
that any indicators of facilitator leadership did not have a significant correlation between three 
control variables of the study. 
5.1.4 Goal Convergence 
The last exogenous latent variable of goal convergence was designed to measure “the 
extent to which organizations have common goals and mission” (Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 
2013, p. 106). The generic measurement model originally consists of six measures, which are 
difference in organizational priorities, multiplicity of differing organizational backgrounds, 
diverging organizational goals, expectations and mission, and common points, were used to 
measure goal convergence among member organizations in public security networks. The survey 
questions were previously used by different studies (Wang &  Kapucu; 2006; Kapucu, 2008; 
Kapucu, Garayev & Wang, 2013).  
The frequency distributions of the responses indicate that respondents think there is a low 
level of organizational goal convergence in province public security networks. Most of the 
respondents agree or strongly agree that organizations in the public security network have 
different organizational priorities, goals, missions, and expectations, but they do not mostly agree 
with that organizations have little in common. Most of the respondents also think that 
collaboration in the network is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing organizational 
backgrounds. As correlation analysis results did not demonstrate any high correlation between 
indicators, no indicators were excluded from the measurement model because of 
multicollinearity. All indicators were found statistically significant at .05 significance level, but 
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the last indicator of missions were excluded from the model because of its factor loading (.394) 
is lower than .40. According to the modification indices, one pair of error terms of indicators was 
correlated with each other. The results of confirmatory factor analysis show that the indicator of 
organizational backgrounds has the highest factor loading (.825), and the indicator of 
organizational priorities takes the second place in terms of regression weight rankings (.781).  
Among three control variables, three indicators were negatively correlated with control 
variable of population and just one indicator was negatively correlated with terror risk level. Any 
other statistically significant correlation was detected between indicators of goal convergence 
and control variables. 
5.1.5 Organizational Culture 
  Organizations in the public security sector have some unique cultural features that make 
them different from other public agencies. This study focuses on six characteristics of security 
agencies’ organizational culture that were argued in the literature (Mouton, 2002; Kappeler, 
Sluder & Alpert, 1998; Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen & Al-Hawamdeh, 2001). 
Defensiveness, organizational secrecy, strict hierarchy, sense of isolation among employees, 
group loyalty and competition among agencies were measured by a single question in the survey 
as separate characteristics of organizational culture in public security networks. Since 
respondents were asked to evaluate a specific statement for each variable, organizational culture 
is not a latent variable and confirmatory factor analysis was not used to validate a measurement 
model. 
 Among the six questions, four questions directly asked respondents the influence of a 
specific cultural attribute on collaboration in networks. In these four questions, respondents were 
asked to evaluate the impact of organizational secrecy perceptions of network members, strict 
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hierarchy, a sense of isolation among employees of member organizations, and competition 
among agencies on network collaboration. The descriptive analysis of these questions shows that 
all of these four cultural attributes have a negative effect on network collaboration. Other two 
questions in the section were formulated to identify the level of defensiveness, and group loyalty. 
Most of the respondents agree or strongly agree that defensiveness and group loyalty are existing 
characteristics of member organizations in their network.  
Among the six variables of organizational culture, defensiveness, strict hierarchy and 
competition had a statistically significant negative correlation with the control variable of 
population. Negative correlation revels that, as the population of the jurisdiction increases, 
defensiveness, hierarchy in security organizations, and competition among members in networks 
decreases. The analyses did not find any other significant correlation between the variables of 
organizational culture and control variables. 
5.1.6 Covariance Structure Model 
Based on literature and the theoretical framework, the main research question of the study 
is, “Which factors are important for effectiveness in public security networks?”  In order to 
address this question, the study aims to test the hypothesized relationships between exogenous 
variables of inter-organizational trust, network leadership style, goal convergence, and specific 
characteristics of organizational culture in the public security sector, and endogenous variable of 
network effectiveness.   
The first hypothesis addressed the research question of, “What is the role of inter-
organizational trust among partner agencies?” The analysis results find a positive relationship 
between inter-organizational trust and network effectiveness. Regression weights of the 
covariance structure analysis indicated that inter-organizational trust (β= 304) is the one of the 
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most important variable along with goal convergence. Inter-organizational trust has a positive 
correlation (.64) with co-producer network leadership style and negative correlation with 
facilitator network leadership style (.26). The result is consistent with the literature that argues 
that trust facilitates collaboration, lessens transaction costs, strengthen network ties, increase 
information collecting and using capacity, and problem solving capacity (Agranoff, 2007; 
Agranof & McGuire, 2001; Isett et al., 2011; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007). 
The second hypothesis addressed the research question of, “Which kind of leadership 
style will achieve the highest performance in public security networks?” There are different 
arguments in network literature about the appropriate leadership style. While McGuire (2006), 
Agranoff (2007), and Whetten (1978) found that the top down leadership (commissioner style) 
provides higher collaboration  in networks, Andrews, Boyne, Law, and Walker (2009) and 
Korssen-van Raaij (2006) found that the bottom-up leadership (the facilitator style ) is more 
appropriate for networks.  
In order to find the most suitable leadership style for public security networks, three 
alternative sub hypotheses were tested in this study. The study found that the co-producer 
leadership style (β= 238) ensures higher network effectiveness, whereas facilitator leadership 
style (β=-.119) decreases the network effectiveness. The study did not find a statistically 
significant relationship between commissioner leadership style and network effectiveness at .05 
significance level.   
 The different results found by different researches related to the appropriate leadership 
style explained by Span et al. (2012) through different conditions in which examined networks 
perform. They suggested that the commissioner style is more effective for simple and stable 
public networks; and the facilitator style is more effective for complex and dynamic public 
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networks, while the co-producer style is better for simple and dynamic public networks and 
complex and stable public network. The results of the study are consistent with Span et al.’s 
argument, since Turkish local public security networks have a complex but stable structure. 
 An interesting point in the results of the study is the contradiction between prevalence of 
the leadership styles and their appropriateness in terms of network effectiveness. Although the 
facilitator style is found to be the most common leadership style in public security networks, it is 
found as inappropriate for network effectiveness. Facilitator style is preferred by the governors 
because of their weak power on some member organizations such as military units and 
intelligence departments. The unwillingness of organizations to work together and the high 
dependence of member organizations to their headquarters in capital city Ankara make it 
difficult for governors to implement commissioner style or co-producer style of network 
leadership. The positive correlation (.64) between the co-producer style and inter-organizational 
trust, and the negative correlation (-.26) between facilitator style and inter-organizational trust 
can be interpreted that the level of trust is an important determiner of the preferred leadership 
style for governors. However, this relationship can also be interpreted that the type of leadership 
style may positively or negatively influence the level of trust between organizations in the 
network. 
The third hypothesis addresses the research question of, “What is the relative importance 
of goal convergence in network effectiveness?” The study found that goal convergence is one of 
the most important variables that have positive impact on network effectiveness. The result is 
also consistent with the literature (Rivera, Soderstrom & Uzzi, 2010; Kapucu and Garayev; 
2013). The study also found a positive correlation between goal convergence and competition 
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among member organizations. This means that as the goals are more similar, the competition 
between agencies is getting higher. 
The fourth hypothesis addresses the research question of, “What is the relative 
importance organizational culture in network effectiveness?”  In order to address this research 
question, six sub hypotheses were tested in the study. As mentioned before, four questions 
directly asked respondents the impact of a specific cultural attribute on collaboration in their 
public security network, and other two questions in the section were formulated to identify the 
level of defensiveness and group loyalty  The frequency distribution of responses and the result 
of the covariance structure model are not consistent with each other for three questions which 
directly ask the impact of organizational secrecy perceptions of the network members, strict 
hierarchy in the organizations, and sense of isolation among employees of the member 
organizations. 
According to the frequency distributions of the statements in these four questions, 
respondents think the examined cultural attributes make it difficult for collaboration in the public 
security networks. The statements in this section were reported the highest percentage of 
agreement responses. More specifically, 86.5 percent of the  of the respondents agree or strongly 
agree that collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to organizational 
secrecy perceptions of the network members. 80 percent of respondents think that strict hierarchy 
in member organizations make collaboration challenging in their security networks. 77 percent 
of the respondents agree or strongly agree that collaboration is challenging in their networks 
because of a sense of isolation among employees of the member organizations. And finally, 76.4 
percent of the respondents think that collaboration is challenging due to competition among 
organizations in their public security networks. However, the covariance structure model did not 
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find a statistically significant relationship between organizational secrecy perceptions, strict 
hierarchy, sense of isolation among employees of the member organizations, and network 
effectiveness. Although frequency distributions support the hypotheses that argue a negative 
relationship between these cultural attributes in the security sector and network effectiveness, the 
results of the covariance structure model did not support the hypotheses which are based on 
literature. On the other hand, competition among member organizations is found to be negatively 
associated with network effectiveness as consistent with the literature. 
With regards to two questions that identify the level of defensiveness and group loyalty, 
69.9 percent of the respondents agree or strongly agree with the organizations involving the 
public security network do not confront problems without becoming defensive, and 72.2 percent 
of respondents think that when an employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake, 
fellows feel responsibility to protect him/her. The covariance structure model did not find a 
statistically significant relationship between defensiveness and network effectiveness; therefore, 
the results were not be able to verify the hypothesis. The results of the covariance structure 
model related to group loyalty contradicts with the hypothesis. While the hypothesis assumes a 
negative relationship, the results indicate an insignificant positive relationship. This result can be 
interpreted that respondents think that group loyalty in member organizations is a sign of group 
loyalty in the network that may have positive impact on network effectiveness. 
Among three control variables, the study only found a negative statistically significant 
relationship between the organized crime risk levels of network jurisdictions between network 
effectiveness. The standardized regression weight of -.153 indicate that one-raw-unit increase in 
the risk level accounts for a .153 unit decrease in network effectiveness. Other control variables, 
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population of the jurisdiction and terror risk level, were not found to be statistically associated 
with network effectiveness.  
5.2 Implications 
This study examined the dynamics of network effectiveness in the public safety sector.  
Local public security managers’ perceptions about network effectiveness were examined.  In the 
light of study results, the implications of the study can be discussed in theoretical, 
methodological, managerial and policy context. 
5.2.1 Theoretical Implications 
The survey was designed to evaluate inter-organizational collaboration among local 
public security network members in Turkey, and understand which factors are important for 
network effectiveness in the public security networks. In this study, the network effectiveness 
concept was examined in the context of the public security sector. Therefore different studies in 
different sectors may indicate different consequences. In other words, the study contributes to the 
literature on the idea of network effectiveness, especially in the public security field. 
The network theory literature discusses that some significant factors, such as inter-
organizational goal convergence, network structure, network resources, leadership style, internal 
and external legitimacy, trust, power differentiation, may contribute the network effectiveness 
(Popp et al., 2013). The results of this study, which indicate a positive relationship between inter-
organizational trust, goal convergence and network effectiveness, are consistent with the 
literature. Inter-organizational trust and goal convergence are found to be the most important 
factors affecting network effectiveness.  
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The results are also consistent with the inter-organizational social capital perspective. 
According to this perspective, social capital provides a more appropriate environment for 
collaboration. It creates a justification for organizations to subordinate their priorities in favor of 
organizational goals and also creates more flexible work practices. Finally, it provides a more 
productive instrument to manage collective actions compared to hierarchical tools. Trust is 
accepted as one of the two main components of social capital (Leanna and Van Burren 1999 & 
Puntham, 1995). Social capital can be realized “through  members'  levels of  collective  goal  
orientation  and  shared  trust” (Leanna & van Burren, 1999, p. 540). The findings of the analysis 
indicate the importance of inter-organizational trust and goal convergence on network 
effectiveness, which were stressed as the two main mechanisms to realize social capital. The 
positive relation between the co-producer leadership style and inter-organizational trust is also a 
significant point in terms of social capital perspective. Therefore, co-producer leadership style is 
found as the most suitable leadership style for enhanced trust and social capital. 
The results confirmed that different leadership styles have different consequences with 
regards to network effectiveness as well. The study has been the first study that compares the 
impacts of three alternative leadership styles in public security networks. According to the 
results, hierarchical methods which are represented by commissioner leadership style do not help 
for better collaboration in the network. Although facilitator leadership is the most common 
leadership style in the public security sector because of the specific difficulties to implement 
other leadership styles in network settings, it is found inappropriate to achieve higher network 
effectiveness. The co-producer network leadership is found as the most convenient leadership 
style in terms of network effectiveness. An important point found in the study is the positive 
correlation between inter-organizational trust and co-producer leadership style and negative 
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correlation between the inter-organizational trust and facilitator leadership style. This study did 
not focus on the causal relationship between the leadership style and inter-organizational trust. 
Therefore, it cannot be firmly said which one leads to another. Further studies may examine the 
causal relationship between trust and network leadership style 
In terms of resource dependency theory, organizations in public security networks are 
dependent upon each other to fight against terrorism and organized crime. However, the findings 
show that they have different priorities and expectations which create a problematic situation for 
network effectiveness. According to the results, network management should encourage 
organizations to actively involve network activities by employing co-producer style behaviors. 
Network leaders should remind the necessity of collaboration and the organizations’ 
interdependence to achieve their goals. Network leaders should embrace collaborative leadership 
skills that focus on productive interaction among network members (McGuire & Silvia, 2009) 
While the results of the descriptive statistics confirm that six specific features of 
organizational culture in the public security sector have negative influence on network 
effectiveness, the hypothesis testing with the covariance structure model only support the 
negative impact of competition among partner organizations. Therefore, the covariance structure 
model did not support literature, which argue that features of organizational cultures in the public 
sector such as isolation, secrecy, hierarchy, group loyalty and defensiveness often prevent 
healthy information sharing and collaboration (Fraser, 2004; Christensen & Crank, 2001; Luen & 
Al-Hawamdeh, 2001; Glomseth, Gottschalk & Solli-Sæther, 2007). The only organizational 
culture attributes found as having negative impact on network effectiveness is competition 
between organizations.  However, the conflicted results obtained by descriptive statistics and 
covariance structure model necessitate further research to examine the relationship between the 
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nature of organizational culture in the public security and network effectiveness in public 
security networks. 
5.2.2 Methodological Implications 
The first methodological implication is related to operationalization of the variables.  In 
terms of the reliability and validity of the latent constructs, the result of confirmatory factor 
analysis verified that inter-organizational trust, commissioner network leadership style, co-
producer network leadership style, facilitator leadership style, goal convergence and network 
effectiveness are acceptable constructs. The survey questions can be used to measure the 
constructs in other studies. Especially, the network effectiveness section of the survey is unique, 
and it was developed in this study in the light of literature to evaluate the success of public 
security networks. However, operationalization of the variables in organizational culture should 
be revisited for potential problems. 
The second implication is that perceptions of network managers can be used to evaluate 
the overall characteristics of public security network. This study surveyed province and district 
governors, deputy province governors, administrative senior inspectors and Interior Ministry 
high and middle level bureaucrats who have worked as public security managers. Since they 
have deep knowledge and experience related to public security networks, they are decent sources 
of information to evaluate different aspects of networks. This method can be replicated in further 
similar researches. 
Finally, a self-reported online survey was used to collect data. The survey was built and 
distributed through a web-based survey tool. The links of the survey questionnaire was 
electronically mailed to the respondents. This is an easy, fast and low-cost method of information 
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gathering method and provides efficient and effective opportunities for sectorial studies. Survey 
questions in inter-organizational trust and goal convergence were taken from previously 
conducted surveys. They were originally prepared in English. Other sections were prepared in 
English as well by using existing literature. Then the survey questions were translated in to 
Turkish. When making translation, cultural differences were considered, and functional 
equivalence was targeted, rather than literal translation.  In order provide reliability and validity 
of the measurement, the Turkish version of the survey was reviewed by Turkish native speakers. 
The reviewers of the translations were selected among professional managers of the Turkish 
Interior Ministry who know the context of the study. When conducting a survey for other 
countries using another language, these translation methods may be replicated to give 
interpretive and actual meaning of the study constructs. 
5.2.3 Managerial and Policy Implications 
 The study indicated the importance of the inter-organizational trust and goal convergence 
in network effectiveness. Government and network managers should focus on establishing 
relationships to promote trust and decrease the goal divergence between partner agencies. They 
should try to increase open communication in the network. This can be possible to encourage 
behaviors characterized by mutual understanding, acceptance and respect. When making 
decisions, sense of fairness is an important aspect of establishing trustful relationships. Creating 
such an environment would push network members to stay reliable and honest in network 
relationships. In order to create such an environment, the education phase of officers of member 
organizations should be focused. This set of behaviors should be identified as education 
objectives in training of military, law enforcement and intelligence service officers.  
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Central government should impose security agencies to work together and information 
sharing. A set of criteria related to inter-organizational collaboration should be identified as a 
performance measure for each agency. In addition to common objectives, unique criteria should 
be determined for specific jurisdictions, because of their different security priorities and 
problems. These criteria should be strictly observed and enforced by central government and 
governors with an effective performance measurement system.   
Another significant policy and managerial implication that can be derived is related to 
network leadership style. The results indicate the facilitator leadership style is the most common 
practice, because it is easier to implement in network settings compared to other leadership 
styles. However, the study found that this is not suitable for network effectiveness.  Facilitator 
style does not help to encourage member organizations to work together. Each organization 
focuses on their goals and their own actions. The network goals stay in the second row behind 
organizational priorities. This situation prevents to produce better results in terms of network 
effectiveness. The results also indicate that commissioner leadership style that uses hierarchical 
tools in network management does not generate positive outcomes.  Networks have unique 
conditions that differ them from single organizations. The results confirmed that top-down 
leadership is not an appropriate style to manage public security networks. 
 According to the study results, co-producer style yields higher network effectiveness. 
The negative relationship between trust and facilitator style, and a positive relationship between 
trust and co-producer style verify the negative impacts of facilitator style and positive 
consequences of co-producer style.  Encouraging joint relationships in formulating goals, vision, 
making decisions, actions, and taking responsibility are more fit to the spirit of the network. 
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Although governors have little tools to implement the co-producer style, they need to find ways 
to create such an environment that co-producer leadership can be employed.  
Governors should focus on three main tasks to build an effective network. First, they 
should ensure an accountable system of public security in which member organizations fulfill 
their obligations to the network. Effective monitoring of network members and their activities is 
an important requirement of accountability. Secondly, governors need to manage conflicts 
between organizations appropriately and constructively (Milward & Provan, 2006). They should 
identify the boundaries of member organizations, network principles, and values (McGuire, 
2002). Another requirement for co-producer leadership style is appropriately coordinating joint 
actions. Governors should ensure continuous communication during the preparation phase and 
operation phase of joint actions. 
In the light of these consequences, central government should select governors between 
candidates who have communication skills, and influence and negotiation skills. Government 
should also aim to gain competencies in three types of leadership behaviors, which are: task 
oriented behaviors, organization oriented behaviors and people oriented behaviors, in education 
and training programs for governors (Van Wart, 2011).  Competencies in task oriented behaviors 
are “monitoring and assessing work, planning, clarifying roles and objectives, informing, 
delegating, problem solving, and managing innovation and creativity”(p.347). Competencies in 
organization oriented behaviors are “scanning the environment, strategic planning, articulating 
the mission and vision of the organization, networking and partnering, performing general 
management functions such as human resource management and budgeting, decision making, 
and managing organizational change” (p. 392). Lastly, people oriented behaviors are important 
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to build inter-organizational trust, mutual respect, continuous communication, manage conflicts 
among member organization and motivate them for shared goals. 
Finally, in order to promote governors to implement behaviors in co-producer leadership 
styles, the central government should strengthen the governor’s authority and financial power on 
military units and intelligence departments. Central government should provide opportunities for 
governors to build local capacity in public security. The highly centralized structure in security 
agencies leads local branches to follow their headquarters rather than province governors. 
Organizations are more inclined to comply with orders from the capital city and omit the goals of 
province public security networks. The enhancing dependency to province resources would push 
organizations to work together. 
5.3 Limitations  
The first limitation is related to the respondents. The survey was distributed to the 
professional public security network managers in Turkey who are current or previous province 
and district governors. The study population is the most knowledgeable group in Turkey about 
the study topic. However, participant agencies’ employees might have different perceptions than 
the managers of the network. There is also a generalizability issue since the study was conducted 
in the context of the Turkish local public security networks. Being all respondents were from 
Turkey, the results may not be applicable to public security networks in other countries. 
Second limitation is about the design. This study is a cross sectional survey based design. 
Cross-sectional surveys collect data at one point in time and indicate snapshots of the population. 
Cross sectional studies might be weak in terms of providing deeper understandings in complex 
problems. Another limitation of the study is about data gathering method. Self-administered 
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surveys might be weak to represent actual thoughts of individuals. Respondents may select more 
favorable choices rather than their actual behaviors.  
 Finally, the study did not test the causal relationships between exogenous variables, 
because of the design of the conceptual framework. Only correlations between exogenous 
variables were examined and possible mediation or moderation relationships between exogenous 
and endogenous variables were not focused. 
5.4 Future Research 
Future studies should examine the perceptions of participant agencies’ employees related 
to latent construct of the study. The perceptions of the network manager may not entirely 
represent the general perceptions in the network. The same survey used in this study should be 
conducted to participant agencies’ employees. Future studies should also examine the study 
constructs by using qualitative methods, which can overcome limitations of cross sectional 
designs. Additional interviews with some of the survey respondents may be conducted to reach 
better understandings about their perceptions.  
Another suggestion is about the design of contextual framework. Future studies should 
examine the mediation and moderation effects between variables. The causal relationship 
between inter-organizational trust and leadership style should be examined. In addition, inter-
organizational trust may be designed as the endogenous variable and the impacts of network 
success or network effectiveness on inter-organizational trust should be examined.  
Finally, in order to increase the generalizability of the study findings, the study should be 
replicated in other countries’ public security networks. Further studies should also replicate this 
study in other sectors. 
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APPENDIX A: SURVEY 
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 This survey is conducted to examine local public security network managers’ 
perceptions about the network effectiveness. Because of increasing challenges about terrorism 
and organized crime, governments establish various new organizational networks to fight against 
different aspects of these problems. This enlargement generates a complex public security 
network system involving law enforcement agencies, military units, and intelligence services. 
Managing complex network arrangements is different from managing and leading a single public 
organization. Governors have limited direct authority over military units and intelligence 
services. This study will look at the dynamics of the network effectiveness in the public security 
sector. The survey is designed to evaluate inter-organizational collaboration among local public 
security networks members across Turkey, and understand which factors are important for an 
effective collaboration in public safety networks. The survey takes about 15 minutes to complete. 
Your responses are confidential, and will not be revealed without your consent; only aggregate 
results will be made available. I appreciate your effort and time for participation.  
Cihan Demirhan 
Senior Administrative Inspector 
PhD. Student at UCF 
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Section 1: In this study, the term of ‘province public security network’ is used to refer a 
province’s security structure, which works under the coordination of a governor, consisting 
of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence departments, and other 
organizations. Please identify a province public security network that you had opportunity 
to observe closely, and rate each of the following statements in regard to this province 
public security network. 
 
Strongly     Neither Agree                    Strongly 
 Agree     Agree          nor Disagree           Disagree         Disagree 
     5                4                         3                           2                     1 
 [   ]   The organizations involving this province public security network have an open 
communication.  
[   ]   The organizations in this public security network are reliable partners. 
[   ]   Honesty is the basis of inter-organizational collaboration in the public security network. 
[   ]   Inter-organizational relations in the network are characterized by mutual understanding.  
[   ]   The organizations in the network keep their commitment.  
[   ]   Mutual acceptance is the important part of inter-organizational collaboration in the 
network. 
[   ]   There is a common belief across the network that each actor is capable of contributing to 
the overall picture.   
[   ]   Inter-organizational collaboration is characterized by mutual respect in the network. 
[   ]   The organizations in the network collaborate with a sense of fairness towards each other. 
 
Section 2: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public 
security network that you identified based on the scale provided by considering that 
governors have limited direct authority over military units and intelligence services. 
Strongly   Neither Agree               Strongly 
 Agree     Agree          Nor Disagree           Disagree         Disagree 
     5                4                         3                           2                     1 
[   ]   Network goals are formulated solely by the governor in the network. 
[   ]   Public security network vision is formulated solely by the governor in the network. 
[   ]   The Governor acts as an executor. 
[   ]   Network activities are steered by the governor. 
[   ]   Decisions in the network are made solely by the governor.  
  
207 
 
[   ]   The governor takes full responsibility for the public security network activities.  
[   ]   Network goals are formulated by all partners jointly.  
[   ]   Network vision is formulated by all partners jointly.  
[   ]   The Governor acts as a partner in the network instead of a hierarchical superior. 
[   ]   Network activities are steered jointly. 
[   ]   Decisions in the network are made by all partners jointly. 
[   ]   All partners are jointly responsible for network activities. 
[   ]   Each organization is formulating their own goals separately in the network. 
[   ]   Each organization is formulating their own visions separately in the network.  
[   ]   The governor acts as an initiator to facilitate the collaboration.  
[   ]   Network activities are steered by each organization. 
[   ]   Decisions in the network are made by each organization. 
[   ]   Each partner is responsible for their own activities.  
 
Section 3: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public 
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence 
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided: 
(Organizational Culture) 
Strongly   Neither Agree                     Strongly 
 Agree     Agree          Nor Disagree           Disagree         Disagree 
     5                4                         3                           2                     1 
[   ]   The organizations involving the public security network do not confront problems without 
becoming defensive. 
[   ]   Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to organizational secrecy     
perceptions of the network members. 
[   ]   Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a strict hierarchy in the 
organizations. 
[   ]   Collaboration in the public security network is challenging due to a sense of isolation 
among employees of the member organizations. 
[   ]   When an employee of an organization in the network makes a mistake, fellows feel    
responsibility to protect him/her. 
[   ]   Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to competition among organizations. 
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Section 4: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public 
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence 
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided. 
Strongly   Neither Agree                     Strongly 
 Agree     Agree          Nor Disagree           Disagree         Disagree 
     5                4                         3                           2                     1 
 [   ] Organizations in the public security network have different organizational priorities. 
 [   ]   Collaboration in the public security is challenging due to a multiplicity of differing 
organizational backgrounds. 
 [   ] There is a gap between organizational goals in the network. 
 [   ] Organizations working together have little in common.  
 [   ] Diverging organizational expectations is the reality of public security networks. 
 [   ] Organizations are hardly related in terms of their organizational missions. 
 
Section 5: Please rate each of the following statements in regard to the province public 
security network consisting of law enforcement agencies, military units, intelligence 
departments, and other organizations that you identified based on the scale provided. 
 
Strongly      Neither Agree                     Strongly 
 Agree     Agree          Nor Disagree           Disagree         Disagree 
     5                4                         3                           2                     1 
[   ] The organizations in the network periodically contact each other to discuss issues 
pertaining to public security.  
 [   ] The organizations constantly develop long-term relationships among each other. 
 [   ] The organizations in the network constantly exchange information.  
 [   ] The public security network provides participant organizations to improve the ability of 
collecting information against terrorist and criminal activities. 
 [   ] The public security network provides participant organizations to improve the ability of 
using information against terrorist and criminal activities. 
 [   ] The public security network is successful in carrying out joint operations. 
 [   ] The public security network is successful in preventing terrorist attacks. 
 [   ] The public security network is successful in preventing organized crime activities 
 [   ] The public security network is successful in solving terror cases.  
 [   ] The public security network is successful in solving organized crime cases.  
 [   ] The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating the terrorists.  
 [   ] The public security network is successful in capturing or eliminating members of 
organized crime gangs. 
 
Section 6: 
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Are there additional elements that you think are important for an effective collaboration in public 
security networks? 
 
Section 7: 
What is the population of this network jurisdiction? 
[ ] Under 250,000   [ ] 250,000- 500,000 [ ] 500,000-1.000,000 [ ] 1.000,000- 2,000,000 
 [ ] Over 2,000,000 
What is the risk level of the network jurisdiction in terms of terrorism? 
 [ ] Very Low   [ ] Low   [ ] Medium    [ ] High      [ ] Very High 
What is the risk level of network jurisdiction in terms of organized crime? 
 [ ] Very Low   [ ] Low   [ ] Medium    [ ] High      [ ] Very High 
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APPENDIX B (SURVEY IN TURKISH) 
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Terör ve organize suç örgütleri kullandıkları yöntemleri sürekli olarak yenilemekte ve 
geliştirmektedir. Bu durum, mücadele de farklı zorlukları ortaya çıkarmakta ve yeni kamu 
birimlerinin kurulmasını zorunlu kılmaktadır. Bu zorunluluk, karmaşık bir kamu güvenliği 
network yapısının ortaya çıkmasının temel nedenlerinden birisidir. Kolluk kuvvetleri, askeri 
birlikler, istihbarat birimleri ve gerektiğinde networke dâhil olan diğer kuruluşlardan oluşan bu 
güvenlik networku arasındaki işbirliğini yönetmek, hiyerarşik bir yapılanma içindeki her hangi 
bir kamu kurumunu yönetmekten farklıdır. Vali ve kaymakamların özellikle askeri birlikler ve 
istihbarat birimleri üzerindeki hiyerarşik yetkileri sınırlıdır. Bu anket, Türkiye’deki yerel 
güvenlik networklerinde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğini ve bu işbirliğin 
artmasında hangi faktörlerin etkin olduğunu ölçmeyi hedeflemektedir. Anketi cevaplandırmanız 
yaklaşık 15 dakika sürecek olup, vermiş olduğunuz cevaplar gizli kalacak, ilgilinin rızası dışında 
hiç bir şekilde açıklanmayacaktır. Doldurulan anketlere ilişkin veriler yalnızca bir bütün olarak 
bilimsel amaçlı olarak kullanılacaktır. Araştırmaya değerli bilgi ve görüşlerinizle yapacağınız 
katkılar ve ayıracağınız zaman için teşekkürler. 
Cihan Demirhan 
Mülkiye Başmüfettişi 
UCF Doktora Öğrencisi 
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Bölüm 1: Bu çalışmada kullanılan il kamu güvenlik networku ifadesi ile il valisinin 
koordinasyonu altında çalışan, kolluk kuvvetleri, askeri birlikler, istihbarat birimleri ve 
gerektiğinde diğer kuruluşlarında katıldığı il güvelik sistemi kastedilmektedir. Lütfen 
yakından gözlemleme imkânı bulduğunuz bir ilin kamu güvenlik networkunu belirleyerek, 
bu il güvenlik networku açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini 
kullanarak belirtiniz.  
 
  Kesinlikle            Emin                         Kesinlikle  
Katılıyorum       Katılıyorum         Değilim           Katılmıyorum        Katılmıyorum 
        5                        4                         3                          2                            1 
[   ]   Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde, birlikte çalışan güvenlik kuruluşları arasında açık bir 
iletişim mevcuttur. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, güvenilir ortaklardır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinde dürüstlük temel esastır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki ilişkide karşılıklı anlayış hâkimdir. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasında karşılıklı kabul, networkteki işbirliğinin önemli 
bir parçasıdır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları networke karsı taahhütlerini yerine getirirler. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her birinin network faaliyetlerine pozitif katkıda 
bulunabilecek yeterlilikte olduğuna dair genel bir kanı mevcuttur. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinde karşılıklı saygı hakimdir. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları birbirlerine karşı adil bir yaklaşım gözeterek işbirliği 
yaparlar. 
 
 
Bölüm 2: Lütfen belirlemiş olduğunuz il güvenlik networku açısından aşağıdaki ifadelere 
ne derece katıldığınızı, valilerin özellikle askeri birlikler ve istihbarat birimleri üzerindeki 
hiyerarşik yetkilerindeki kısıtları da göz önüne alarak, cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz. 
Kesinlikle            Emin                         Kesinlikle  
Katılıyorum       Katılıyorum         Değilim           Katılmıyorum        Katılmıyorum 
        5                        4                         3                          2                            1 
[   ]   Bu il kamu güvenliği networkünün amaçlarının belirlenmesinde vali müstakil belirleyicidir. 
[   ]   Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünün vizyonunun belirlenmesinde vali müstakil belirleyicidir. 
[   ]   Vali, networkün rutin isleyişine yönelik kararları bizzat uygulamaktadır. 
[   ]   Network faaliyetleri vali tarafından bizzat yönetilmektedir. 
[   ]   Networkte kararlar müstakil olarak vali tarafından alınmalıdır. 
[   ]   Vali, güvenlik networkunun faaliyetleri ile ilgi bütün sorumluğu üstlenmektedir. 
[   ]   Networkün amaçları, tüm katılımcı kuruluşlarca birlikte belirlenmektedir. 
[   ]   Networkun vizyonu, tüm katılımcı kuruluşlarca birlikte belirlenmektedir. 
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[   ]   Vali, güvenlik networku içerisinde hiyerarşik üst gibi değil eşit söz hakkına sahip ortak gibi 
hareket etmektedir. 
[   ]   Network faaliyetleri, bütün katılımcı kuruluşlarla birlikte yürütülmektedir. 
[   ]   Networkte kararlar bütün katılımcı kuruluşlarca hep birlikte alınmaktadır. 
[   ]   Bütün katılımcı kuruluşlar network faaliyetlerinden hep birlikte sorumludur. 
[   ]   Bu il kamu güvenliği networkündeki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her biri,  kendi amaçlarını   
networkten bağımız olarak belirlemektedir. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her biri, kendi vizyonunu networkten bağımız olarak 
belirlemektedir. 
[   ]   Vali yalnızca networkte yer alan tarafları bir araya getirerek işbirliğini kolaylaştırmaktadır. 
[   ]   Network faaliyetleri, networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının her birince müstakil olarak          
yürütülmektedir. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, networku ilgilendiren konularda kararlarını kendileri 
alırlar. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, her biri kendi yürüttüğü faaliyetlerden sorumludur. 
 
Bölüm 3: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler, 
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından 
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.  
  Kesinlikle            Emin                         Kesinlikle  
Katılıyorum       Katılıyorum         Değilim           Katılmıyorum        Katılmıyorum 
        5                        4                         3                          2                            1 
[   ]   Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları, karşılaştıkları problemlerle 
savunmacı bir yaklaşım göstermeksizin yüzleşmezler. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının kurumsal gizlilik anlayışları, networkte işbirliğini 
zorlaştırmaktadır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarındaki katı hiyerarşik yapı, networkte işbirliğini   
zorlaştırmaktadır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının çalışanlarının kendilerini kurum dışındaki insanlardan 
izole etme eğilimleri, networkte işbirliğini zorlaştırmaktadır. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının bir çalışanı, kasten veya kusurlu olarak bir yanlış      
yaptığında diğer kurum çalışanları arkadaşlarını koruma ihtiyacı hissederler. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki rekabet, networkteki işbirliğini 
zorlaştırmaktadır.  
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Bölüm 4: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler, 
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından 
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.  
  Kesinlikle            Emin                         Kesinlikle  
Katılıyorum       Katılıyorum         Değilim           Katılmıyorum        Katılmıyorum 
        5                        4                         3                          2                            1 
[   ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkündeki güvenlik kuruluşlarının farklı kurumsal öncelikleri 
mevcuttur. 
[   ]   Networkteki güvenlik kuruluslar arasındaki kurumsal anlayış farklılıkları, networkteki 
işbirliğini zorlaştırmaktadır.  
[   ]   Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının amaçları arasında önemli farklılıklar mevcuttur. 
[   ]   Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının müşterek noktaları azdır. 
[   ]   Kurumsal beklentiler arasındaki ayrışma, bu güvenlik networkunun bir gerçeğidir. 
[   ]   Bu networkteki güvenlik kuruluşlarının kurumsal görevleri arasındaki ilişki zayıftır. 
 
Bölüm 5: Lütfen yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz, kolluk, askeri birlikler, 
istihbarat birimleri ve diğer kuruluşlardan müteşekkil bu il güvenlik networku açısından 
aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katıldığınızı cevap ölçeğini kullanarak belirtiniz.  
  Kesinlikle            Emin                         Kesinlikle  
Katılıyorum       Katılıyorum         Değilim           Katılmıyorum        Katılmıyorum 
        5                        4                         3                          2                            1 
[   ] Bu il kamu güvenlik networkünde birlikte çalışan güvenlik kuruluşları, periyodik 
aralıklarda kamu güvenliğini ilgilendiren konularda iletişim halindedir. 
[   ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, devamlı olarak birlikte çalışabilecekleri uzun sureli 
projeler geliştirirler. 
[   ] Networkteki güvenlik kuruluşları, düzenli olarak bilgi alışverişinde bulunurlar. 
[   ] Networkun faaliyetleri, katılımcı güvenlik kuruluşlarının terör ve organize suç gruplarına 
yönelik bilgi toplama kabiliyetlerini arttırabilmelerini sağlar. 
[   ] Networkun faaliyetleri, katılımcı güvenlik kuruluşlarının terör ve organize suç gruplarına 
yönelik elde ettikleri bilgileri kullanma kabiliyetlerinin gelişmesini sağlar.  
[   ] Bu network, ortak operasyonları gerçekleştirmekte başarılıdır. 
[   ]   Bu network, muhtemel terör saldırılarını önlemekte başarılıdır. 
[   ]   Bu network, muhtemel organize suç faaliyetlerini önlemekte başarılıdır. 
[   ]   Bu network, işlenmiş olan terör suçlarının faillerinin tespitinde başarılıdır.  
[   ]   Bu network, işlenmiş olan organize suçlarının faillerinin tespitinde başarılıdır.  
[   ]   Bu network, işlenmiş olan terör suçlarının faillerinin yakalanmasında başarılıdır.  
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[   ]   Bu network, işlenmiş olan organize suçlarının faillerinin yakalanmasında veya saf dışı 
edilmesinde başarılıdır 
Bölüm 6:  
İl kamu güvenlik networklerinde yer alan güvenlik kuruluşları arasındaki işbirliğinin etkinliğine 
ilişkin olarak, önemli olduğunu düşündüğünüz diğer faktörleri belirtiniz? 
Bölüm 7:  
Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin nüfusu ne kadardır?  
 
[ ]  250.000’ den az   [ ] 250.000- 500.000 [ ] 500.000-1.000.000 [ ] 1.000,000- 2.000.000 
[ ] 2.000.000’dan fazla 
 
Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin, terör olayları acısından risk seviyesini nasıl 
değerlendirirsiniz?  
  
[ ] Çok Az   [ ] Az  [ ] Orta    [ ] Yüksek     [ ] Çok Yüksek 
 
Yakından gözlemleme imkanı bulduğunuz bu ilin organize suç olaylarına acısından risk 
seviyesini nasıl değerlendirirsiniz?  
  
[ ] Çok Az   [ ] Az  [ ] Orta    [ ] Yüksek     [ ] Çok Yüksek 
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Table 34 Correlation Matrix for Exogenous and Endogenous Variables with Control Variables 
                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
 
T1 
Correlation Coefficient .091 -.107 -.130
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .114 .063 .024 
N 305 305 305 
T2 
Correlation Coefficient -.015 -.146
*
 -.193
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .793 .011 .001 
N 305 305 305 
T3 
Correlation Coefficient .012 -.101 -.186
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .834 .077 .001 
N 305 305 305 
T4 
Correlation Coefficient .096 -.040 -.127
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .093 .488 .026 
N 305 305 305 
T5 
Correlation Coefficient .064 -.122
*
 -.111 
Sig. (2-tailed) .264 .033 .052 
N 305 305 305 
T6 
Correlation Coefficient .043 -.061 -.137
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .452 .289 .016 
N 305 305 305 
T7 
Correlation Coefficient -.011 -.009 -.091 
Sig. (2-tailed) .852 .873 .111 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
T8 
Correlation Coefficient .114
*
 -.019 -.032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .738 .573 
N 305 305 305 
T9 
Correlation Coefficient .111 -.018 -.075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .756 .190 
N 305 305 305 
NL1 
Correlation Coefficient .076 -.128
*
 -.183
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 .026 .001 
N 305 305 305 
NL2 
Correlation Coefficient .076 -.130
*
 -.187
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 .023 .001 
N 305 305 305 
NL3 
Correlation Coefficient .010 -.055 -.142
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .856 .335 .013 
N 305 305 305 
NL4 
Correlation Coefficient .048 -.037 -.103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .401 .517 .073 
N 305 305 305 
NL5 
Correlation Coefficient .044 -.148
**
 -.184
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .440 .010 .001 
N 305 305 305 
NL6 
Correlation Coefficient -.008 -.069 -.086 
Sig. (2-tailed) .896 .232 .135 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
NL7 
Correlation Coefficient .028 -.040 -.166
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .621 .487 .004 
N 305 305 305 
NL8 
Correlation Coefficient .056 -.012 -.128
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .332 .833 .026 
N 305 305 305 
NL9 
Correlation Coefficient .075 -.003 .033 
Sig. (2-tailed) .192 .953 .566 
N 305 305 305 
NL10 
Correlation Coefficient .018 -.008 -.126
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .755 .883 .028 
N 305 305 305 
NL11 
Correlation Coefficient .076 -.078 -.132
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .188 .172 .021 
N 305 305 305 
NL12 
Correlation Coefficient -.008 -.005 -.123
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .892 .936 .032 
N 305 305 305 
NL13 
Correlation Coefficient -.042 -.013 .041 
Sig. (2-tailed) .461 .816 .478 
N 305 305 305 
NL14 
Correlation Coefficient -.008 .012 .045 
Sig. (2-tailed) .890 .829 .439 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
NL15 
Correlation Coefficient .032 -.045 -.021 
Sig. (2-tailed) .574 .435 .715 
N 305 305 305 
NL16 
Correlation Coefficient -.056 -.043 -.026 
Sig. (2-tailed) .326 .453 .650 
N 305 305 305 
NL17 
Correlation Coefficient .004 -.083 -.007 
Sig. (2-tailed) .946 .148 .899 
N 305 305 305 
NL18 
Correlation Coefficient .073 .076 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .205 .184 .722 
N 305 305 305 
OC1 
Correlation Coefficient -.121
*
 -.043 .017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .453 .765 
N 305 305 305 
OC2 
Correlation Coefficient -.087 -.022 .011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .132 .699 .847 
N 305 305 305 
OC3 
Correlation Coefficient -.116
*
 .024 .034 
Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .672 .556 
N 305 305 305 
OC4 
Correlation Coefficient -.056 .056 .047 
Sig. (2-tailed) .329 .326 .415 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
OC5 
Correlation Coefficient -.101 .003 -.014 
Sig. (2-tailed) .080 .965 .805 
N 305 305 305 
OC6 
Correlation Coefficient -.126
*
 .078 -.002 
Sig. (2-tailed) .028 .173 .974 
N 305 305 305 
GC1 
Correlation Coefficient -.158
**
 .005 -.011 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .926 .846 
N 305 305 305 
GC2 
Correlation Coefficient -.088 .087 .072 
Sig. (2-tailed) .126 .131 .210 
N 305 305 305 
GC3 
Correlation Coefficient -.121
*
 -.010 .027 
Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .859 .634 
N 305 305 305 
GC4 
Correlation Coefficient -.055 .003 .072 
Sig. (2-tailed) .335 .952 .209 
N 305 305 305 
GC5 
Correlation Coefficient -.153
**
 -.006 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .918 .721 
N 305 305 305 
GC6 
Correlation Coefficient -.044 -.127
*
 -.017 
Sig. (2-tailed) .445 .026 .773 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
NE1 
Correlation Coefficient -.070 -.027 -.055 
Sig. (2-tailed) .225 .643 .342 
N 305 305 305 
NE2 
Correlation Coefficient .059 -.022 -.032 
Sig. (2-tailed) .308 .700 .582 
N 305 305 305 
NE3 
Correlation Coefficient .051 .048 -.050 
Sig. (2-tailed) .378 .405 .387 
N 305 305 305 
NE4 
Correlation Coefficient .052 .048 -.104 
Sig. (2-tailed) .361 .400 .069 
N 305 305 305 
NE5 
Correlation Coefficient .032 .012 -.114
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .575 .841 .047 
N 305 305 305 
NE6 
Correlation Coefficient .064 -.066 -.153
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .262 .251 .007 
N 305 305 305 
NE7 
Correlation Coefficient .075 -.107 -.125
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .191 .061 .029 
N 305 305 305 
NE8 
Correlation Coefficient .066 -.095 -.151
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .250 .099 .008 
N 305 305 305 
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                 Population       Terror Risk 
Organized Crime 
Risk 
NE9 
Correlation Coefficient .027 -.108 -.147
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .634 .060 .010 
N 305 305 305 
NE10 
Correlation Coefficient .014 -.119
*
 -.162
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .809 .038 .005 
N 305 305 305 
NE11 
Correlation Coefficient .045 -.165
**
 -.140
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .432 .004 .014 
N 305 305 305 
NE12 
Correlation Coefficient .045 -.148
**
 -.165
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .433 .010 .004 
N 305 305 305 
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